Opinion
WR-56,592-03
03-29-2023
EX PARTE MICHAEL EUGENE RILEY, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 765453-C IN THE 209TH DISTRICT COURT FROM HARRIS COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
Applicant was convicted of capital murder. The First Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Riley v. State, No. 01-00-00462-CR (Tex. App.-Houston, March 28, 2002, pet. ref'd). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
The trial court held a hearing and concluded that, on the preponderance of the evidence, Applicant would not have been convicted if previously unavailable scientific evidence had been presented during his trial. Art. 11.073(a), (b). The court recommended granting relief. We disagree.
On post-conviction review of habeas corpus applications, the convicting court is the "original factfinder" and this Court is the "ultimate factfinder." Ex parte Storey, 584 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). In most circumstances, we defer to the trial judge's findings of fact because the judge is in the best position to assess witnesses' credibility. Ex parte Thuesen, 546 S.W.3d 145, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). However, if our independent review of the record reveals circumstances that contradict or undermine the trial judge's findings, we may exercise our authority to enter contrary findings and conclusions. Storey, 584 S.W.3d at 440. We review de novo conclusions of law. Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
The previously unavailable scientific evidence at issue consists of post-conviction DNA testing of blood stains from two items recovered from Applicant's residence - a television believed to have been stolen during the murder, and a white ball cap. Applicant has not shown how his inclusion or exclusion as a probable contributor to DNA mixtures on items recovered from his residence was material. On the other hand, DNA testing has consistently suggested that the victim was a likely contributor to the blood stain from the television. This is persuasive evidence that Applicant took the television from the victim during the murder. In addition, the post-conviction DNA testing does not affect the weight of other inculpatory evidence presented at trial. For example, an investigator testified at trial that the television had a bloodstain with a handprint identified as Applicant's.
Applicant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that, if the post-conviction DNA test results had been presented at trial, he would not have been convicted of capital murder. Art. 11.073; cf. Ex parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Ex parte Pruett, 458 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
We agree with the trial court that Applicant's remaining allegations are without merit.
Relief is denied.