We disagree. In Ex parte Nottingham, 522 So.2d 777 (Ala. 1988), this Court held that for venue purposes an action on a lease is one in personam, not in rem, and is transitory and therefore may be brought in any county where other transitory actions could be brought. 522 So.2d at 779. In Nottingham this Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its order of transfer because that court, apparently holding that an action on a lease was an action in rem, had transferred the action to the county where the leasehold property was located.

Ala. Code 1975, § 37-14-2. Coosa Valley argues that the trial court properly interpreted the venue provisions of the Territory Acts when it denied APCo's motion to transfer the action to Shelby County. It says that the undisputed facts show that the EWRN's site is a single facility that straddles two counties, and that, based on the 1984 Act's definition of "premises," venue was proper in St. Clair County or in Shelby County, citing Ex parte Nottingham, 522 So.2d 777, 779 (Ala. 1988) ("[w]hen venue is proper in two or more counties the plaintiff may elect the county in which to proceed, and when this election is made venue will not be disturbed"); Medical Service Administration v. Dickerson, 362 So.2d 906 (Ala. 1978); Associated Grocers v. Graves Co., 272 Ala. 158, 130 So.2d 17 (1961); Ex parte H.L. Raburn Co., 384 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1980). We cannot agree with the circuit court's interpretation of the venue statute.