Opinion
No. 05-16-01106-CR
02-07-2017
EX PARTE SHUNDALE TAYLOR
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F16-75497-Q
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Evans, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Schenck
Shundale Taylor appeals the trial court's order denying relief on her pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a reduction in bail. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reduce her bail to an amount sufficiently high to ensure her appearance, but not so high as to be an instrument of oppression. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court's order.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was indicted for murder. Her pretrial bail was set initially at $500,000 and later reduced to $150,000. Appellant filed the current writ application to challenge the amount of bail as excessive. Appellant's writ application alleged she had lived in Dallas, Texas all of her life, has two children enrolled in the Dallas Independent School District, has been employed since she was seventeen years old, and could only afford a $25,000 bond.
During a brief hearing on the writ application, appellant's girlfriend, Jelicia Linwood, testified she and appellant had lived together in an apartment with appellant's two small children for a year-and-a-half before the offense. During the time Linwood had known her, appellant had been working at Walmart and was receiving child support until her arrest. Linwood was a nightclub dancer.
Linwood had hired an attorney to represent appellant to get her bail reduced. Linwood estimated that she could raise $2,500 toward appellant's bond and intimated that appellant's family and friends were willing to "give what they could," but they could not raise the $15,000 necessary to secure a $150,000 bond. Linwood testified that if appellant was released on bond, appellant would live with appellant's mother because her mother has a landline phone for electronic monitoring. Linwood testified appellant was not a danger to the community, she was not a violent person, she had not had any trouble in jail, and Linwood was aware appellant had a previous assault case that had been dismissed. Linwood testified appellant had been born in Dallas County, had gone to school there, and had no relatives anywhere else.
Linwood testified the offense occurred when she and appellant left their apartment and were confronted in the parking lot by a group of fifteen-to-twenty people who arrived in five vehicles. The group had come to support Dajee Dillard, a woman who intended to fight Linwood over a dispute arising from their workplace. Linwood testified that men in one vehicle had guns. The crowd rushed in close around the combatants and the fight commenced. Linwood did not see the murder take place, but she was aware that as she was fighting Dillard, appellant rushed in to break up the fight, telling everyone to get away, brandishing her pistol, and fired a warning shot into the air. The complainant rushed in to, in Linwood's estimation, "attack" appellant, leading to the fatal shooting. Linwood testified that she and appellant were warned to leave and did so, leading to a chase on the freeway during which someone fired at them. After speaking to her mother, appellant agreed to turn herself in to officers.
Appellant's mother, Chantel Taylor, testified appellant is twenty-five years old and left high school to work after having two children. Taylor is caring for four children including appellant's two children and she has a pending disability case. Taylor denied having any "extra money" to put toward appellant's bail and specifically denied that she could afford $15,000 for appellant's bond. Taylor affirmed appellant had two prior marijuana cases that had been resolved, that appellant had hired her own attorney for the marijuana cases, and that appellant could hire her own attorney for the pending case. Taylor testified that appellant had never been out of Texas, and all of appellant's relatives live in Dallas County. Taylor opined that a $25,000 bond would be sufficient to guarantee appellant's appearance for trial. Taylor denied appellant would be a threat to the community.
Counsel represented to the trial court that he had prepared the writ application for free, but appellant and Lindale intended to retain him for the remainder of the case. The defense also admitted into evidence a copy of the Dallas County Recommended Bond Schedule and argued to the trial court that the bond recommended for appellant's offense was $25,000.
The State called Dallas homicide detective Duncan Wilkins to impeach Lindale's testimony. Wilkins testified he had discovered that Lindale and Dillard had scheduled the fight at the offense location in a series of posts on Facebook and phone messages back and forth during the afternoon before the offense. Wilkins was aware of allegations that some of the people arriving for the fight were armed, but he was unable to substantiate that anyone was armed or fired weapons other than appellant. Wilkins testified that a cellphone video shot during the fight did not show anyone else with a gun. The State also introduced into evidence jail records showing appellant had been transferred to another cell block after she and three other prisoners had bullied two other jail inmates.
The trial court denied relief. In deciding not to order any further reduction in the bond amount, the trial court orally stated that the bond to be set is discretionary with the trial court and "not governed exclusively by the bond schedule." The trial court further stated that it thought $150,000 was appropriate bail "given the totality of the circumstances and the nature of this offense" and the allegation that appellant "brought a gun to a fistfight. . . ."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An applicant for habeas corpus relief must prove the applicant's claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In reviewing the trial court's order, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and we uphold the ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id. The trial court, as fact finder at the writ hearing, is the exclusive judge of witness credibility. Ex parte Amezquita, 223 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We afford almost total deference to a trial court's factual findings when those findings are based upon credibility and demeanor. Id. If, however, the trial court's determinations are questions of law, or else are mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an evaluation of witnesses' credibility and demeanor, then we owe no deference to the trial court's determinations and review them de novo. State v. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d 587, 596-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
In a habeas challenge to the amount of bail, it is the accused's burden of proof to show that the bail set by the trial court is excessive. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). We review the trial court's determination for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 850; Ex parte Miller, 442 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles or if its actions are arbitrary or unreasonable. Miller, 442 S.W.3d at 481. It does not constitute an abuse of discretion for the trial court merely to decide a matter within its discretion in a different manner than the appellate court would under similar circumstances. Id.
ANALYSIS
The primary purpose of a bond is to secure the accused's presence at trial. Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The code of criminal procedure provides:
The amount of bail to be required in any case is to be regulated by the court, judge, magistrate or officer taking the bail; they are to be governed in the exercise of this discretion by the Constitution and by the following rules:TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 2015).
1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.
2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression.
3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered.
4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point.
5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be considered.
In determining a reasonable bail, courts may also consider an accused's work record, family and community ties, length of residency, prior criminal record, conformity with previous bond conditions as well as the existence of any other bonds, and any aggravating circumstances of the charged offense. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849-50.
Appellant contends the $150,000 bail is oppressive because the evidence shows she does not have the ability to raise enough money to secure her release. Appellant contends Linwood's account of the offense shows the large crowd of onlookers were "menacing" both her and appellant, that men in the crowd were armed, the deceased was interfering with appellant's efforts to stop the fight despite appellant's firing of a warning shot, and appellant contacted police to turn herself in. Appellant contends the record shows she has the ability to pay only a $25,000 bond. Appellant contends the State put on no evidence about how her release would affect the future safety of the community. She points to her own evidence showing she would have a place to stay with her mother and she would be able to make arrangements for whatever monitoring systems the trial court deemed appropriate. Finally, appellant contends the trial court totally failed to consider the other factors addressed in Rubac despite the record showing she has strong and exclusive ties to Dallas County, an offense history of only two misdemeanors, and has always appeared in court when required.
Regarding the amount of the bond and appellant's ability to pay, the accused's ability or inability to make bail is only one factor the trial court must consider in setting bail and is not dispositive. See Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Miller, 442 S.W.3d at 482. As the State points out, appellant presented scant evidence of her ability to pay the bond. There was no evidence before the trial court of appellant's income, expenses, or assets. Appellant had filed a request for appointed counsel listing her income and assets as zero. The trial court found appellant indigent and appointed counsel initially. During the hearing, however, the testimony established appellant had been working and receiving child support up until the time she was incarcerated. Linwood admitted that she and appellant's family and friends could afford some type of bond, and appellant's mother testified appellant had used retained counsel for her legal cases in the past and could do so now. Appellant's trial counsel represented to the trial court that he anticipated being retained and paid by appellant.
The record shows the trial court heard and weighed evidence bearing on the standards for setting bail laid out in article 17.15 and in Rubac. Given the charge against appellant, the spotty and incomplete evidence of her financial resources, the testimony of Lindale and Wilkins that appellant chose to use deadly force against an unarmed man during a fistfight, and the jail report that appellant had to be transferred because she had been bullying other inmates, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief and leaving pretrial bail set at $150,000. See, e.g., Ex parte Ragston, 422 S.W.3d 904, 908-09 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (affirming $250,000 bail in capital murder case); Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 148-51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (concluding $500,000 bail for murder and attempted murder offenses was reasonable); Richardson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 756, 759-60 (Tex. App.—Waco, no pet.) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to reduce $200,000 bail for murder defendant); Ex parte Davis, 147 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App. —Waco 2004, no pet.) (reducing $1,000,000 pretrial bail for two murder defendants to $500,000 and $750,000). We overrule appellant's sole issue on appeal.
We affirm the trial court's order denying relief on appellant's pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus.
/David J. Schenck/
DAVID J. SCHENCK
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47 161106F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F16-75497-Q.
Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. Justices Bridges and Evans participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the order of the trial court denying relief on appellant's pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 7th day of February, 2017.