Opinion
No. 12–P–844.
2013-03-13
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. Julian HEINMETS & another, coexecutors.
By the Court (KANTROWITZ, BERRY & AGNES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS) sued the defendants, Julian Heinmets and Hilary Heinmets, in their capacities as coexecutors of the estate of Frances Heinmets, their mother (decedent). The decedent had received Medicaid benefits totaling $152,245.47 before her death, which EOHHS sought to recover from the estate pursuant to G.L. c. 118E, § 31. Summary judgment was granted in favor of EOHHS, and the defendants' motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), was denied. The defendants now appeal. We affirm.
Background. In 2006, the decedent began receiving Medicaid benefits. During the time she was receiving those benefits, she was institutionalized as a permanent resident in a nursing home. Throughout this period, the decedent owned a home, upon which EOHHS placed a lien. After the decedent died in 2009, EOHHS filed a notice with the Probate and Family Court indicating that it was seeking reimbursement from the estate under G.L. c. 118E, § 31( a )(1), ( b ) (1). By letter dated May 15, 2010, the attorney for the defendants denied the validity of the claim but did not state any grounds therefor or otherwise send EOHHS any documents showing that the estate was entitled to an exception from the requirements of G.L. c. 118E, § 31. In response to the defendants' denial of the validity of EOHHS's claim, EOHHS filed a complaint in Superior Court. The defendants, through their attorney, responded. EOHHS filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. The defendants filed a timely notice of appeal. Despite the pending appeal, the defendants also filed a motion pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The motion judge denied the motion “for the reasons articulated by [EOHHS] at the hearing and in its papers.” The defendants also filed a timely notice of appeal from that decision. Summary judgment. At issue is whether the Superior Court judge erred by allowing summary judgment on the question whether Julian Heinmets was eligible for an undue hardship waiver under G.L. c. 118E, § 31( b )(3), and 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 515.011(D) (2004).
The defendants claim that Julian was entitled to the exception because he met the requirements of financial hardship provided in the statute. Conversely, EOHHS contends that the defendants failed to comply with G.L. c. 118E, § 32( d ), and pursuant to the language of the statute, that failure is deemed an admission that no undue hardship conditions exist.
.General Laws c. 118E, § 31( b )(3), provides: “Recovery from Persons Age 55 and Over for Post–October 1, 1993 Medicaid: From the estate of an individual who was fifty-five years of age or older when he or she received such assistance, where such assistance was for services provided on or after October first, nineteen hundred and ninety-three. Any recovery may be made only after the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a
time when he or she has no surviving child who is under age twenty-one or is blind or permanently and totally disabled. The division shall waive recovery if such recovery would work an undue hardship, as defined by the division in its regulations.”
Title 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 515.011(D) (2004) states: “For claims presented on or after November 15, 2003, recovery will be waived if: (a) a sale of real property would be required to satisfy a claim against the member's estate; and (b) an individual who was using the property as a principal place of residence on the date of the member's death meets all of the following conditions: 1. the individual lived in the property on a continual basis for at least one year immediately before the now-deceased member became eligible for MassHealth ... and continues to live in the property at the time MassHealth first presented its claim for recovery against the deceased member's estate; 2. the individual has inherited or received an interest in the property from the deceased member's estate as defined in 130 C.M.R. 501.013(A)(2) and 515.01l(A)(2); 3. the individual is not being forced to sell the property by other devisees or heirs at law; and 4. at the time the Division first presented its claim for recovery ... the gross annual income of the person's family group ... was less than or equal to 133% of the applicable federal poverty level income standard for the appropriate family size.”
“A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature....” Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001). When an agency is charged with enforcing a particular statute, the courts will give the agency substantial deference in interpreting its own regulations. See Taylor v. Housing Appeals Comm., 451 Mass. 149, 154 (2008). As such, EOHHS's interpretation will not be overturned unless it is “patently wrong, unreasonable, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious.” Brookline v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Envtl. Quality Engr., 398 Mass. 404, 414 (1986).
In the present case, the sections that the defendants claim apply to them are subject to the provisions set forth in G.L. c. 118E, § 32( d ), as amended through St.2004, c. 149, § 168, which states in pertinent part:
“The executor or administrator shall have 60 days from the date of presentment to mail notice to the division by certified mail of one or more of the following findings ... (3) circumstances and conditions where the division will waive recovery for undue hardship under its regulations exist. A notice under clause
... (3) shall state the specific circumstances and conditions which exist and provide supporting documentation satisfactory to the division .... Failure to mail notice under clause (3) shall be deemed an admission that the circumstances and conditions for the division to waive recovery for undue hardship under its regulations do not exist.” (Emphasis added.)
Here the record reveals that the defendants failed to provide any supporting documentation that was satisfactory to the division within sixty days. The defendants through their attorney merely sent a letter stating that “they disagreed” with the claim but neither stated any reasons nor provided any documentary proof. The statute clearly states that failure to provide such documentation will be deemed an admission that undue hardship does not exist. The failure to produce any supporting documentation in this case means that, under the statute, hardship was not proved by the defendants. Accordingly, there was no error in the Superior Court judge's summary judgment determination.
Rule 60 motion. The defendants filed a motion for relief from judgment under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), claiming that any failure to substantiate their undue hardship or deferral claim as required under the statute was attributable to their prior counsel.
The defendants however fare no better in their appeal from the denial of their motion. First, mistakes by prior counsel ordinarily are insufficient to allow a rule 60(b)(1) motion. Tai v.. Boston, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 220, 222–223 (1998). Further, they still failed to provide specific circumstances with supporting documentation to support their claims.
We note at the outset that, contrary to the position taken by EOHHS, the appeal was not entered in this court until May 22, 2012, and the trial court thus retained jurisdiction over the case at the time the motion was filed on November 10, 2011, and decided on February 6, 2012. See Garland v. Beverly Hosp. Corp., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 913, 915 n. 5 (1999) (judge could have ruled on rule 60[b] motion if he so chose “because the appeal had not yet been docketed in the Appeals Court”); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 350, 351 n. 2 (2001) (“[T]he determinative jurisdictional date is the date of entry of the appeal in the appellate court and not the date of filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court”). Cf. Reporters' Notes to Rule 60(a), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, at 1125 (LexisNexis 2012–2013) (“The taking of an appeal does not divest the trial court of power to correct errors. However, once the case is docketed in the appellate court, the trial court can only grant relief after first obtaining the appellate court's leave”).
While the defendant Julian Heinmets provided an affidavit stating the reasons he qualified for a waiver or deferral, he failed to include any supporting documentation. He neither provided any medical documentation of his disability nor of his limited income.
We have reviewed all of the other arguments of the defendants and find them to be without merit.
For these reasons as well as for substantially those in the brief of the plaintiff and those provided by the judge below, the judgment and the order denying the motion for relief from judgment are affirmed.
So ordered.