Opinion
19297
October 7, 1971.
Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Emmet H. Clair, and John P. Wilson, Asst. Attys. Gen., of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to the lower Court's exceeding its authority in directing the commitment of a child under the age of seventeen (17) years to the South Carolina Department of Corrections for service of sentence and in declaring the commitment provisions of the Correction of Juveniles Act to be arbitrary and irrational and without binding effect upon the sentencing power of that court: Correction of Juveniles Act. Act No. 386, Acts and Joint Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 1969; Sec. 55-50.30, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962), as amended; 251 S.C. 242, 161 S.E.2d 822; U.S. 435, 447, 24 L.Ed.2d 634. 645; 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645; 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206; 244 S.C. 425, 431, 137 S.E.2d 608, 611; 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111; 249 S.C. 605, 155 S.E.2d 916; 392 F.2d 440, 444. As to the lower Court's exceeding its authority in designating the degree of restraint and choice of confinement facility under which a sentence of imprisonment was to be served: Sec. 55-321. 1, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962); Sec, 55-303.
Marion H. Kinon, Esq., Solicitor, of Dillion, for Respondent.
October 7, 1971.
Upon conviction of robbery, the sixteen-year-old defendant was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in the Department of Corrections. The director of that department refused to receive the defendant into custody, whereupon the sentencing court ordered the director to do so. The director has appealed from this order.
Section 55-50.30, Code of 1962 (Supp. 1970), prescribes the conditions under which juveniles below the age of seventeen may be committed to the custody of the Board of Juvenile Corrections or the Board of Juvenile Placement and Aftercare. The section further provides that "(n)o child under the age of seventeen years shall be committed or sentenced to any other penal or correctional institution of this State for a period exceeding thirty days."
The lower court declared this provision "arbitrary and irrational when applied to this defendant in light of the present unavailability of adequately secure correctional facilities within the Board of Juvenile Corrections"; the statutory provision was thereupon found to be "without binding effect upon the inherent sentencing power of this court."
The circuit court has no inherent authority to sentence those convicted of crime to the state penitentiary and may not do so without statutory authorization. State v. Hord, 8 S.C. 84 (1876). Applicable statutory provisions with respect to the place of confinement are obligatory upon the sentencing court, 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, Sec. 593 (1965); 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2000 (1962). The commitment of the sixteen-year-old defendant to the Department of Corrections was contrary to law.
Reversed. Let the defendant, Robert McKinley, be returned to the Court of General Sessions for Dillon County for the imposition of a lawful sentence.