Moreover, the fact that applicant is no longer actually confined in the penitentiary is not dispositive of his standing before us, since during his term of parole he is "in custody" and "confined" in terms of statutory construction. See Art. 11.21, V.A.C.C.P. See also Ex parte Henderson, 645 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983); and Ex parte Peel, 626 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982). See and compare Ex parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987).
By contrast, parole is "a form of constructive custody." Ex parte Peel, 626 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). Third, sec. 2(b) provides that the pre-parole transferee "is subject to the good conduct time provisions of Art. 6181-1. . . ."
Nor is a parolee entitled to good time credit while on parole or under mandatory supervision. See Ex parte Peel, 626 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); see also TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 498.003(c) ("An inmate may not accrue good time during any period the inmate . . . is on parole or under mandatory supervision."). There is no evidence that the parole laws have been applied retroactively to deprive petitioner of any right under federal or state law.
Ex parte Evans, 964 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); Ex parte Ruthart, 980 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); Ex parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). See also Ex parte Henson, 731 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Ex parte Peel, 626 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); Ex parte Hurd, 613 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Ex parte Pizzalota, 610 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Ex parte Weaver, 537 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976); Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d at 340-42.Ex parte Stokes, 15 S.W.3d 532, 533 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
The applicant is not challenging his conviction, but is instead challenging the time necessary to fulfill his sentence, and this Court has previously held that the duration of a prisoner's confinement and applicable time credits is a proper subject for an Article 11.07, supra, writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Henson, 731 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987); Ex parte Peel, 626 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Ex parte Hurd, 613 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Ex parte Pizzalota, 610 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Ex parte Weaver, 537 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex parte Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976). Further, a time credit complaint is not rendered moot if direct or collateral legal consequences may flow from the wrongful denial of earned time credit.
Parole is a form of constructive custody. Ex parte Peel, 626 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). However, it is not the type of custody that entitles a parolee to good time or trusty time.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has similarly recognized that parole is a form of custody by the State. See Ex parte Peel, 626 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (holding parole is “a form of constructive custody”). While the Court of Criminal Appeals referred to parole as “constructive custody,” the statute does not distinguish between types of custody for its application.