Ex Parte Jackson

54 Citing cases

  1. Whatley v. Hamm

    CIV. ACT. 1:19-cv-938-TFM-N (S.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2023)

    Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982); Ex parte Jackson, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994).

  2. Whatley v. State

    146 So. 3d 437 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)   Cited 50 times
    Holding that evidence of a capital defendant's future dangerousness is admissible during the penalty phase of the trial under § 13A-5-45(d), Ala. Code 1975

    “The trial court may refuse an instruction on a lesser included offense if it is clear to the judicial mind that there is no rational basis to support the instruction.” Ex parte Jackson, 674 So.2d 1365, 1367 (Ala.1994).

  3. Waldrop v. State

    859 So. 2d 1138 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)   Cited 51 times
    Noting under Alabama statutes "unanimity is not required in the penalty phase. Ten votes are required in order to recommend death. At least seven votes are required in order to recommend life without parole"

    In Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), aff'd as to conviction, rev'd and rem'd as to sentence, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994), this Court stated: "'"'[U]nless intoxication, in and of itself, so impairs the defendant's mind that he is "unconscious of the meaning of his words," the fact that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he confessed is simply one factor to be considered when reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.' Carr v. State, 545 So.2d 820, 824 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989).

  4. Grayson v. State

    824 So. 2d 804 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that defendant kidnapped hitchhiker even though victim voluntarily entered defendant's car

    Although the appellant claims that his being interrogated between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. caused his statement to be involuntary, such alleged fatigue is only a factor to be considered by the jury in determining whether it finds a statement to be involuntary. In Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318, 1326-28 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd in pertinent part, reversed in part, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994), on return to remand, 674 So.2d 1370 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995), the appellant claimed that his statement was involuntary because "he had not slept since the previous night, and the officers continued to interrogate him, despite what he describes as his state of sleep deprivation."

  5. Thomas v. State

    766 So. 2d 860 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)   Cited 86 times
    Holding that Thomas's Eighth Amendment claim was procedurally barred under state procedural rules and that as a matter of federal constitutional law, Thomas's Eighth Amendment claim was without merit

    In regard to Thomas's allegation of the prosecutor's unfavorable comparison of this case with others, we note that the prosecutor did not say that these observations were his personal opinion. Thus these comments did not have the impact of the comments in Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318, 1335 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd in pertinent part, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994). There, the trial court had to admonish the prosecutor not to make arguments that "of all the cases I have tried . . . this case was the most. . . ." Id. at 1335.

  6. Mitchell v. State

    706 So. 2d 787 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that a defendant was not entitled to the benefits of juvenile Miranda rights because he was 18 years and 6 months old

    Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318, 1362 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd. in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994) (quoting DeBruce v. State, 651 So.2d 599, 622 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd. 651 So.2d 624 (Ala. 1994)).

  7. Gaddy v. State

    698 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)   Cited 110 times
    Holding in the absence of any objection, a defendant's complaint that he was absent during a post-trial hearing must be analyzed under the plain error rule

    However, the officer stated that the appellant appeared coherent and responsive and that he did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), affirmed as to conviction, reversed and remanded as to sentence, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994), the defendant, who had been convicted of capital murder, alleged that his statements were involuntary because he said he was intoxicated when he gave his first statement, which was given on the same day of his arrest. In that case, the defendant had been arrested for driving under the influence and the evidence clearly showed that the defendant had been drinking at a club.

  8. Jenkins v. Allen

    Case no. 4:08-cv-00869-VEH (N.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    'There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson [v. State ], 612 So.2d [1288] at 1294 [ (Ala.Crim.App. 1992) ]; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1995). ' "Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known . . . of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence."

  9. James v. Culliver

    Civil Action No. CV-10-S-2929-S (N.D. Ala. Sep. 30, 2014)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that a petitioner will be deemed to have procedurally defaulted a claim if the petitioner "fails to initially present a federal claim to the state courts at the time, and in the manner, dictated by the state's procedural rules," and the state court thus decides "that the claim is not entitled to review on its merits"

    "'There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson [v. State], 612 So. 2d [1288] at 1294 [ (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ]; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So. 2d 1318 (Ala. Cr. App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So. 2d 1365 (Ala. 1995). "Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known . . . of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence."

  10. Giles v. Culliver

    Case No. CV-06-S-348-S (N.D. Ala. Apr. 3, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    "'There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson [v. State ], 612 So. 2d [1288] at 1294 [ (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ]; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So. 2d 1318 (Ala. Cr. App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So. 2d 1365 (Ala. 1995). ' "Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known ... of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence."