Opinion
SC-2023-0626
10-13-2023
Ex parte M.H. v. Talladega County Department of Human Resources In re: M.H.
Talladega Juvenile Court: JU-20-172.05; Court of Civil Appeals: CL-2022-1142
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SELLERS, JUSTICE
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
Wise, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion.
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the Court's denial of the petition for the writ of certiorari in this termination-of-parental-rights case. I write separately to address the arguments surrounding my special writing in Ex parte Bodie, [Ms. 1210248, Oct. 14, 2022] ____ So.3d _____, _____ (Ala. 2022), and to provide some further guidance as to the "more coherent analytical framework" I suggested therein. Id. at ___ (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
This Court has adopted strict scrutiny as the standard of review in termination-of-parental-rights cases. See Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So.3d 634, 643-45 (Ala. 2011); see also § 26-1-6, Ala. Code 1975. In my special writing in Bodie, I suggested application of the strict-scrutiny standard by employing a three-part analysis to determine (1) that grounds for termination exist, (2) that no viable alternative to termination exists, and (3) that termination is in the best interest of the child. Ex parte Bodie, ____ So.3d at ____. The emotional bond between a parent and a child is relevant only as to part (3) of that analysis. Id. at ___. Although that emotional bond is important, and its preservation a worthy goal, it cannot by itself prevent a court from terminating parental rights in the face of grounds for termination and the lack of any viable alternative. As I said in Bodie, the best interest of the child is "not a 'super factor' that can override the first two, constitutional, elements." Id. at ___.
I believe this State's juvenile courts need a more coherent analytical framework for the termination of parental rights. My stance in Bodie has not changed. However, the petitioner here has not provided this Court with an opportunity to apply strict-scrutiny review, as required by Ex parte E.R.G., using the analytical framework I suggested in Bodie. He has asked this Court to determine whether the termination of parental rights despite the existence of an emotional bond is a material question of first impression for this Court. And to that question, the answer is no. For this reason, I concur.