Ex Parte Paulson

17 Citing cases

  1. Mays v. Shields

    444 P.2d 949 (Or. 1968)   Cited 15 times
    In Mays v. Shields, 251 Or. 168, 444 P.2d 949 (1968), it was held that such an authentication fulfills the requirements of ORS 147.030.

    Ex Parte Terranova, 170 Tex Cr 445, 341 S.W.2d 660 (1960). Cf., Hayes v. O'Connell, 263 S.W.2d 66 (Mo App 1953); Levine v. Warden of Women's Prison, 188 Misc. 307, 64 NYS2d 337 (1946), affirmed 67 NYS2d 708 (1947); Ex Parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 124 P.2d 297 (1942). Plaintiff also attacks the extradition request on the ground that certified copies of the papers filed with the request show that the warrant on the escape charge is dated May 6, 1964 but the complaint is dated October 6, 1964.

  2. Fisco v. Clark

    243 Or. 466 (Or. 1966)   Cited 5 times

    An extradition is simply one step in securing the arrest and detention of the defendant. Ex parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 124 P.2d 297 (1942). When confronted with a similar problem concerning rendition of a fugitive to Louisiana it was said in Ex parte Stanley, (Tex 1964) 377 S.W.2d 650:

  3. In re Cooper

    53 Cal.2d 772 (Cal. 1960)   Cited 37 times

    (See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 374-376 [21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577]; Stark v. Livermore, 3 N.J. Super. 94 [ 65 A.2d 625, 627]; People ex rel. MacSherry v. Enright, 112 Misc. 568 [184 N.Y.S. 248, 252]; State ex rel. Phillips v. Garren, 186 S.C. 333 [ 195 S.E. 834, 835]; Ex parte Murray, 112 S.C. 342 [ 99 S.E. 798, 800, 5 A.L.R. 1152]; cf. State ex rel. Hogan v. Moeller, 191 Minn. 193 [ 253 N.W. 668, 669]; People v. Mulcahy, supra, 392 Ill. 498 [ 65 N.E.2d 21, 22]; Ex parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457 [ 124 P.2d 297, 302-303]; People ex rel. De Martini v. McLaughlin, 243 N.Y. 417 [ 153 N.E. 853, 854]; Ex parte Cooper, 163 Tex.Crim. Rep. [ 295 S.W.2d 906, 907]; Ex parte Logan, 151 Tex.Crim.

  4. Fain v. Bourbeau

    488 A.2d 824 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    In the context of extradition proceedings, in which considerable deference is afforded to the proceedings of the demanding state, we should not superimpose general Connecticut authentication requirements upon the specific provisions for authentication contained in the extradition statute itself. Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a demanding governor's certification of authentication is binding upon the courts of an asylum state. See Clark v. Leach, 200 Colo. 151, 153, 612 P.2d 1130 (1980); People ex rel. Dimas v. Shimp, 83 Ill. App.3d 150, 155, 403 N.E.2d 750 (1980); Austin v. Brumbaugh, 186 Neb. 815, 818-19, 186 N.W.2d 723 (1971); Ex Parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 472-73, 124 P.2d 297 (1942); Ex Parte Posey, 453 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); State ex rel. Clayton v. Wolke, 69 Wis.2d 363, 368-69, 230 N.W.2d 869 (1975); see also 1 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (12th Ed. Torcia 1974) 116. Unless there is a defect on the face of extradition papers other than a lack of individualized authentication, the certificate of the demanding governor forecloses further judicial scrutiny. Our resolution of the question of authentication against the petitioner requires us to conclude that the trial court also erred in finding that the petitioner had not been "substantially charged" with the crime of larceny.

  5. Hall v. Cronin

    585 P.2d 286 (Colo. 1978)   Cited 4 times

    Other courts addressing the general authentication of "papers" under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act have upheld such authentication. The Supreme Court of Oregon addressed a similar attack in Ex parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 124 P.2d 297 (1942). It resolved the issue against the petitioner, stating:

  6. Glover v. State

    515 S.W.2d 641 (Ark. 1974)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that an affadavit in accordance with the laws of the demanding state is sufficient and that its sufficiency must be tested by the laws of that state.

    It is quite generally held that an affidavit in accordance with the standards of the criminal procedural law of the demanding state is a sufficient charge of an offense against the laws of that state to warrant extradition and that its sufficiency must be tested by the laws of that state. Ex Parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 124 P.2d 297 (1942); People v. Sheriff, 251 N.Y. 33, 166 N.E. 795 (1929); Collins v. Traeger, 27 F.2d 842 (9 Cir., 1928); Goodale v. Spain, 42 App. D.C. 235 (1914); In Re Acton, 103 N.E.2d 577 (Ct.App. Ohio 1949); People v. Moran, 137 Misc. 905, 244 N.Y.S. 590 (1930); Annot, 40 A.L.R.2d 1151, 1161 (1956). It is not for the asylum state to apply its own rules of procedure.

  7. State ex rel Yarbrough v. Snider

    448 P.2d 379 (Or. 1968)   Cited 2 times

    The act of congress which prescribes the procedure necessary to put into effect the power to extradite persons charged with crime in one state and found in another also requires authentication by the governor of the demanding state. Ex Parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 124 P.2d 297. Since there appears from the record made to support the warrant for arrest issued by the Governor of the state of Oregon that there was no authentication of the required documents by the Governor of the demanding state, this cause must be reversed with instructions to discharge the petitioner from custody.

  8. Smith v. State

    403 P.2d 221 (Idaho 1965)   Cited 13 times

    The general rule in extradition matters is that the sufficiency of the affidavit, or indictment as a pleading is not open to inquiry on habeas corpus proceedings to review issuance of a rendition warrant. See: Starks v. Turner, 365 P.2d 564 (Okla.Ct.Cr.App. 1961); Ex parte Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 124 P.2d 297 (1942); 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 39, p. 554; 25 Am.Jur. 195, Habeas Corpus, § 69; Annots., 81 A.L.R. 552, at 565, and 40 A.L.R.2d 1151, at 1159; 4 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 1667 (1957). The next question to be considered deals with the admissibility of the affidavits to prove the identity of the appellant and his presence in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.

  9. In re Martz

    83 Idaho 72 (Idaho 1960)   Cited 13 times

    The great weight of authority supports this conclusion. In re Gundy, 130 Okl.Cr. 390, 236 P. 440; Ex parte Jackson, 82 Cal.App. 719, 256 P. 250; Ex part Paulson, 168 Or. 457, 124 P.2d 297; Ex parte Rubens, 73 Ariz. 101, 238 P.2d 402, certiorari denied Rubens v. Boies, 73 S.Ct. 50, 344 U.S. 840, 97 L.Ed. 653; Ex parte Hagan, 295 Mo. 435, 245 S.W. 336; Ex parte Combs, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 500, 105 S.W.2d 1096; Ex parte Watkins, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 14, 259 S.W.2d 215; State ex rel. Arnold v. Justus, 84 Minn. 237, 87 N.W. 770, 55 L.R.A. 325; Morrison v. Dwyer, 143 Iowa 502, 121 N.W. 1064; State ex rel. Webster v. Moeller, 191 Minn. 193, 253 N.W. 668; Ex parte Molisak, 291 Mich. 46, 288 N.W. 329; Lacondra v. Hermann, 343 Ill. 608, 175 N.E. 820, at page 823; In re Murphy, 321 Mass. 206, 72 N.E.2d 413; People ex rel. Goshern v. Babb, 4 Ill.2d 114, 122 N.E.2d 239; Ullom v. Davis, 169 Miss. 208, 150 So. 519; Harris v. State, 257 Ala. 3, 60 So.2d 266; Ex parte Morgan, D.C. Cal., 78 F. Supp. 756, affirmed Morgan v. Horrall, 9 Cir., 175 F.2d 404, certiorari denied 70 S.Ct. 76, 338 U.S. 827, 94 L.Ed. 503; United States ex rel. Miller v. Walsh, D.C.Ill., 90 F. Supp. 332, affirmed Miller v. Walsh

  10. Storms v. Lambert

    355 P.2d 766 (Or. 1960)   Cited 4 times

    "In this proceeding the guilt or innocence of the petitioner may not be inquired into, § 26-2620, 3 O.C.L.A. [ORS 147.200] Nor can we concern ourselves with the motives of his accusers, Goodale v. Splain, supra, nor with the wisdom of the statute of a sister state which the petitioner is charged with transgressing. If the petitioner was charged with crime in South Dakota and is a fugitive from the justice of that state, and that fact is made properly to appear to the governor of this state, it is his duty, under the Constitution and laws of the United States and the statutes of this state, to honor the requisition of the governor of South Dakota, and the court has no power to interfere unless it finds illegality in the proceedings. * * *" Ex Parte Paulson, 1942, 168 Or. 457, 474, 124 P.2d 297. In Defoe v. Pratt, 1946, 179 Or. 334, 348, 170 P.2d 383, we said: "Whether the prosecution of plaintiff is actuated by malice or in good faith, merely presents a question of credibility to be accorded to or withheld from the testimony of the prosecutrix; and in effect bears exclusively upon the guilt or innocence of plaintiff."