Opinion
WR-65 137-04
09-22-2021
EX PARTE CLINTON LEE YOUNG, Applicant
Do Not Publish
ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN CAUSE NO. CR-27181-D IN THE 385TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT MIDLAND COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
This is a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in a capital case filed pursuant to the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071, § 5.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Articles are to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Applicant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in April 2003. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Young v. State, No. AP-74, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2005) (not designated for publication).
In March 2005, Applicant filed his initial postconviction application for a writ of habeas corpus (our -01) in the trial court, raising fourteen claims. In January, March, and June 2006, Applicant filed pleadings that we determined to be his first subsequent writ application (our -02), which raised nine additional claims. This Court denied relief on Applicant's initial postconviction application for writ of habeas corpus and dismissed his first subsequent application as an abuse of the writ. Ex parte Young, Nos. WR-65, 137-01 and WR-65, 137-02 (Tex. Crim App. Dec. 20, 2006) (not designated for publication).
Applicant filed his second subsequent habeas application (our -03), in which he raised four claims, in the trial court in March 2009. We denied relief on one claim and dismissed the rest. Ex parte Young, No. WR-65, 137-03 (Tex. Crim. App. June 20, 2012) (not designated for publication); Ex parte Young, No. WR-65, 137-03 (Tex. Crim. App. June 3, 2009) (not designated for publication).
Applicant filed his third subsequent habeas application (our -04, which is the subject of this order) in the trial court on October 2, 2017, raising eight claims. We found that Applicant's first claim, in which he contends that the State unknowingly used false or misleading testimony at trial, met the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5, and we remanded that claim to the trial court for consideration. Ex parte Young, No. WR-65, 137-04 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017) (not designated for publication).
While the case was on remand, Applicant filed his fourth subsequent habeas application (our -05) in the trial court on August 14, 2020. In that application, Applicant presents three claims based on newly discovered information that one of the prosecutors representing the State in Applicant's capital murder case was also employed as a "judicial clerk" for the trial judge during Applicant's trial and initial postconviction proceedings. We concluded that Applicant's claims met the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5, and we remanded all three claims to the trial court for consideration. Ex parte Young, Nos. WR-65, 137-04 and WR-65, 137-05 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2020) (not designated for publication).
The habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing via Zoom. After the hearing, the habeas judge signed an order adopting Applicant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommending to this Court that relief be granted on the claims asserted in Applicant's fourth subsequent habeas application (the -05). The habeas court did not consider the remanded claim of the third subsequent habeas application (the -04 claim) at the hearing, nor did the court generate any findings or conclusions concerning that claim or make a recommendation as to relief on that claim.
On this day, we hand down our opinion in Ex parte Clinton Lee Young, No. WR-65, 137-05 (Tex. Crim. App. DATE, 2021) (not designated for publication), in which we grant relief on Applicant's fourth subsequent habeas application (the -05) and remand Applicant's case for a new trial. In light of that opinion, we dismiss Applicant's remanded claim of his third subsequent habeas application (the -04) without reaching the merits of the claim. Even if the State unknowingly used false testimony at Applicant's trial, any error is cured by the grant of relief on the -05 writ application. The remainder of Applicant's claims are dismissed as an abuse of the writ. See Art. 11.071, § 5.
IT IS SO ORDERED.