Nos. 05-05-00939-CR, 05-05-00947-CR
Opinion issued October 17, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. 2005-2-381, 2005-2-382. Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and RICHTER.
Opinion By Justice MORRIS.
In these cases, Manuel Medina Ruiz filed applications for writ of habeas corpus challenging the voluntariness of his guilty pleas. Following a hearing, the trial court denied appellant the relief he sought. Appellant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying him habeas corpus relief because his pleas were rendered involuntary by violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, articles 26.01 and 26.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and section 80.100 of the Texas Administrative Code. We affirm the trial court's orders.
Factual Background
Appellant pleaded guilty to two offenses of assault involving family violence. Pursuant to plea agreements, the trial court assessed punishment in each case at 365 days' confinement in jail, probated for two years, and a $300 fine. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision. Thereafter, appellant filed the applications for writ of habeas corpus challenging the original guilty pleas. At the hearing on appellant's applications for writ of habeas corpus, Melida Ailshire, an interpreter, testified that her records showed she acted as an interpreter on the day appellant entered his guilty pleas. Ailshire had no independent recollection of appellant's specific hearing. Ailshire testified that she has been an interpreter for nine years and has interpreted for many defendants who do not have lawyers. When Ailshire is called upon to act as an interpreter, she is instructed to give information to the defendant about what he or she is signing. She translates the defendant's rights to the defendant as they are told to her. She translates the paperwork for the defendant. She goes over the paperwork thoroughly with the defendant. And she tells the defendant to ask any questions he or she may have. If a defendant asks questions, Ailshire immediately translates the questions for whomever is present. Ailshire does not give the defendant legal answers. Ailshire testified that, before she goes over the plea papers with a defendant, the prosecutor will explain that the defendant has the right to an attorney, and, if the defendant cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed. The defendant is also told that if he or she does not feel comfortable with the plea, the defendant can ask the judge for more time to find an attorney. If the defendant agrees to the plea, Ailshire goes over each paper individually with the defendant and asks if the defendant understands. If the defendant does not understand, Ailshire will ask the prosecutor to explain the paperwork. In the courtroom, Ailshire translates the proceedings for the defendant. The judge then also reviews the paperwork with the defendant. Appellant's testimony at the writ hearing conflicted with Ailshire's. He claimed that Ailshire did not interpret anything the assistant county attorney said during their meeting. He admitted Ailshire interpreted the court proceedings, but he claimed she did not read the plea papers to him. Appellant stated at the hearing that he did not know what his rights were until his current attorney told him. Later, appellant admitted that Ailshire had read the papers to him about his right to counsel, including having counsel appointed. But appellant said he did not understand what that meant. According to appellant, Ailshire did not read the papers word for word, nor did she tell him in general terms what they said. He claimed he had no idea what his constitutional rights were. Appellant testified he told the trial judge he understood his rights because he wanted to get the proceedings over with. At the conclusion of the hearing on the applications for writ of habeas corpus, the trial court denied appellant relief. The trial court made written findings of fact that: (1) appellant pleaded guilty and punishment was assessed in accordance with plea bargain agreements; (2) appellant was not represented by counsel at the plea hearing; (3) appellant waived in writing his right to be represented by counsel; (4) an interpreter was appointed to interpret for appellant, and the interpreter interpreted for appellant during negotiations with the prosecutor, appellant's execution of the plea documents, and the court proceedings; (5) the trial court admonished appellant in writing and received appellant's signed statement that he understood the admonishments and was aware of the consequences of his plea; (6) appellant testified under oath during the plea proceedings that the interpreter had read the plea documents to him (including the waiver of the right to counsel), that he fully and completely understood the documents, and that he signed the documents freely and voluntarily, (7) the judge orally admonished appellant of the consequences of violating his community supervision, and (8) appellant said he had no questions regarding the proceedings. The court concluded appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, was not denied his right to counsel, and freely and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. The court further concluded the judgments placing appellant on community supervision were valid and legal. Discussion
In issues two, three, and four, appellant asserts his guilty pleas were involuntary due to violations of articles 26.01 and 26.04 of the code of criminal procedure and section 80.100 of administrative code. The State responds appellant waived these complaints and, alternatively, they are not cognizable by writ of habeas corpus. We agree the complaints are not cognizable in this habeas corpus proceeding. Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure "establishes the procedure for an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a felony or misdemeanor case in which the applicant seeks relief from an order or judgment of conviction ordering community supervision." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 1 (Vernon 2005). An application may not be filed under article 11.072 if the applicant could obtain the requested relief by means of an appeal. See id. § 3(a); Ex parte Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (per curiam) (habeas corpus generally not available to raise complaint that could have been raised on direct appeal). Moreover, claims of statutory violations are not cognizable by post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy reserved for those instances in which there was a jurisdictional defect that renders the judgment void or for denials of fundamental or constitutional rights. See Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Appellant's claims relating to the alleged statutory violations do not raise a jurisdictional defect or the denial of fundamental or constitutional rights. See Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 109 (failure to adhere to statutory procedures serving to protect constitutional provision violates statute, not constitutional provision). Furthermore, the alleged statutory violations were claims that could have been raised on direct appeal at the time appellant was placed on community supervision. Accordingly, they are not cognizable by writ of habeas corpus. We resolve issues two, three, and four against appellant. In his first issue, appellant complains his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. In his fifth issue, appellant contends that because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated, his convictions should be reversed and judgments of acquittal rendered. The argument under appellant's fifth issue merely restates his complaints in the previous issues. Therefore, we will address appellant's complaint only to the extent he contends he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. This claim could have been brought by direct appeal at the time appellant was placed on community supervision. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, is fundamental and essential to a fair trial. See Ex parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)). The right to counsel may only be waived by the conscious and intelligent decision of the person who holds the right and must be done competently, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Ex parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d at 835. Therefore, we will address the merits of appellant's complaint. In a habeas corpus proceeding, the applicant has the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 818 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (per curiam). In reviewing the trial court's ruling on an application for writ of habeas corpus, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the ruling. See id. at 819. We afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We afford the same level of deference to a trial court's ruling on an application of law to fact questions if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See id. We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not involve credibility and demeanor evaluations. See id. Where, as here, the trial judge makes findings of fact, we will defer to the findings if they are supported by the record. See Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416, 417-18 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We will uphold the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 819. Here, the record of the habeas corpus proceeding contained conflicting evidence about appellant's understanding of his right to counsel and his waiver of that right. Ailshire testified to the procedure she uses in each case to ensure the defendant understands the paperwork he or she is signing. Appellant testified that Ailshire did not interpret the paperwork for him. Later, he testified that she did interpret the paperwork for him, but he did not understand it. Appellant also testified that even though he said he understood the paperwork, he did not understand his rights. The trial court, however, found that appellant admitted under oath at the plea hearing that the interpreter had read the waiver of the right to counsel to appellant, that appellant understood the papers completely, and that he freely and voluntarily signed the forms. The trial court was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses in this habeas corpus proceeding. We conclude the record before us supports the trial court's findings. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant habeas corpus relief. We resolve appellant's first and fifth issues against him. We affirm the trial court's orders denying appellant the relief sought by his applications for writ of habeas corpus.