No. 05-10-01354-CR
Opinion Filed March 22, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. WX10-90027-X.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG-MIERS and FILLMORE.
Opinion By Justice LANG-MIERS.
Michael Logan filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking to avoid extradition to Tennessee. The application was referred to a magistrate who conducted a hearing on the application during which the Governor's warrant and supporting documents were admitted into evidence. The magistrate denied relief. Subsequently, the trial court denied relief. Appellant brings a sole issue on appeal complaining that the trial court erred in denying relief because his detainment under a fugitive warrant for four years without access to counsel violated his right to due process of law. We affirm the trial court's order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court's decision to deny habeas corpus relief for an abuse of discretion. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Appellant bears the burden to prove that he is entitled to the relief he seeks by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. We review the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. In conducting our review, we afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts the record supports, especially when the fact findings require an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Ex parte Amezquita, 223 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). BACKGROUND
During the hearing on his writ application, appellant offered his handwritten, six-page statement into evidence. In his statement, appellant alleges he was arrested in 2006 under a fugitive warrant issued by Davidson County, Tennessee and also for offenses he was alleged to have committed in Van Zandt and Dallas Counties in Texas. Appellant alleges he was arraigned before a Van Zandt County magistrate and asked for counsel at that time and that counsel was never appointed to represent him. Unable to make the $200,000 bail assessed in Van Zandt County, he was confined in the Van Zandt County jail from September 18, 2006 until the Van Zandt County case was dismissed on December 19, 2009. He was then transferred to the Dallas County jail. Appellant alleges the Dallas County case against him was dismissed on August 20, 2010, and he was confined after that under the extradition detainer. Appellant alleges that although a "Detainer/Hold For Extradition To Tennessee" was placed against him in 2006, Van Zandt officials told him he would not be returned to Tennessee until his pending Texas charges were resolved, and that the authorities in Van Zandt and Dallas Counties in Texas and Davidson County in Tennessee did not contact the Governors of Texas and Tennessee to begin the extradition process until April 2010. On appeal, appellant contends that due process required that he be appointed counsel at the time he was detained under the fugitive warrant. Appellant contends that the lengthy delay between his arrest and the issuance of the Governor's warrant "without the benefit of counsel was an error so great as to fatally corrupt the actual issuance of the warrant." Appellant was not, however, only detained pursuant to the fugitive warrant. Instead, he was also detained to answer charges in two separate Texas counties. APPLICABLE LAW
The filing of a Governor's warrant and its supporting papers constitutes a prima facie case authorizing extradition. Ex parte Worden, 502 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). The burden then shifts to the petitioner to show the illegality of his arrest. Id. An indigent petitioner has the right to have counsel appointed so that he might file an application for writ of habeas corpus to contest his extradition. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13 § 10 (West 2006); Ex parte Potter, 21 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Extradition proceedings are limited in scope in order to facilitate a swift and efficient transfer of custody to the demanding state. Potter, 21 S.W.3d at 294. Only four issues may be raised to challenge an extradition: (1) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (2) whether appellant has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (3) whether appellant is the same person named in the extradition request; and (4) whether appellant is a fugitive. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978); State ex rel. Holmes v. Klevenhagen, 819 S.W.2d 539, 542-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Issuance of a valid Governor's warrant renders moot any complaint about confinement under a fugitive warrant. See Worden, 502 S.W.2d at 805. ANALYSIS
Appellant's complaint is that he was not appointed counsel early enough. But this Court has held that an accused is not entitled to appointment of counsel in extradition proceedings until after the Governor issues a Governor's warrant. See Ex parte Ransom, 726 S.W.2d 203, 204-05 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.). The Governor's warrant here was issued on June 3, 2010. After that warrant issued, complaints regarding confinement under the fugitive warrant became moot. After the Governor's warrant issued, counsel was appointed to represent appellant. Appellant relies on dicta in Ex parte Werne, 118 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no. pet.) where the court upheld the petitioner's extradition but stated it would not declare that no circumstances exist in which an underlying proceeding fatally corrupts a later proceeding. See id. at 837. But, even if there hypothetically could be such circumstances, none exist here. And appellant did not raise any issues to challenge the extradition which are allowed under Doran. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 289. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole issue. We affirm the trial court's order.