Ex Parte McReynolds

13 Citing cases

  1. Gibbons v. State

    676 So. 2d 956 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)   Cited 6 times
    Holding defendant escaped from custody after officer grabbed his wrist and told him he was under arrest

    " The appellant, relying on Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886 (Ala. 1994), asserts that he was not in "custody" because, he argues, Detective Foshee's attempt to arrest him was not completed. After examining the relevant caselaw, we hold that the appellant was "in custody" under these circumstances so as to support the conviction for escape in the third degree. The United States Supreme Court has held that for purposes of determining whether a person is in "custody," "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest."

  2. State v. Stroud

    207 Ariz. 476 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 6 times

    ¶ 11 Stroud cites various cases from other jurisdictions in support of his argument that "a consistent definition of `arrest' is required for both statutes." See Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886 (Ala. 1994) (defendant convicted of possession of marijuana, assault, and first-degree escape); People v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1996) (defendant charged with escape); People v. Becoates, 451 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App.Div. 1982) (defendant pled guilty to possession of stolen property and was convicted of second-degree escape); Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (defendant convicted of escape and possession of cocaine). Although none of those cases involved a situation in which the defendant had been charged with and convicted of both resisting arrest and escape, and those courts were not confronted with reconciling those two charged offenses after the defendant was convicted of both, they do yield some instructive language.

  3. Crawford v. State

    671 So. 2d 773 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    The State contends that the appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal was properly denied because, according to Sanders v. State, 512 So.2d 809, 811 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), a person is in custody even when "he is lawfully physically restrained for the briefest period of time." However, in Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886 (Ala. 1994), the Alabama Supreme Court overruled Sanders "[t]o any degree . . . [that it] intimates that the arrest need not be completed for the crime of escape to be committed." The Court stated that the distinction between "escape from custody" and "resisting arrest" is that one cannot escape from custody until one is in custody and that one is not in custody until he has been arrested.

  4. State v. Stroud

    209 Ariz. 410 (Ariz. 2005)   Cited 200 times
    Holding defendant escaped from custody when officer grabbed the collar of his shirt and told him he was under arrest

    ¶ 9 In concluding that Stroud was never in custody, the court of appeals relied upon definitions of custody derived from other jurisdictions. Id. at 479-80, ¶¶ 11-12, 88 P.3d at 193-94 (citing Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886 (Ala. 1994); People v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1996); People v. Becoats, 88 A.D.2d 766, 451 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1982); Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)).

  5. White v. Commonwealth

    267 Va. 96 (Va. 2004)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that the Court will not consider assignments of error as modified by appellant's opening brief, but only as granted by the Court

    Accordingly, we further hold that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to convict White of felony escape under Code § 18.2-479(B). Although we have found no case precisely on point with the facts here, our decision is in general accord with decisions of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886, 888 (Ala. 1994) ("One cannot escape from custody until one is in custody . . . [which] is defined as a restraint or detention `pursuant to a lawful arrest' "); Hubbard v. State, 800 P.2d 952, 954 (Alaska 1990) ("if an officer approaches an offender for the purpose of making an arrest, which he is unable to do because the other eludes him by running away, there has been no `escape' "); People v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 729, 734 (Colo. 1996) ("for a suspect to be `in custody' . . . an officer must have effected the suspect's arrest by establishing physical control of the suspect sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the suspect will not leave"); State v. Ryan, 612 P.2d 102, 103 (Haw. 1980) ("once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him to the police station or to a judge has commenced, his arrest is complete, and he is in `custody,' for the purposes of the escape statute"). CONCLUSION

  6. People v. Thornton

    929 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1997)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that, under the proper construction of the escape statute, probable cause existed to believe the defendant was “in custody” before fleeing

    Cases from other jurisdictions support construction of an escape statute to require the degree and continuity of physical control inherent in effecting an arrest to satisfy the "in custody" element of an escape statute. Although the statutory frameworks and precise holdings vary, a common theme is that effecting an arrest, in the sense of establishing physical control for a continuing detention, is the point at which the potential for an escape charge begins and the potential for a less serious charge such as resisting arrest ends. See, e.g., Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886, 888 (Ala. 1994) (words of arrest, alone, do not establish "custody" so as to support a charge of escape from custody); State v. Sanchez, 701 P.2d 571, 573 (Ariz. 1985) (actual restraint or submission to custody is necessary to support a charge of escape from custody); People v. Kosyla, 494 N.E.2d 945, 954-55 (Ill.App.Ct. 1986) (escape charge not supported in absence of actual restraint or submission); State v. Logan, 654 P.2d 492, 494-95 (Kan.Ct.App. 1982) (authority and intent to detain suspect not sufficient to support escape charge in absence of restraint or submission where suspect evaded custody by leaving station house); State v. Daley, 411 A.2d 410, 411-12 (Me. 1980) (the custody required to support an escape charge requires physical seizure by arresting officer or submission to officer's control); People v. Caffey, 521 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (N.Y.App. Div.

  7. Crawford v. State

    671 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 1995)

    MADDOX, Justice (dissenting). I dissent from the order quashing the writ, because I believe this case is substantially similar to Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886 (Ala. 1994), which involved an escape conviction. I dissented in McReynolds.

  8. Hunter v. State

    867 So. 2d 361 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)   Cited 10 times
    Affirming an escape conviction on facts similar to Gibbons and this case

    '" Gibbons v. State, 676 So.2d 956, 957 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). The Alabama Supreme Court held that for purposes of the escape statute, a person is not in "custody" until his arrest is completed. Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886 (Ala. 1994). A person's arrest is complete when there is an assertion of the intent to arrest followed by either physical touching or submission of the arrestee.

  9. Walker v. State

    881 So. 2d 1059 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)

    " Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886, 888 (Ala. 1994). The question, then, is whether Walker's arrest was lawful.

  10. Chambers v. City of Opelika

    698 So. 2d 792 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times

    The crime of harassment is not a lesser included offense of menacing because one does not necessarily have to fulfill the elements of harassment to be guilty of the crime of menacing. See Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So.2d 886 (Ala. 1994) reh'g denied on remand, McReynolds v. State, 662 So.2d 890 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (holding that resisting arrest is not a lesser included offense of the crime of escape). One can fulfill the requirements of menacing without unconsented touching or use of abusive language or obscene gestures required for the crime of harassment. For instance, one could silently and without the accompaniment of obscene gestures aim a gun at another and place them in fear of imminent serious physical injury and be guilty of menacing but not harassment.