After a hearing in this case, the trial court found that Christopher's average pre-injury weekly wage was $414.07, and that his average post-injury weekly wage was $404.02. In calculating the average weekly wages, the trial court included all of Christopher's medical insurance premiums paid by FHG, including the amount paid by FHG for Christopher's family insurance premiums, stating that the family premiums "constitute[d] a discernible economic value to plaintiff" and citing Ex parte Murray, 490 So.2d 1238 (Ala. 1986). Because the trial court found that Christopher did not return to work at a wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury wage, it held that the provisions of § 25-5-57(a)(3)i, Ala. Code 1975, did not apply, and, therefore, considered the opinion of the vocational expert as well as that of the orthopedic surgeon.
Just as Ala. Code 1975, § 25–5–53, provides that workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for injuries received in a work-related accident, the LHWCA provides, in 33 U.S.C. § 905(a), that an injured worker may not maintain a tort action against his employer for any negligence of the employer giving rise to the injury; the injured worker's exclusive remedy is under the LHWCA. In International Paper Co. v. Murray, 490 So.2d 1234 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, Ex parte Murray, 490 So.2d 1238 (1986), this court noted:" ‘ "The LHWCA was adopted in 1927 as a federal compensation plan for maritime workers, and was patterned after existing state workers' compensation laws.... The LHWCA is a workmen's compensation statute similar to our own, where employers have ‘relinquished their defenses to tort actions in exchange for limited and predictable liability.’ "
Just as Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-53, provides that workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for injuries received in a work-related accident, the LHWCA provides, in 33 U.S.C. § 905(a), that an injured worker may not maintain a tort action against his employer for any negligence of the employer giving rise to the injury; the injured worker's exclusive remedy is under the LHWCA. In International Paper Co. v. Murray, 490 So. 2d 1234 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, Ex parte Murray, 490 So. 2d 1238 (1986), this court noted:"'"The LHWCA was adopted in 1927 as a federal compensation plan for maritime workers, and was patterned after existing state workers' compensation laws.... The LHWCA is a workmen's compensation statute similar to our own, where employers have 'relinquished their defenses to
Other states, such as Washington, have interpreted their statutes to include health insurance, reasoning that it is a core, nonfringe benefit—critical to protecting workers' “basic health and survival.” See Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 16 P.3d 583, 594 (2001); see also Ex parte Murray, 490 So.2d 1238 (Ala.1986). Alternatively, many states have left the matter to the legislature.
This was grouped in a category of "voluntary or negotiated payments"; that category includes other insurance and pension benefits that, together with the disability premium, cost $3.354 per hour in 1993 and $3.037 per hour in 1992. In Ex parte Murray, 490 So.2d 1238 (Ala. 1986), this Court interpreted the following sentence, which is the last sentence of Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-57(b): "Whatever allowances of any character made to an employee in lieu of wages are specified as part of the wage contract shall be deemed a part of his or her earnings." This Court held that fringe benefits, such as the premiums and pension benefits discussed above, "are includable in the computation of the employee's average weekly wage," 490 So.2d at 1241, for purposes of calculating workers' compensation benefits due.
McGhee's testimony suggesting that he was sporadically employed as a welder and an iron worker is inconsistent with the trial court's determination that McGhee's average weekly earnings are $1,328.25. That amount represents an average 67-hour work week 40 regular hours and 27 overtime hours — at McGhee's hourly wage of $16.50. The calculation of the average weekly earnings should determine the amount that the employee has lost due to the injury. See Ex parte Murray, 490 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Ala. 1986). Although the trial court's calculation of McGhee's average weekly earnings accurately reflects the earnings that McGhee lost during the duration of the project, the record does not indicate that the trial court's calculation accurately reflects the earnings that McGhee could be expected to lose over the course of an entire year.
The calculation of the average weekly earnings should determine the amount that the employee has lost due to the injury. SeeEx parte Murray, 490 So.2d 1238, 1241 (Ala.1986). Although the trial court's calculation of McGhee's average weekly earnings accurately reflects the earnings that McGhee lost during the duration of the project, the record does not indicate that the trial court's calculation accurately reflects the earnings that McGhee could be expected to lose over the course of an entire year.
Whether there is in fact a conflict between the last sentence of § 25-5-57(b), on the one hand, and the remainder of § 25-5-57(b) and § 25-5-1(6), on the other hand, is not a question which we must resolve in order to resolve the case now before us. Even if the last sentence of § 25-5-57(b) were to be read as broadening the parameters that would otherwise be established by § 25-5-1(6), the mileage reimbursements at issue in this case would not fall within those broader parameters. In Ex parte Murray, 490 So.2d 1238 (Ala. 1986), our Supreme Court explained that "allowances of any character" under the last sentence of § 25-5-57(b) include employer-paid fringe benefits that have a "discernible economic value to the [employee]" that is lost to an employee when he or she is unable to continue the employment following a work-related injury. 490 So.2d at 1241. The Supreme Court reasoned that the employer's payment of premiums for the employee's medical, hospitalization, and life insurance policies in that case was "in lieu of wages," and it included the amount of those payments in the employee's earnings for purposes of calculating benefits.
Just as Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-53, provides that workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for injuries received in a work-related accident, the LHWCA provides, in 33 U.S.C. § 905(a), that an injured worker may not maintain a tort action against his employer for any negligence of the employer giving rise to the injury; the injured worker's exclusive remedy is under the LHWCA. In International Paper Co. v. Murray, 490 So.2d 1234 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, Ex parte Murray, 490 So.2d 1238 (1986), this court noted: "`The LHWCA was adopted in 1927 as a federal compensation plan for maritime workers, and was patterned after existing state workers' compensation laws. . . . The LHWCA is a workmen's compensation statute similar to our own, where employers have "relinquished their defenses to tort actions in exchange for limited and predictable liability."'
In this case, the validity of the setoff turns on whether Dunlop "provided [Sanders's] benefits or paid for the plan" that provides Sanders's medical disability retirement benefits. Sanders, citing Ex parte Murray, 490 So.2d 1238 (Ala. 1986), argues that he paid for the medical disability retirement plan, because, he says, the plan was part of his fringe benefits resulting from the collective bargaining agreement between Dunlop and Dunlop's employees, and because, he says, fringe benefits were a part of his earnings. Our supreme court has held that under § 25-5-57(b), Ala. Code 1975, employer-paid fringe benefits "constitute 'allowances of any character' and are includable in the computation of the employee's average weekly wage."