Ex Parte O'Neal

Full title: EX PARTE WILLIAM EDMOND O'NEAL, JR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jul 16, 2004

No. 05-04-00707-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 16, 2004)

Opinion

No. 05-04-00707-CR

Opinion Filed July 16, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. WX04-01673-W. Reverse.

Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice WRIGHT.

William Edmond O'Neal, Jr. is charged with murder. Bail is currently set at two million dollars. Appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a bond reduction. The trial court denied appellant the relief he sought and continued the bail at this amount. In one point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying him relief because the bail is excessive. We reverse the trial court's order denying appellant a bond reduction. We order that bail be set at $750,000.

Facts

Appellant is charged with murdering his wife Helen O'Neal. Bond was originally set at $1,000,000. Appellant filed a motion to reduce bond. Following a hearing on April 15, 2004, the trial judge raised appellant's bond to $2,000,000. No appeal was taken at that time. On April 22, 2004, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking to have his bond reduced to $50,000. The reporter's record of the April 15, 2004 hearing was introduced into evidence at the habeas corpus hearing. The judge denied appellant's request for relief on May 6, 2004. At the April 15 hearing, Sachse detective sergeant Marvin Brown testified that he responded to a medical emergency call at appellant's house on March 20, 2004. Helen O'Neal had been found with a gunshot wound to her chest. The paramedics were still trying to resuscitate Helen when they took her to the hospital, but she later died. Brown testified appellant reported that several items of his wife's jewelry had been stolen. Brown testified that although appellant was not originally considered a suspect, that changed after Carla York contacted the police and said she believed appellant might have been involved in Helen's murder. York worked with appellant and had been involved in an affair with him. York told Brown that one week before the murder, appellant said he "wished his wife was killed in a car accident." After Helen's death, York began to fear for her safety and the safety of her daughter. York also became concerned that appellant would try to "set her up" for the murder. Therefore, she reported her suspicions to the police and agreed to assist them in their investigation. York began recording her telephone conversations with appellant. Brown testified that during these conversations, appellant admitted to killing Helen and provided details of how he committed the crime. York volunteered to accompany appellant when he retrieved the murder weapon, and the police set up surveillance to follow appellant. Appellant traveled along his bike route, which went past his home, and retrieved a handgun from a culvert along the route. To retrieve the weapon, appellant used a wood pole that had a hanger attached by duct tape to one end. After York separated from appellant, she signaled the police that she had seen the gun and they stopped appellant's vehicle. During a search of the vehicle, the police found a pair of heavy utility gloves and one dishwashing glove that had blood on it. They also found a handgun, which was later identified as the murder weapon, and the object used to retrieve the gun from the culvert. The police later searched appellant's house pursuant to a warrant and found hidden the jewelry appellant had reported stolen. Brown further testified that when they were investigating appellant's story about the bicycle ride, they learned that appellant was seen at the beginning and the end of the ride, but no one remembered seeing appellant during the middle part of the ride. Brown testified he is concerned for York's safety as a material witness and maintains daily contact with her. Brown also testified that York, on a daily basis, expresses concern for her safety if appellant is released. Appellant has not made any threats against York, and before he was arrested, appellant told York that he would not hurt her. It was Brown's opinion, though, that in light of appellant's age and the offense, appellant would have "nothing to lose" by retaliating against York. Appellant's sister, Ida Joe O'Neal-Lee, testified that appellant is sixty-nine years old and has lived in Dallas since 1962. Appellant has a son and daughter who live in Illinois and Tennessee, respectively. O'Neal-Lee lives in East Tawakani, Texas. Appellant also has a brother, but no additional information was given regarding the brother. O'Neal-Lee testified that she did not believe appellant could make the $1,000,000 bond. Appellant is a retired DISD school teacher and currently works at GSI Highway Products in Hutchins, Texas. In addition to his salary from GSI, appellant receives monthly retirement income of $2000. O'Neal-Lee testified that appellant's home is valued at $50,000, but he currently owes $80,000 on the home. Appellant has never been arrested or convicted of any type of criminal offense. O'Neal-Lee further testified that she will support appellant. She does not believe appellant is a threat to anyone and that he will attend all of his court hearings.

Applicable Law

The primary object of an appearance bond is to secure the accused's presence at trial on the offense charged. Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980). It is within the trial judge's discretion to determine the proper amount of bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (Vernon Supp. 2004). The person seeking the reduction has the burden of demonstrating the bail is excessive. Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d at 550. In determining the amount of bail to set, the judge shall be guided by the following rules:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be considered.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15; Ex parte Welch, 729 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.). Circumstances to be considered in determining the amount of bond include the accused's work record, family and community ties, length of residency, prior criminal record, and conformity with the conditions of any previous bond, as well as the existence of any outstanding bonds and aggravating circumstances involved in the charged offense. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Ex parte Welch, 729 S.W.2d at 309. The trial court may also consider the range of punishment for the charged offense. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d at 550.

Analysis

Appellant is charged with murdering his wife, a first degree felony. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b), (c) (Vernon 2003). If convicted, he faces a punishment range of five to ninety-nine years or life imprisonment, and a fine of up to $10,000. See id. § 12.32. The circumstances of the alleged offense show considerable planning and premeditation. Evidence was presented that one week before the murder, appellant expressed to York a desire that his wife would die. Evidence was also presented that on the date of the murder, appellant claimed to be on a bike ride. The route went right past his house, and although appellant was seen at the beginning and end of the ride, no one saw him in between. Furthermore, there was evidence that appellant hid the murder weapon in a culvert along the bike route and hid some of Helen's jewelry, then reported it stolen to the police. Appellant is sixty-nine years old and has lived in the Dallas area forty-two years. Appellant owns a house, but there was no testimony as to how long he has lived in this house. Appellant is a retired school teacher and, before his arrest, was employed by GSI. There was no evidence of whether he would return to work at GSI if released on bail. There was also evidence that appellant has a "strong support system for his spiritual belief." No other evidence of community ties was presented. Appellant has two children, both of whom live out of state. However, appellant's sister lives in East Tawakani, Texas, and she testified she would support appellant if he was released on bail. O'Neal-Lee also testified that she believed appellant would appear for his court hearings. Appellant receives a monthly pension of about $2000 and he was employed before his arrest. It appears that appellant's indebtedness on his house exceeds the property's value. O'Neal-Lee testified appellant could not afford a $1,000,000 bond, but could afford a $50,000 bond. However, "[j]ust as a defendant's inability to afford bail does not, in itself, demonstrate that bail is excessive, a defendant's ability to afford bail in the amount set does not in itself justify bail in that amount." Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref'd). There was testimony that York was concerned for the safety of herself and her daughter. Brown was concerned for York's safety as a material witness and believed appellant would have nothing to lose by retaliating against York. The safety of the community is one factor to consider. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15. However, there was no evidence appellant made any threats against York or her daughter, either before or after his arrest. In setting bail, the court must strike a balance between the defendant's presumption of innocence and the State's interest in assuring the defendant's appearance at trial. See Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d at 573. Under the facts of this case, we cannot conclude a $2,000,000 bond strikes that balance. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant a bond reduction. We sustain appellant's point of error. We reverse the trial court's order denying appellant habeas corpus relief. We order that bail be set for appellant at $750,000, subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as may be determined by the district court.