In Ex parte Deveraux, 389 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Cr.App. 1965), and Ex parte Watson, 154 Tex.Crim. R., 225 S.W.2d 850 (1949), this court held that the penalty provisions of city ordinances were void where they provided a penalty different from that provided in the statute. Also, in Ex parte Farley, 65 Tex.Crim.

In Ex parte Devereaux, 389 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Cr.App. 1965), and Ex parte Watson, 154 Tex.Crim. R., 225 S.W.2d 850 (1949), this court held that the penalty provisions of city ordinances were void where they provided a penalty different from that provided in the statute. The Legislature has enacted speeding restrictions for the State. Article 6701d, V.A.C.S., provides in § 166(a) that no person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing and that any speed in excess of the limits specified in said section "or established as herein before authorized" shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge. Appellant was convicted in the Corporation Court of the City of Houston for speeding, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $200. Appellant appealed this conviction to the County Court at Law No. 3 of Harris County, where upon a trial de novo his punishment was assessed at a fine of $101. His appeal to this Court is predicated upon the sole contention that the Corporation Court conviction was 'voidable' because the fine assessed was greater than is provided by Article 827a, Section 9-b Vernon's Ann.P.C. Reliance is had upon Ex parte Watson, 154 Tex.Crim. 167, 225 S.W.2d 850. Appellant overlooks the fact that this Court in its opinion on rehearing in Ex parte Seals, 158 Tex.Crim. R., 255 S.W.2d 215, overruled that portion of Ex parte Watson, supra, which held that the punishment for a violation of Section 8 of Article 827a was to be found in Section 9-b of that Act and held that Section 15 of the Act contained the provision for punishment.

The opinion of this Court on the appeal of this conviction found that Article 534a was void and, being void, did not repeal Article 534, that both Articles denounced the crime of which appellant was convicted, and that the court which tried the appellant had jurisdiction of the offense denounced by Article 534. Reliance is had upon Ex parte Watson, 154 Tex.Crim. R., 225 S.W.2d 850. In that case, we held an ordinance of the City of Clarksville void because the maximum punishment provided by such ordinance was different from that provided in a State statute which defined substantially the same offense.

A city ordinance is invalid if it prescribes a greater, lesser, or different punishment than that fixed by state law for the same unlawful act. SeeHoneycutt v. State, 627 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Young v. State, 267 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1954); Ex ParteWatson, 225 S.W.2d 850, 851-52 (1949); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0048 (1999) at 2. "If the state denounces an offense and fixes the punishment for it, and the city or town undertakes to pass an ordinance punishing the same offense, then the ordinance must be the same as the state law both as to definition and as to punishment."

Plaintiff thereafter was re-arrested on capias pro fine, and sued out a writ of habeas corpus before a District Judge in Dallas County. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in Ex parte Watson, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 167, 225 S.W.2d 850, ordered plaintiff's release and discharge and held that the ordinance of the City of Clarksville under which plaintiff had been arrested and convicted was void. Thereafter plaintiff employed attorney Fred Ramsey of Dallas, who brought suit against defendant Lemon, his bondsman, Standard Accident Insurance Company, and the City of Clarksville for false arrest.