Murray contends, in part, that there was no basis on which to set aside his felony-murder conviction and that any prosecution under the March 2002 indictment violates the principle of double jeopardy. For the reasons explained in Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d 990 (Ala. 2004), a case involving the reindictment of one of Murray's codefendants under similar circumstances, Murray's contention is correct. Therefore, the trial court is directed to dismiss the March 2002 indictment against Murray and to reinstate his conviction and sentence for felony murder.
The Alabama Supreme Court granted Peterson's petition, stating that because felony murder during a robbery was a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of capital murder during a robbery, the guilty plea to felony murder was a valid plea and, therefore, that jeopardy had attached, which "prohibit[ed] any further prosecution of Peterson for the murder of Eddie Allen." Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d 990, 993 (Ala. 2004). Thus, at the conclusion of this series of events, the 2002 indictment was dismissed, Peterson's conviction and sentence for robbery were vacated, and his conviction and sentence for felony murder were reinstated.
893 So.2d at 354. For the procedural history of the case of Murray's codefendant, Charles Peterson, whose case is also being decided under similar circumstances in an opinion issued today in (CR-03-2004), see Peterson v. State, 842 So.2d 734 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001); Ex parte Peterson, 884 So.2d 924 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003); and Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d 990 (Ala. 2004). On June 11, 2004, the Montgomery County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Murray with three counts of second-degree burglary — count one charged a violation of § 13A-7-6(a), Ala. Code 1975, i.e., that Murray or another participant was armed with explosives or a deadly weapon — a firearm — while committing the burglary; count two charged a violation of § 13A-7-6(b), Ala. Code 1975, i.e., that Murray or another participant caused physical injury to Eddie Allen by shooting him with a firearm while committing the burglary; and count three charged a violation of § 13A-7-6(c), Ala. Code 1975, i.e., that Murray or another participant used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous instrument — a firearm — while committing the burglary.
See Ex parte Wright, 477 So. 2d at 493. See also Ex parte Peterson, 890 So. 2d 990, 993 (Ala. 2004) (explaining that, after a defendant entered a valid guilty plea to felony murder, "jeopardy attached to the felony-murder conviction, prohibiting any further prosecution" of the defendant for the same offense). Absent a voluntary withdrawal of his guilty plea, Blackman was not subject to further prosecution by the State, and the trial court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the trial.
"`Jeopardy attaches on a guilty plea when the plea is accepted and entered by a court with jurisdiction.' Ex parte Wright, 477 So.2d 492, 493 (Ala. 1985)." Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d 990, 992 (Ala. 2004). In this case, the trial court clearly accepted D.L.A.'s guilty plea, but it did not adjudicate D.L.A. guilty.
"Peterson petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the March 2002 indictment and to reinstate his guilty-plea conviction for felony murder. The Alabama Supreme Court granted Peterson's petition, stating that because felony murder during a robbery was a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of capital murder during a robbery, the guilty plea to felony murder was a valid plea and, therefore, that jeopardy had attached, which `prohibit[ed] any further prosecution of Peterson for the murder of Eddie Allen.' Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d 990, 993 (Ala. 2004). Thus, at the conclusion of this series of events, the 2002 indictment was dismissed, Peterson's conviction and sentence for robbery were vacated, and his conviction and sentence for felony murder were reinstated.
Although the indictment charged Taylor with first-degree robbery, he pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery, a lesser-included offense to the charged offense of first-degree robbery. Typically, an indictment need not specifically charge the lesser-included offense. Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d 990 (Ala. 2004). Rule 13.