Opinion
WR-94,542-01
04-19-2023
EX PARTE ALLEN MAURICE JOHNSON, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 20508-B(1) IN THE 104TH DISTRICT COURT FROM TAYLOR COUNTY
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Applicant pleaded guilty to failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal. Johnson v. State, No. 11-17-00286-CR (Tex. App. - Eastland March 22, 2018) (not designated for publication). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 11.07.
Applicant contends, among other things, that he is actually innocent and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Due to errors in the Sex Offender Registry paperwork at the time of his plea, all of the parties incorrectly believed that Applicant was required to register for approximately ten years after the registration requirement should have expired. The errors in the record were not corrected until April of 2022. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that Applicant has established by clear and convincing evidence that he is actually innocent, and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.
We agree. Relief is granted. Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The judgment in cause number 20508B in the 104th District Court of Taylor County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Taylor County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within ten days from the date of this Court's mandate.
Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Today the Court grants Applicant post-conviction habeas relief based on his claims of actual innocence and involuntary plea. I agree that Applicant is entitled to relief. I write separately to briefly express my disagreement with the Court's jurisprudence surrounding actual innocence.
I agree with the Court that Applicant has satisfied the burden established in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Where my thinking differs is that the Court declares Applicant to be “actually innocent” by virtue of meeting this standard alone. For reasons that I have expressed before, I disagree with the Court's use of the term “actually innocent” when granting relief under Elizondo; simply satisfying the Elizondo burden is not enough to prove literal “actual innocence.” See Ex parte Cacy, 543 S.W.3d 802, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (Yeary, J., concurring) (“The Elizondo standard, on its face, does not really focus on innocence per se. It is, instead, an exceedingly high burden by which an applicant must show that, if newly available evidence were added to the evidentiary mix, no reasonable jury would have found the State's case to have been compelling enough to defeat the systemic presumption of innocence.”).
Still, I am persuaded that Applicant is, in fact, "actually innocent" in an "absolute sense," as described by my concurring opinion in Ex parte Warfield, 618 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (Yeary, J., concurring). On that basis, I respectfully concur.