A cursory examination of court records, both territorial and state, indicates that bonds aggregating $87,500 as required of petitioner in the instant case are far in excess of any bail ever exacted of any defendant for any offense in the 88 year annals of Arizona jurisprudence. The law is well settled that the power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression. Ex parte Castillo, 102 Tex.Crim. 52, 277 S.W. 126, cited in the Annotation appearing in 53 A.L.R. 399. Another factor that must be considered in fixing the amount of bail in a given case is the fact that the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. 6 Am.Jur., Bail and Recognizance, sec. 87. See also Annotation, Bail, Factors Fixing Amount, 72 A.L.R. 821, and cf. Green v. Petit, 222 Ind. 467, 54 N.E.2d 281; State v. Mistich, 182 La. 43, 161 So. 14; Ex parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750, 96 P. 24; State ex rel. Corella v. Miles, 303 Mo. 648, 262 S.W. 364, 365. In the latter case it is stated: "* * * The bail bond must be fixed with a view to giving the prisoner his liberty, not for the purpose of keeping him in jail.

"In an application to this court upon habeas corpus, for a reduction of bail upon the ground that the amount fixed by the trial court is excessive," "[i]t must clearly appear that the trial court has abused its discretion before this court will reduce the amount." (Ex parte Ruef (1908) 7 Cal.App. 750, 752 (Ruef); see, e.g., Ex parte Black (1934) 140 Cal.App. 361, ["it is well settled that this court should not reduce the bail unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion"].) Although rarely exercised, the Supreme Court's authority to set bail is long-established.

( In re Williams, 82 Cal. 183 [23 P. 118].) It is said in the case of Ex parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750 [ 96 P. 24, 25], that "it is not sufficient that this court might originally have deemed a lesser amount sufficient. It must clearly appear that the trial court has abused its discretion before this court will reduce the amount.

For these purposes, the allegations of the criminal complaint (and by analogy the arrest report for pre-complaint setting of bail) are presumed to be true. E.g., Ex parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750 (1908).

Along with those primary considerations of victim and public safety, the court must assume the truth of the criminal charges. (See Ex parte Duncan (1879) 53 Cal. 410, 411 ; Ex parte Ruef (1908) 7 Cal.App. 750, 752, 96 P. 24.) These are constitutionally permissible considerations, within certain parameters.

( In re Underwood, 9 Cal.3d 345, 348 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 401, 508 P.2d 721]; McDermott v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.3d 693, 695 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 297, 493 P.2d 1161].) Accordingly, while both the seriousness of the crime or crimes charged (Pen. Code, § 1275) and the number of separate offenses thus charged ( Ex parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750, 753 [ 96 P. 24]) are factors which are considered in determining the amount of bail required, the ultimate test is "the probability of his appearing at the trial or hearing of the case." (Pen. Code, § 1275.)

In view of this purpose a person's inability to give bail does not of itself entitle him to be discharged from custody. ( In re Burnette, 35 Cal.App.2d 358, 360 [ 95 P.2d 684]; Ex parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750, 752 [ 96 P. 24].) In Moore v. City County of San Francisco, 5 Cal.App.3d 728 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 281], it was held that section 1295 providing for booking a defendant anterior to his release on a deposit of cash bail on his arrest for a misdemeanor is not unconstitutional as violative of the Eighth Amendment or article I, section 6, of the California Constitution.

The chances of conviction increase geometrically, not arithmetically. While there is no decision in this jurisdiction recognizing this reality which the trial court learned by experience, our research has found such a decision in a sister state. In Ex Parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750, 96 P. 24 (1908), the defendant was charged in 116 indictments charging bribery. Bail was set in each case at $10,000.

There are numerous considerations entering into the determination of the amount of bail to be required by the trial court in any case. ( In re Tsuji Horiuchi, 105 Cal.App. 714 [ 288 P. 708]; Ex parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750 [ 96 P. 24]; In re Williams, 82 Cal. 183 [23 P. 118].) Under the authorities cited, this court must assume in this proceeding that the petitioners are guilty and must further assume that the trial court determined from the facts before it that the bail fixed was reasonably necessary.

[4] Upon an application to a court of appeal for reduction of bail upon the ground that the amount fixed by the court is excessive, it must clearly appear that the trial court has abused its discretion, before a higher court will reduce the amount. ( Ex parte Ruef, 7 Cal.App. 750, 752 [ 96 P. 24].) It is sometimes stated that in order to justify such interference, the bail demanded must be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.