Criminal contempt, from the earliest days of the common law, springs from the inherent power of the courts to protect the judicial system established by the people as the proper and official method of settling disputes. Mechanic v. Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Mo.App. 1970); Ex parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Mo.App. 1980); State ex rel. Girard v. Percich, 557 S.W.2d 25, 36 (Mo.App. 1977); Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W.2d 1005, 1012, 29 A.L.R.2d 1141 (Mo. banc 1951), cert. den., 343 U.S. 953, 72 S.Ct. 1046, 96 L.Ed. 1354 (1952). Contempts are also logically arranged and divided into direct and constructive or indirect. Ex parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S.W. 990, 996 (1907); McMilian v. Rennau, 619 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Mo.App. 1981).

"The distinction between criminal contempt and civil contempt is not always clear and '[t]here can be contempts in which both civil and criminal elements appear.'" Ex parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Mo.App. 1980) (quoting State ex rel. Jarboe v. Holt, 444 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Mo.banc 1969)). "'Although at times the line is hard to draw, the essential difference lies in who is sought to be protected by the contempt proceeding.'"

We agree with respondent's suggestion that a judgment of civil contempt is appealable and that habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. Accordingly, we look not to the sufficiency of the evidence but only to the propriety of the record in order to determine the legality of petitioner's incarceration in this proceeding. See Ex Parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Mo.App. 1980). Because the purpose of civil contempt is to enforce compliance with a judgment or court order, the legality of the contemnor's restraint is dependent upon his ability to purge himself by compliance.

Habeas corpus also is available to determine the legality of a petitioner's restraint insofar as it can be determined from the face of the record. Ex parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Mo.App. 1980). The marriage of the parties was dissolved on November 7, 1983.

Although an appeal lies from a judgment of civil contempt, habeas corpus is also available as a means of determining the legality of a petitioner's restraint insofar as it may be determined from the face of the record. Ex Parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Mo.App. 1980). It is well established that a judgment or commitment order in a contempt proceeding which fails to recite the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense, but merely states legal conclusions, cannot stand. Ex Parte Brown, 530 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Mo. banc 1975); In re Marriage of Allison, 649 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Mo.App. 1983); Leslie v. Leslie, 620 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Mo.App. 1981); Ex Parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 891-92 (Mo.App. 1980).

Respondent's argument fails because the statute has not "shorn" contempt power from the court. The courts have recognized that although the power to punish for contempt is inherent, it has been, and is, the subject of statutory enactment, Ex Parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 890-91 (Mo.App. 1980), and the requirements of the statute are mandatory. Ex Parte Hough, 544 S.W.2d 333, 334. In Chicago A. Ry. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170, 118 S.W. 86 (1909), the court confronted the issue of what power the legislature had to limit the court's inherent contempt power.

We do not consider this contention because in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as opposed to a direct appeal, the legality of the civil contemnor's restraint may be considered only insofar as it can be determined from the face of the record. Ex Parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Mo.App. 1980); Roark v. Roark, 723 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Mo.App. 1986). In order for a contempt judgment and commitment to be valid, the trial court must make findings regarding the delinquent party's ability to pay.

The trial court did not indicate, and we cannot determine, whether the contempt it found was civil or criminal in nature. There is no right of appeal from a judgment of criminal contempt. Ex Parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Mo. App. S.D. 1980). The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is reflected in whether the remedy is coercive or punitive.

The respondent judge refers to the transcript, incorporated by the order of contempt into that adjudication, to show that the relator Tannenbaum "adopted a studied and deliberate practice of interrupting the court throughout the proceedings," although "ordered not to interrupt" and "warned that her interruptions were contemptuous." Of course, the transcript can only be used to show that notwithstanding the facts recited as constituting the contempt, there was in actual fact no contempt. Ex parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 892[7] (Mo.App. 1980). That is because the court cannot make contempt of that which is not contempt, and proof that there was in fact no contempt avoids the judgment.

' State ex rel. Jarboe v. Holt, 444 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Mo. banc 1969)." Ex parte Ryan, 607 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Mo.App. 1980). (Footnote omitted.)