Opinion
NO. WR-28,195-07
02-01-2023
EX PARTE Fred MUNOZ, Applicant
Habeas corpus denied.
CONCURRING OPINION
Slaughter, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Richardson, J., joins.
Almost ten years ago, on April 26, 2013, Applicant filed this application for a postconviction writ of habeas corpus in Harris County challenging his conviction for accident resulting in bodily injury. The trial court entered an order designating issues on August 8, 2013. For reasons that remain unknown, it appears that no further action was taken until the application was belatedly forwarded to this Court on September 9, 2022. In the time that it has taken for the application to be forwarded to this Court, Applicant's sentence has been discharged. Nevertheless, this Court has now independently reviewed the record and considered the claims raised in the application, and it has determined that Applicant's claims lack merit. Although I agree with the Court's ultimate assessment that the application should be denied, given the extraordinary delay that has occurred in this case, I believe it is appropriate to at least provide Applicant with some explanation for why his application is being denied after almost a decade.
I. Background and Merits
On April 11, 2013, Applicant pleaded guilty to the offense of accident resulting in bodily injury and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Pursuant to his plea bargain, Applicant had no right to appeal. Applicant filed the present application shortly after his conviction. Applicant argues that he is entitled to relief on two grounds: insufficient evidence for the deadly-weapon finding and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to contest the deadly-weapon finding. I will briefly address each ground in turn.
A. Insufficient Evidence for Deadly-Weapon Finding
Applicant argues that his use of a motor vehicle during the commission of the offense does not meet the definition of a deadly weapon. In support, Applicant asserts that there was no proof he fled the scene of the accident in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, as no witnesses reported that he drove erratically or dangerously, disregarded traffic signs, or sped off. Applicant argues instead that the evidence would show his vehicle was damaged from the accident and was incapable of exceeding a speed of fifteen miles per hour.
See Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(17) (" ‘Deadly weapon’ means: ... (B) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.").
It is well established that the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction cannot be attacked collaterally in a postconviction application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Williams , 703 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). This is because "the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as substitute for or to usurp the function of an appeal." Id. Moreover, Applicant pleaded guilty to the charged offense and stipulated to the deadly-weapon finding. A voluntary and knowing plea of guilty is sufficient to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for each element of the offense. Ex parte Martin , 747 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). "The entry of a valid guilty plea has the effect of admitting all material facts alleged in the formal criminal charge." Ex parte Williams , 703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). For these reasons, Applicant is not entitled to relief on this ground and the Court appropriately denies relief.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Applicant also claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not argue against the deadly-weapon finding. Applicant further alleges that he suffered prejudice because the deadly-weapon finding increased the amount of time he must serve before reaching parole eligibility.
With the filing of his writ, Applicant attached a letter he sent his attorney documenting his concern about the applicability of the deadly-weapon finding, as well as case law he believed supported his position. The habeas court ordered trial counsel to respond to Applicant's claim with an affidavit. Trial counsel failed to respond. While it is concerning that trial counsel ignored the order of the habeas court and shirked his duty, Applicant's allegations do not support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel finding.
The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is laid out in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, an applicant has the burden to prove that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial to the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The deficiency prong requires a showing that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ " Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana , 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955) ). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
Applicant's allegations cannot satisfy the Strickland burden because Applicant accepted the plea agreement and pled guilty to the offense and the deadly-weapon finding. Applicant has not alleged that his plea was involuntary, and the record shows that Applicant was properly admonished prior to entering his guilty plea. If Applicant wanted counsel to challenge the finding, he should have rejected the plea offer and gone to trial. Accordingly, Applicant fails to allege sufficient facts under either the deficiency or prejudice prong and is not entitled to relief on this ground.
II. The Delay
Turning to the matter of the extended delay in resolving Applicant's habeas application, I wish to provide Applicant with a brief explanation for why it has taken this Court a decade to rule on his case. It has recently come to this Court's attention that dozens, possibly hundreds, of applications for writs of habeas corpus filed in Harris County during the past several decades were not timely forwarded to this Court. It is only in the past several months that the long-delayed applications have finally been forwarded. No reason or justification has yet emerged for this breakdown in the Harris County District Clerk's office, which plainly violates the procedural rules governing resolution of habeas applications. The sheer volume of cases this Court has received with extraordinary delays is clear evidence of a systemic failure in Harris County's processes for handling postconviction habeas applications. Ultimately, I acknowledge that the situation is extremely troubling, completely unacceptable, and terribly unfair to the applicants who have waited for years for any response regarding their applications. I urge Harris County to properly investigate the reason for these "lost and found" writs and ensure that nothing like this ever happens again.
See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(5) (providing that, on the 181st day after the application is received by the State, the district court "shall forward the writ record to this Court unless the district court has received an extension of time from the Court of Criminal Appeals"); Id. R. 73.5 ("Within 180 days from the date of receipt of the application by the State, the convicting court shall resolve any issues that the court has timely designated for resolution.").
Nevertheless, while I acknowledge this significant problem in the handling of Applicant's postconviction writ applications, for the reasons already explained above, I agree with the Court that Applicant has failed to establish entitlement to relief. Therefore, I join the Court's decision denying relief.