Opinion
No. 05-05-00584-CR
Opinion Filed September 16, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 199-81702-02. Affirm.
Before Justices MORRIS, LANG, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sebastian Green Lamar appeals the trial court's order denying him release on a personal bond pending appeal. We affirm the trial court's order. A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault and assessed punishment at five years' imprisonment. An affirmative deadly weapon finding was also made. The trial court's judgment has been affirmed on direct appeal. See Lamar v. State, No. 05-04-00741-CR (Tex.App.-Dallas Aug. 9, 2005, no pet. h.). During the pendency of the appeal, appellant filed a motion for release on a personal bond. The trial court denied appellant's motion and this appeal followed. Appellant, who is representing himself in this appeal, filed a brief that attacks only the underlying conviction. It raises no issues related to the denial of the personal bond. Appellant, as a pro se litigant, is not entitled to any special treatment and is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys. See Kindley v. State, 879 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.). Failure to properly brief the complaints leaves us without anything to review. See id. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, we have reviewed the record before us. The only interest furthered by an appellant's right to remain free during an appeal is the interest in protecting the appellant from an erroneous judgment. Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). That interest must be balanced against society's interest in enforcing the penal laws. Id. This Court has reviewed the merits of appellant's conviction on appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment. See Lamar, No. 05-04-00741-CR. Therefore, appellant's interest in being protected from an erroneous judgment has been fulfilled. Moreover, the judge who presided over the trial heard evidence that could have reasonably led him to believe appellant would commit a new offense while on bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for release on a personal bond. See Ex parte Turner, 612 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (review ruling on appeal bond under abuse of discretion standard). We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant's motion for a personal bond.