While the statute provides that a requisition may be based upon "a copy of an indictment found," there are decisions to the effect that the act can not be construed to exclude a case where a charge is brought in the form of a criminal information in a State in which it is a proper method of charging a person with the commission of a crime. In re Gundy, 30 Okla. Cr. 390 ( 236 P. 440); Morrison v. Dwyer, 143 Iowa, 502 ( 121 N.W. 1064); People v. Stockwell, 135 Michigan 341 (97 N.W. 765); In re Hooper, 52 Wisconsin 699 (58 N.W. 741); Ex parte Nash, 44 F.2d 403; In re Davis, 68 California App. Rep. 798 ( 158 P.2d 36); Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Cr. 144 ( 129 P.2d 204); People v. Smith, 352 Ill. 496 ( 186 N.E. 159); Cook v. Rodger, 215 Ind. 500 ( 20 N.E.2d 933); In the Matter of Strauss, 197 U.S. 324 ( 49 L. ed. 774); In re Van Sciever, 42 Neb. 772, 778 (60 N.W.. 1037); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 55 Pa. Super., 435. Though there are decisions to the contrary, it seems that the foregoing is a better interpretation of the intent of the statute, and more especially so where there has been a conviction and sentence.

J.E. Taylor, Attorney General, and Gordon P. Weir, Assistant Attorney General, for relator. (1) The court erred in holding that an unverified information was not sufficient upon which to base a request for extradition. Moore on Extradition, sec. 551, p. 875; Ex parte Nash, 44 F.2d 403; Ex parte Ryan, 129 P.2d 204; Sec. 303, Title 22, Chap. 4, p. 112, (Okla. Ann. Stat.): Ex parte Talley, 4 Okla. Cr. 398, 112 P. 36, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 805; Ritchie v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. 188, 122 P. 944; Henson v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 201, 114 P. 630; Heacock v. State, 4 Okla. Cr. 606, 112 P. 949; Constitution of Okla., Sec. 17, Art.

Matter of Strauss, supra, and other authorities are there cited in support of the foregoing statement of the law. Also see Ex parte Nash, 44 F.2d 403; People v. Enright, 112 Misc. 568 [184 N.Y.S. 248, 250-251], affd. 188 N.Y.S. 945; Cook v. Rodger, 215 Ind. 500 [ 20 N.E.2d 933]; Ex parte Rogers, 33 Okla. Crim. 82 [ 242 P. 781]; Morrison v. Dwyer, 143 Iowa 502 [121 N.W. 1064]; Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Crim. 144 [ 129 P.2d 204, 207]. Section 1548.2 of our Penal Code is not inconsistent with section 2 of article IV of the Constitution of the United States, nor does the federal statute, section 662, title 18, U.S.C.A., purport to exclude legislation by the states in aid of the purposes of the constitutional provision, which are not for the benefit of an alleged fugitive, but to secure his presence for trial in the courts of the state where he is charged with crime.

It is a well-recognized rule of law that a bill of information will be sufficient to order an interstate extradition of a fugitive when a bill of information is recognized by the demanding state as being sufficient to charge the fugitive with the crime therein set forth. People ex rel. Matochick v. Baker, 280 App. Div. 1025, 116 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756, Aff. 306 N.Y. 32, 114 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1952); Ex Parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Cr. 144, 129 P.2d 204, 207 (1942). The application of the Governor of Louisiana for extradition of the prisoner states on its face that "The requisition asked for said fugitive is not sought for the purpose of collecting a debt or confirming a civil remedy, or to answer any other private end whatever."

We think the warrant of extradition was properly issued. While there is merit in the view taken in the MacSherry case ( supra) that an information is a sufficient compliance with the Federal statute, and while there is ample authority in support of that view ( State ex rel. Webster v. Moeller, 191 Minn. 193, 195; Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Cr. 144, 148-149; Matter of Hooper, 52 Wis. 699, 703; 81 A.L.R. 552 et seq.; Spear on Extradition [3d ed.], p. 363; see Matter of Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 332-333), we predicate our determination herein on the theory, expressed in the Hollander case ( supra), that a State may enact legislation to supplement the Federal statute by permitting extradition on less exacting terms than those imposed by the latter statute. This theory has already been acknowledged in other jurisdictions, in treatises, and by those who prepared the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ( Gulley v. Apple, 213 Ark. 350, 357; Matter of Davis, 68 Cal.App.2d 798; Stark v. Livermore, 3 N.J. Super. 94, 98-99; Ex parte Bledsoe, 93 Okla. Cr. 302; 22 Am. Jur., Extradition, p. 250, n. 1; 9 Uniform Laws Ann., p. 170).

The judge was correct in denying requests numbered 7 and 8, which ignored the existence of a method authorized in the Federal and the State statutes alike. See Goodale v. Splain, 42 App. D.C. 235, 239; People v. Mulcahy, 392 Ill. 290, 292-293; State v. Moeller, 191 Minn. 193, 195; Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Cr. 144, 148-149. See also Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223.

The Criminal Court of Appeals has uniformly held that the burden is on the habeas corpus petitioner to prove allegations of petition. Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Cr. 144, 129 P.2d 204; Ex parte Seale, 75 Okla. Cr. 183, 129 P.2d 862, certiorari denied Seale v. Hunt, 317 U.S. 696, 63 S.Ct. 436, 87 L.Ed. 557; In re Hazel, 80 Okla. Cr. 66, 157 P.2d 225. And see Davis v. Rhyne, 181 Kan. 443, 312 P.2d 626, and Engling v. Edmondson, 175 Kan. 883, 267 P.2d 487, where that court held that in habeas corpus proceedings the burden is upon petitioner to prove the grounds upon which he relies for his release, and that the unsupported statements of a petitioner do not meet the requirements of the proof.

Further, in habeas corpus proceedings, the burden is upon petitioner to prove the grounds upon which he relies for his release, and the unsupported statements of a petitioner do not meet the requirements of proof. Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Cr. 144, 129 P.2d 204; Ex parte Steale, 75 Okla. Cr. 183, 129 P.2d 862, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 696, 63 S.Ct. 436, 87 L.Ed. 557; Davis v. Rhyne, 181 Kan. 443, 312 P.2d 626; Engling v. Edmondson, 175 Kan. 883, 267 P.2d 487. The petitioner also seeks a record of the testimony presented at the time of the revocation of his suspended sentence.

The petitioner does not attack the regularity or the sufficiency of the papers upon which the Governor of Oklahoma acted in the issuance of the warrant on foreign requisition. See Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Cr. 144, 129 P.2d 204, 206, wherein this court said: "The proceedings being regular in form, it is incumbent upon the petitioner for habeas corpus, seeking to defeat extradition to establish that he is not a fugitive from justice."

" The complaint being sufficient to charge the crime of rape in the first degree and it appearing that the petitioner was within the State of California, at the time or times alleged, his second contention that he is not a fugitive from justice is wholly without merit. Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okla. Cr. 144, 129 P.2d 204. In relation to the petitioner's third contention that the prosecution, in California, was not brought in good faith, it has been held by this court in Ex parte Welborn, 69 Okla. Cr. 282, 102 P.2d 624, 625, quoting the court: