Assuming, without deciding, that the underlying declaratory-judgment action could be construed as a petition for a writ of mandamus, the Surginers did not name the probate judge as a respondent. See Ex parte Privett, 887 So.2d 854, 856 (Ala. 2004) (denying a petition for a writ of mandamus in part because the petitioner named the incorrect judge as a respondent and that judge owed no duty or responsibility to petitioner); Ex parte State Pers. Bd., 45 So.3d 751, 754 (Ala. 2010) (holding that trial court lacked authority to restrict the actions of a nonparty State agency); and J.A.W. v. G.H., 72 So.3d 1254, 1257 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) ("When a court lacks jurisdiction over a person, any order directed at that person is void."). This court requested letter briefs from the parties on the issue whether they had properly invoked the trial court's jurisdiction, whether a petition for a writ of mandamus was required to be filed in the trial court, and whether the probate judge should have been joined in the proceedings.

Our conclusions in this regard also foreclose the remaining nonmonetary forms of relief sought by the plaintiffs as to the Board defendants. To the extent that the plaintiffs have requested that the Board should be enjoined from violating its “present rules and duties” and should be made, via injunction or writ of mandamus, to certify Quinn as an educational administrator based upon the criteria for certification at the time of her graduation in 2001, the record does not reflect that, under the governing law, the Board has taken any unlawful action or that it has any duty to issue a certification to Quinn that would give rise to a right to such a certification. See State Dep't of Indus. Relations v. Clegg Mfg. Co., 348 So.2d 249, 251–52 (Ala.Civ.App.1976) (injunction will not issue to restrain the legal actions of public officer); Ex parte Privett, 887 So.2d 854, 856 (Ala.2004) (denying petition for writ of mandamus because of absence of “clear legal right to the order sought”). Further, because the plaintiffs have not shown that the Board has any authority concerning the internal governance of ASU—an institution as to which the legislature has expressly divested the Board's jurisdiction and that has been placed under the sole control of its board of trustees except as otherwise provided by law, seeAla.

Our conclusions in this regard also foreclose the remaining nonmonetary forms of relief sought by the plaintiffs as to the Board defendants. To the extent that the plaintiffs have requested that the Board should be enjoined from violating its "present rules and duties" and should be made, via injunction or writ of mandamus, to certify Quinn as an educational administrator based upon the criteria for certification at the time of her graduation in 2001, the record does not reflect that, under the governing law, the Board has taken any unlawful action or that it has any duty to issue a certification to Quinn that would give rise to a right to such a certification. See State Pep't of Indus. Relations v. Clegg Mfg. Co., 348 So. 2d 249, 251-52 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (injunction will not issue to restrain the legal actions of public officer); Ex parte Privett, 887 So. 2d 854, 856 (Ala. 2004) (denying petition for writ of mandamus because of absence of "clear legal right to the order sought"). Further, because the plaintiffs have not shown that the Board has any authority concerning the internal governance of ASU -- an institution as to which the legislature has expressly divested the Board's jurisdiction and that has been placed under the sole control of its board of trustees except as otherwise provided by law, see Ala. Code 1975, § 16-50-24 -- the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief, as a matter of Alabama law, on their claim that the Board has somehow failed to carry out a hypothetical duty to undertake oversight of educator-certification masters-degree programs at ASU.