Opinion
No. M2000-00614-COA-R3-CV.
Filed January 24, 2001. December 7, 2000 Session.
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 99-2695-II; Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor.
Reversed; and Remanded.
Scott K. Haynes, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Exxon Corporation.
Karl F. Dean, Shayna Abrams, and David Diaz-Barriga, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee and The Metropolitan Beer Permit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.
David R. Farmer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Ben H. Cantrell, J., joined. Holly K. Lillard, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINION
In 1999, Exxon acquired a business located at 1401 Charlotte Avenue in Nashville, Tennessee in order to construct a Tigermarket. The previous business had held a beer permit and had sold beer on the property since May 26, 1992. Exxon removed the existing structure and built a new building on a different site on the property. After the building had been completed, Exxon submitted an Application for a Beer Permit for its new business. The Metropolitan Beer Permit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro Beer Board") denied the application on the grounds that the new structure was less than 100 feet from a playground in violation of Metro Code. Exxon appealed this decision to the trial court, citing grandfather provisions under section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code. The trial court denied Exxon's petition seeking relief from the Metro Beer Board's denial of a permit. The trial court found that the grandfather clause in section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code did not apply in this case because `location' as listed in the statute referred to the physical structure of a building.
Exxon had previously obtained a conditional beer permit from the Metro Beer Board. The Metro Beer Board makes conditional approvals of beer permit applications before construction is complete in order to facilitate the application process. Applications are given final approval upon completion of the construction if the structure meets all the conditions required under the applicable Metropolitan Code section.
The issue, as we perceive it, is as follows:
Did the trial court err when it determined that Exxon was not entitled to protection under section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code?
Our review in this case with respect to the trial court's legal conclusions is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See, e.g., Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen and Ginsburg, P.A ., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999); Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d).
Statute Interpretation
Section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code states:
A city or county shall not suspend, revoke or deny a permit to a business engaged in selling, distributing or manufacturing beer on the basis of the proximity of the business to a school, residence, church, or other place of public gathering if a valid permit had been issued to any business on that same location as of January 1, 1993. This section shall not apply if beer is not sold, distributed or manufactured at that location during any continuous six-month period after January 1, 1993.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-109 (Supp. 2000).
Under the basic rules of statutory construction, "courts are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the Legislature within the four corners of the statute, unless an ambiguity requires resort elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent." Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co ., 655 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. 1983). A court must determine the "legislative . . . purpose . . . primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, when read in the context of the entire statute, without any forced or subtle construction to limit or extend the import of the language." Id . at 149 (quoting Worrall v. Kroger Co ., 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (1977)).
It is thus necessary to examine section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code and, using the "natural and ordinary meaning of the language used" within the statute, determine the intent of the legislature. Both the Appellant and the Appellee argue that the definition of the term `location' is controlling in this case. Exxon argues the "natural and ordinary" definition of location is the "designation of the boundaries of a particular piece of land." Black's Law Dictionary 847 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, Exxon contends, the Tigermart was constructed at the same location as the previous business and is entitled to the grandfather protection in the statute.
Metro Beer Board argues that the definition of `location' is the "site or place where something is or may be located." Id . Metro Beer Board cites several cases in which `location' has referred to the building in which beer was sold. See generally, Bostic v. Board of Comm'rs , 1992 WL 62013, at *1 (Tenn.Ct.App. March 31, 1992); Lones v. Blount County Beer Bd ., 538 S.W.2d 386 (Tenn. 1976); Needham v. Beer Bd ., 647 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. 1983). None of these cases, however, address the interpretation of the statute currently before this court. Metro Beer Board argues that as `location' refers to the building in which beer was previously sold, when Exxon demolished the existing structure to build the Tigermart, the location was changed. As such, Exxon was not entitled to the grandfather protection in section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code.
Metro Beer Board actually cites the seventh edition of Black's Law Dictionary in its arguments. This edition defines location as "[t]he specific place or position of a person or thing." Black's Law Dictionary 951 (7th ed. 1999). For consistency, we have cited from the fifth edition in this opinion as the differences in the definitions are minor.
Upon review by the court, it is clear that both definitions of `location' are correct. However, this court recognizes that the statute must be read in the context of the language of the entire statute. With an examination of all the language within the statute, it is possible to determine the legislative intent in using the word `location.'
Examining the statute, it is clear that the legislature intended to provide protection to businesses that had valid permits if that permit "had been issued to any business on that same location as of January 1, 1993." Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-109 (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). Thus, `location' must be examined in the context of its use in the part of the statute stating "on that same location." `On' is defined as "upon. . . at or in contact with [the] upper surface of a thing." Black's Law Dictionary 981 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, the phrase "on that same location" as used in the statute must refer to a business that sits upon that same location.
Comparing the definitions of the word `location' offered by both parties, it is clear that Exxon's definition of `location' is correct when examined in context with the remainder of the statute. The legislature clearly intended that in this statute "on that same location" would have the same meaning as "upon that same property." We believe that, had the legislature intended the definition contended by the Metro Beer Board, it would have written a statute allowing business "upon that same building" or "within the same building" to be protected under the grandfather provision. Metro Beer Board's interpretation of the statute is clearly not consistent with the "natural and ordinary meaning of the language used." Austin , 655 S.W.2d at 148.
With this opinion, we by no means suggest that the word `location' as used by the Legislature will always refer to the boundaries of property. It is merely our intention to reinforce the well-settled case law that the proper definition of a word should be determined through an examination of its use in the context of the language of the entire statute.
As this court is "restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the Legislature within the four corners of the statute," it is clear that Exxon meets the requirements set forth under section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code. Id . As such, the trial court was incorrect when it failed to grant Exxon's petition for relief and we remand this case to the trial court for rulings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is clear from the record and undisputed by the parties that Exxon met the six month requirement in the statute.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing conclusions, we hereby reverse the trial court's judgment. Costs on appeal are assessed against the Appellees, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, and the Metropolitan Beer Permit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, and their surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the phrase "on that same location" is not limited to the same building for which the prior beer permit was issued, and thus could include a newly-built structure, as in this case. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "the legislature clearly intended that in this statute `on that same location' would have the same meaning as `upon that same property.' " While the phrase "on that same location" indicates that it may refer to a new structure, the new structure must be in the same "location," that is, the same place. To hold that the term "location" in this statute means within the property's boundary lines considerably broadens the grandfather provision, which is intended to confer only a limited exception to the normal requirements for a beer permit.
In this case, the difference may be small, since it involves a relatively small piece of property. In a case involving a larger piece of property, the difference may be considerable. The obvious reason for the grandfather provision is to ensure that the situation with respect to neighboring landowners is at least no worse that it was when the statute became effective in 1993. If "location" means within the boundaries of the property lines, a neighboring landowner could end up much closer to the business which is selling beer. For example, if the property encompassed several acres and one end of the property was adjacent to a school, the property owner could demolish an existing, grandfathered business on the end of the property farthest away from the school, and erect a new, grandfathered structure next to the school. This cannot be the result intended by the legislature.
If the term "location" is deemed to mean the same "place," this need not be applied in a rigid or hypertechnical manner. I would hold that, under the statute, the new building must be built in the same place, for purposes that would be meaningful in the context of a beer permit statute. Thus, if the rear corner of the new building is four feet closer to the day care than was the old building, this would be a new building "on that same location" as the old building. On the other hand, if the new building is considerably larger and most of it is located much closer to the day care, this makes it more likely that the neighboring day care would suffer increased adverse effects from the flow of customers purchasing beer. The parties in this case dispute whether the new building was built in the same place as the prior building, noting that a portion of the new building is closer to a neighboring day care. In this case, I would reverse, but remand the case for a factual determination by the trial court of whether the new building is "on that same location" as the prior building, that is, in the same place, within the context of the grandfather exception to the beer permit requirements.