Opinion
NO. WR-75,296-02
11-27-2013
EX PARTE CHARLES G. RUIZ, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. 1993CR0904 IN THE 175TH DISTRICT COURT
FROM BEXAR COUNTY
Per curiam .
ORDER
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). A jury convicted Applicant of aggravated sexual assault of a child and assessed a sentence of sixty-five years' imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and Applicant's petition for discretionary review was refused. Ruiz v. State, 04-94-00060-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 5, 1995).
Applicant, through habeas counsel, alleges 128 claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IAC). He also complains in several issues that he was denied due process and a fair trial. The claims were remanded to the trial court to hold a live evidentiary hearing, and the trial court conducted the hearing in which Applicant, his trial counsel, and other witnesses testified.
After a review of the writ record, which includes a transcription of the writ hearing, and after reviewing the record on appeal, which this Court obtained from the appellate court and which includes a transcription of the testimony given at trial, the appellate briefs, and the district clerk's record, it appears to this Court that trial counsel was deficient in some respects when Applicant's case was tried in 1993. Applicant, however, fails to show that any of these deficiencies harmed him at his trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
The child testified that Applicant had sexually abused him, and Applicant and his wife, who was the child's mother, testified that the acts could not have occurred, giving their reasons. Trial counsel questioned witnesses regarding motives the child's biological father may have had to convince the child to fabricate the allegations, and counsel argued, inter alia, that there was no physical evidence suggesting that any sexual abuse had ever occurred. The credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the jury to determine, and as evidenced by the guilty verdict, the jury believed the testimony of the child and the prosecution's witnesses and not Applicant and the defense witnesses. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lafoon v. State, 543 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
In presenting the 128 claims in the writ application and at the writ hearing, Applicant has focused almost entirely on trial counsel's deficiencies. He has failed, however, to demonstrate that representation by a more competent trial counsel could have led to a different result, as to undermine confidence in the jury's verdict, and he has failed to show that he was denied a fair trial due to the assistance of his trial counsel. See Strickland, supra. Further, Applicant's delay in seeking relief from his 1993 conviction has prejudiced the credibility of his claims, including his claim that he would have accepted a plea offer if counsel had better explained it to him. See Ex parte Young, 479 S.W.2d 45, 46-7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012).
This Court holds that Applicant's IAC claims lack merit, and his remaining claims are procedurally barred. See Strickland, supra; Ex parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d 189, 198-200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). After this Court's independent review of the writ and appellate records, relief is denied. Do not publish