Opinion
04-21-00475-CR
08-24-2022
EX PARTE Paul Anthony SANCHEZ
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the 456th District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. 21-1341-CV-A Honorable Heather H. Wright, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
REBECA C. MARTINEZ, CHIEF JUSTICE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Appellant Paul Anthony Sanchez challenges the trial court's order denying his pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking release on personal bond or bail reduction. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Background
On June 23, 2021, Sanchez applied for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking pretrial release because the State was not ready for trial within ninety days of the commencement of his detention as required by article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, § 1(1). The trial court held a hearing.
At the hearing, the evidence showed that Sanchez had been arrested on February 25, 2021 on five felony charges: burglary of a habitation, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02; possession of a controlled substance in penalty group 1 or 1-B, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d); theft, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(5); possession of a controlled substance in penalty group 2, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.116(b); and fraudulent use or possession of identifying information, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.51(c)(2). The evidence also showed that Sanchez had been held in jail continuously for more than ninety days. Based on these facts, Sanchez argued that because the State was not ready for trial on the unindicted charges, he was entitled to release on personal bond or by a bond reduction on those charges. The trial court denied the writ and Sanchez appealed.
Sanchez was arrested on eight felony charges and one misdemeanor charge. At the time of the habeas corpus hearing, Sanchez had been given personal recognizance on the misdemeanor charge and had been indicted on three of the eight felony charges. Sanchez only challenges the five unindicted felonies.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review the trial court's order denying a pretrial habeas corpus application for an abuse of discretion. Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ex parte Sifuentes, 639 S.W.3d 842, 847 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2022, pet. ref'd). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles. Ex parte Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d 160, 161 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, pet. ref'd).
Article 17.151, "Release because of delay," provides, in pertinent part:
A defendant who is detained in jail pending trial of an accusation against him must be released either on personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail required, if the state is not ready for trial of the criminal action for which he is being detained within . . . 90 days from the commencement of his detention if he is accused of a felony[.]Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, § 1(1). Article 17.151, section 1 is mandatory. Ex parte Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d at 430. Under this section, a judge has two alternatives when the State is not ready for trial within ninety days after an accused's arrest on a felony charge: "either release the accused upon personal bond or reduce the bond amount." Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d at 429; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, § 1(1). Section 2(2) of article 17.151, however, provides that: "The provisions of this article do not apply to a defendant who is . . . being detained pending trial of another accusation against the defendant as to which the applicable period has not yet elapsed." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, § 2(2).
Analysis
Sanchez argues the trial court abused its discretion by not reducing his bond amount or releasing him on a personal bond when the evidence showed that the State was not ready for trial within ninety days of his arrest. The State concedes that the trial court erred when it denied Sanchez's writ of habeas corpus.
It is undisputed that Article 17.151 was triggered in this case. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, § 1(1). At the time that he filed his writ of habeas corpus, Sanchez had been detained for 118 days, and the State was not ready for trial because indictments had not been filed on the challenged charges. See id.; see also Ex parte Shaw, No. 02-12-00116-CR, 2012 WL 6632926, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Dec. 21, 2012) ("Because the State stipulated that indictments were not filed on those cases, it could not have been ready to try them." (citing Kernahan v. State, 657 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). Therefore, the trial court only had two options: to release Sanchez on personal bond or reduce the bond amount to an amount he could afford to pay. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, § 1(1); Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d at 429.
At the hearing, the State argued that the exception in section 2 of Article 17.151 applied because Sanchez was being held on other indicted charges. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, § 2(2) ("The provisions of this article do not apply to a defendant who is . . . detained pending trial of another accusation . . . as to which the applicable period has not yet elapsed[.]"). However, as the State recognizes on appeal, Sanchez was not being detained pending trial of other accusations as "to which the applicable period ha[d] not elapsed," as the exception requires. See id. Rather, he was being detained pending trial of other accusations as to which the applicable period had elapsed. See id. Therefore, the exception in section 2 of Article 17.151 does not apply and the trial court should have issued an order reducing Sanchez's bond amount or releasing him on personal bond. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, §§ 1(1), 2(2). Because the terms of Article 17.151 are mandatory, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion. See id.; see also Ex parte Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d at 927; Ex parte Shaw, 2012 WL 6632926, at *3.
Conclusion
Having held that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse the trial court's order denying habeas relief and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings including releasing Appellant on personal bond or reducing the amount of bail required in the five cases that formed the basis for the writ.