BOLIN, Justice.This Court granted B.C.'s petition for certiorari review based on our recent decision in Ex parte L.J., 176 So.3d 186 (Ala.2014), in which this Court held that a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under § 12–15–114, Ala.Code 1975, of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, § 12–15–101 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the AJJA”), over a termination-of-parental-rights action when the subject of the termination was not a child alleged “to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision.” We reverse and remand.

176 So.3d at 185. On the mother's petition for a writ of certiorari, however, the supreme court reversed this court's decision, holding that the juvenile court did have jurisdiction over the case. Ex parte L.J., 176 So.3d 186, 207 (Ala.2014). The supreme court remanded the cause to this court for us to consider the father's remaining arguments, which had been pretermitted by this court on original submission because of our dismissal of the appeal.

ing Corp., 64 N.Y.2d; Matter of Scism v Fiala, 122 A.D.3d 1197 [3d Dept 2014]; Matter of Jamaica Recycling Corp v City of NY, 38 A.D.3d 398 [1st Dept 2007]; Matter of Trifaro v Town of Colonie, 31 A.D.3d 821 [3d Dept 2006]; D'Agostino Bros Enters v Vecchio, 13 A.D.3d 369 [2d Dept 2004]; Linder v Schneider, 176 A.D.2d 319 [2d Dept 1991]). Courts around the country, from the Founding until now, have held that when the law changes in this way the change in law can be raised for the first time on appeal, even before a court of last resort. (See, e.g., United States v Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 226 [1934]; Hamling v United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101-102 [1974]; Henderson v United States, 568 U.S. 266, 271-277 [2013]; Demars v First Service Bank for Savings, 907 F.2d 1237 [1st Cir 1990]; EEOC v Westinghouse Elec Corp, 765 F.2d 389 [3rd Cir 1985]; Alexander S. v Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1388 [4th Cir 1997]; Deck v Peter Romein's Sons, Inc., 109 F.3d 383, 386 [7th Cir 1997]; Ex parte L.J., 176 So.3d 186, 194 [Ala 2014]; Fresneda v State, 458 P.2d 134, 143 [Alaska 1969]; People v Bank of San Luis Obispo, 159 Cal 65, 68-69 [1910]; Nevada D.H.H.S. Div. of Welfare v Lizama, 2016-SCC-0031-FAM, 2017 WL 6547070, at *4 [N Mariana Is., Dec. 21, 2017].) Several of our cases speak to that very point.

Property rights are considered to be "vested rights." See Vestavia Plaza, LLC v. City of Vestavia Hills, No. 2:11-cv-4152-TMP, 2013 WL 4804196, Sept. 9, 2013 (N.D. Ala.2013) (not reported in Federal Supplement) ("[T]here can be little question that ownership of real property and the ‘bundle’ of rights associated with its use are well-recognized and protected property interests for due process purposes under the constitution."); Ex parte L.J., 176 So. 3d 186, 203 (Ala. 2014)(Bolin, J., concurring in the result)(observing that "vested rights" are "contract or property rights"); and Bryson v. Central Elec. Co., 402 So. 2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1981) ("‘In order to become vested, the right. must be … a property right….’" (quoting 1A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23.34 at 283 (Sands ed. 1972))).

(not reported in Federal Supplement) ("[T]here can be little question that ownership of real property and the 'bundle' of rights associated with its use are well-recognized and protected property interests for due process purposes under the constitution."); Ex parte L.J., 176 So.3d 186, 203 (Ala. 2014)(Bolin, J., concurring in the result)(observing that "vested rights" are "contract or property rights"); and

" ‘[W]hen one parent seeks to terminate the other parent’s parental rights, a "finding of dependency" is not required, and the trial court should determine whether the petitioner has met the statutory burden of proof and whether that termination is in the child’s best interest, in light of the surrounding circumstances.’ " Ex parte L.J., 176 So. 3d 186, 189-90 (Ala. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d at 954). It is well settled that the paramount concern in a termination-of-parental-rights action is the best interest of the child.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.; Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P.; Ala. Code 1975, §§ 12-15-301(1), 12-19-317, 12-19-319(a)(1), & 12-15-319(d); Ex parte L.J., 176 So. 3d 186, 192 (Ala. 2014); Soutullo v. Mobile Cnty., 58 So. 3d 733, 739 (Ala. 2010); Ex parte Johnson, 474 So. 2d 715, 717 (Ala. 1985); C.P.P. v. L.J.B., [Ms. 2180953, Feb. 28, 2020] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2020); K.S.B. v. M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650, 655 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016); T.B. v. Lee Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 216 So. 3d 1246, 1251 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016); C.C. v. L.J., 176 So. 3d 208, 216 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015); and D.F.C. v. T.D., 142 So. 3d 1159, 1160 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Edwards, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

NO OPINION. See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.; Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; Act No. 2014-350, Ala. Acts 2014; Ex parte B.C., 178 So. 3d 853 (Ala. 2015); Ex parte L.J., 176 So. 3d 186 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1132 (Ala. 2009); J.L. v. Morgan Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 182 So. 3d 570, 571-72 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015); Hobbs v. Heisey, 118 So. 3d 187, 190-92 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012); and Woodward v. State ex rel. Woodward, 664 So. 2d 211, 214 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). All the judges concur.

Although the AJJA no longer contains language explicitly stating that a juvenile court's exclusive original jurisdiction over dependency matters does not "deprive other courts of the right to determine the custody ... [of a child] when such custody ... is incidental to the determination of cases pending in those courts," former § 12–15–30(b)(1), our supreme court recently determined that the omission from the AJJA of other jurisdictional language that had existed in a precursor statute did not indicate that the legislature had intended to alter the traditional boundaries of jurisdiction between the circuit courts and the juvenile courts. See Ex parte L.J. , 176 So.3d 186, 192 (Ala.2014) (holding that "[i]t is ... unlikely that the legislature intended to foreclose a parent from filing a termination petition against another parent" in the juvenile court by omitting from the AJJA language that appeared in former § 12–15–30(b)(6), Ala.Code 1975, which granted the juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction over all termination-of-parental-rights proceedings). Accordingly, we conclude that the omission from the AJJA of the language regarding concurrent jurisdiction previously found in former § 12–15–30(b)(1) does not deprive a circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction over matters pertaining to custody of a child who has been previously adjudicated dependent by a juvenile court.

The supreme court held that “ ‘a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under § 12–15–114[, Ala.Code 1975,] over a termination-of-parental-rights claim when the subject of the termination was not a child alleged “to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision.” ’ ” 178 So.3d at 855 (quoting Ex parte L.J., 176 So.3d 186, 194 (Ala.2014)), and it remanded the cause to this court for us to consider any arguments that had been pretermitted by this court on original submission. 178 So.3d at 858.The remaining issue to be addressed by this court is the father's argument that, based on the failure to comply with Ala.Code 1975, § 12–15–120, the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.