Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982); Ex parte Jackson, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994).
“The trial court may refuse an instruction on a lesser included offense if it is clear to the judicial mind that there is no rational basis to support the instruction.” Ex parte Jackson, 674 So.2d 1365, 1367 (Ala.1994).
In Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), aff'd as to conviction, rev'd and rem'd as to sentence, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994), this Court stated: "'"'[U]nless intoxication, in and of itself, so impairs the defendant's mind that he is "unconscious of the meaning of his words," the fact that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he confessed is simply one factor to be considered when reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.' Carr v. State, 545 So.2d 820, 824 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989).
Although the appellant claims that his being interrogated between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. caused his statement to be involuntary, such alleged fatigue is only a factor to be considered by the jury in determining whether it finds a statement to be involuntary. In Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318, 1326-28 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd in pertinent part, reversed in part, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994), on return to remand, 674 So.2d 1370 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995), the appellant claimed that his statement was involuntary because "he had not slept since the previous night, and the officers continued to interrogate him, despite what he describes as his state of sleep deprivation."
In regard to Thomas's allegation of the prosecutor's unfavorable comparison of this case with others, we note that the prosecutor did not say that these observations were his personal opinion. Thus these comments did not have the impact of the comments in Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318, 1335 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd in pertinent part, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994). There, the trial court had to admonish the prosecutor not to make arguments that "of all the cases I have tried . . . this case was the most. . . ." Id. at 1335.
Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318, 1362 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd. in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994) (quoting DeBruce v. State, 651 So.2d 599, 622 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd. 651 So.2d 624 (Ala. 1994)).
However, the officer stated that the appellant appeared coherent and responsive and that he did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), affirmed as to conviction, reversed and remanded as to sentence, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1994), the defendant, who had been convicted of capital murder, alleged that his statements were involuntary because he said he was intoxicated when he gave his first statement, which was given on the same day of his arrest. In that case, the defendant had been arrested for driving under the influence and the evidence clearly showed that the defendant had been drinking at a club.
'There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson [v. State ], 612 So.2d [1288] at 1294 [ (Ala.Crim.App. 1992) ]; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1995). ' "Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known . . . of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence."
"'There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson [v. State], 612 So. 2d [1288] at 1294 [ (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ]; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So. 2d 1318 (Ala. Cr. App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So. 2d 1365 (Ala. 1995). "Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known . . . of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence."
"'There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson [v. State ], 612 So. 2d [1288] at 1294 [ (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ]; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So. 2d 1318 (Ala. Cr. App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So. 2d 1365 (Ala. 1995). ' "Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known ... of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence."