The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that this amendment is not applicable retroactively. Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185, 187, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App., 1976). We have determined that Texas is not constitutionally required to apply this article retroactively.

parte Pizzalota, 610 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980) (credit for time of release from prison in disregard of detainer); Ex parte Tarlton, 582 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979) (credit for time of release from prison after county of subsequent conviction failed to notify prison that appeal had been withdrawn); Ex parte Bates, 538 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976) (credit for time of release from prison after county of subsequent conviction failed to notify prison that conviction had been affirmed on appeal); Ex parte Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976) (same); Ex parte Downey, 471 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971) (credit for time of release from prison when notification of subsequent conviction had not yet arrived at prison); Ex parte Morgan, 159 Tex.Crim. 241, 262 S.W.2d 728 (1953) (credit for time of release from jail after sentence when trial court, without authority, ordered release). These include Ex parte Kuester, 21 S.W.3d 264, 272 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002) (stating the rule in dictum), and Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976) (no credit for time of release during which applicant contested extradition). IV.

Ibid.Ex parte Yates, 659 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Ex parte Morris, 626 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982); Hurd, 613 S.W.2d at 744; Ex parte Tarlton, 582 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976); Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d at 341; Ex parte Downey, 471 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Crim.App. 1971); Ex parte Bates, 538 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976). Of course, to prevail in habeas, an applicant must show harm.

On February 12, 1997, applicant was transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, to serve the instant sentences. Applicant's case calls into play a well-established rule that a sentence cannot be required to be served in installments; it must be served as one continuous, uninterrupted sentence. Ex parte Hurd, 613 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Ex parte Tarlton, 582 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex parte Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d 339(Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex parte Downey, 471 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971). Thus, when a sentence begins is obviously a critical fact to calculate credit because it must run continuously except for conditional release authorized by statute.

While it is better practice for the formal sentence to reflect whether the sentence is to run concurrently or to be cumulative with other outstanding sentences, it is well settled that where a trial court does not order two or more sentences to be cumulative, the terms of imprisonment shall automatically run concurrently. Ex parte Bates, 538 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976), and cases there cited. See also Ex parte Ward, 161 Tex.Crim. R., 274 S.W.2d 693 (1955); Ex parte Sadler, 162 Tex.Crim. R., 283 S.W.2d 235 (1955).

If there is a plea bargain that the Texas sentence is to run concurrently with a sentence from a federal court, it means simply that and no more. The reverse is not true. The Texas court has no authority to control or place conditions on a sentence from a foreign jurisdiction. If the Texas sentence is running concurrently with the prior sentence of a federal court or a sister state, then the plea bargain is being kept, despite what the proper federal or sister state authorities do with the sentence from their jurisdiction. It is well settled that where a trial court does not order two or more sentences to be cumulative, the terms of imprisonment shall automatically run concurrently whether expressed in the formal sentence or not. Ex parte Bates, 538 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976), and cases there cited. If on the other hand, a Texas court, on approving a plea bargain, goes beyond its authority and assures a defendant that not only will his Texas sentence run concurrently with an outstanding sentence from another jurisdiction, but his other sentence will run concurrently with the Texas sentence, then the basis for a broken plea bargain may well be laid. This is particularly true where the foreign jurisdiction subsequently decides to place a detainer on the defendant with Texas authorities and ceases the "running" of his sentence from that jurisdiction until he is again in their custody.

Thus, an inmate who should not have been but was released from confinement is entitled to credit on a sentence for the time he was at liberty. A sentence must be continuous and an inmate cannot be required to serve his sentence in installments, unless it is shown that a premature or unlawful release of the inmate resulted or occurred through some fault on the part of the Page 843 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Ex parte Hurd, 613 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Ex parte Tarlton, 582 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex parte Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex parte Downey, 471 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); and Ex parte Bates, 538 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976). There is nothing in this cause to reflect that applicant was released from the Texas Department of Corrections because of any fault on his part.

There is no showing that petitioner was at fault in bringing about these delays. Compare Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Since the trial court is given the primary authority to determine credit for time spent in jail, we accept the trial court's determination that petitioner's conviction was "pending appeal" as of this date.

While the Texas Department of Corrections is authorized to award good time credits through Article 6184l, supra, it must be noted that the award of good time credit is not Mandatory but, rather, is dependent upon an inmate's Good conduct during the service of his sentence, whether it be in the county jail or in the state prison system. See Article 42.03, Sec. 4, supra; Article 6184l, supra; Ex parte Enriquez, 490 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Ex parte Bennett, 508 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Ex parte Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Ex parte Jasper, supra; Ex parte Bates, supra. The record in the case at bar shows that appellant has maintained a 'trusty' status while in the Smith County Jail; therefore, assuming continued good conduct, there is little doubt that appellant will be entitled to some commutation credit under Article 6184l, supra.

This Court has recently had occasion to review several cases in which inmates claim that clerical errors submitted by trial officials have prevented them from obtaining full credit toward the discharge of their sentences. See Ex parte Downey, 471 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Ex parte Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App. opinion delivered April 7, 1976). These cases set out the general rule that where a court does not order that two or more sentences in different prosecutions shall be cumulative, then the terms of imprisonment run concurrently, and the sentence begins to run on the date that it is pronounced, if the Petitioner is in custody.