Opinion
WR-94,786-01
06-07-2023
EX PARTE CHRISTOPHER DEWAYNE FLOWERS, Applicant
Do not publish
On Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Cause No. 1361743-A in the 232nd District Court from Harris County
KEEL, J., did not participate.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Applicant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to ninety days' imprisonment. Applicant did not file a direct appeal. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.
Applicant raises claims of false evidence, involuntary plea, and actual innocence related to the discovery of prior misconduct by former Houston Police Officer Gerald Goines, who was the sole witness against Applicant in his case. Based on the record, the trial court found that Applicant was denied due process by the use of false evidence against him and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The State and trial court both recommend granting relief on false evidence and involuntary plea grounds but not on actual innocence grounds. We agree.
Relief is granted. Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The judgment in cause number 1361743 in the 232nd District Court of Harris County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Harris County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within ten days from the date of this Court's mandate.
Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Applicant was convicted of delivery of less than a gram of cocaine, a state-jail felony, and sentenced pursuant to Section 12.44(a) of the Penal Code to confinement for ninety days. TEX. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 481.112(b); TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.44(a). Applicant now challenges his conviction in this Court through an application for writ of habeas corpus. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071. Applicant alleges that he was denied due process by the State's use of false evidence against him, that his plea was involuntary, and that he is actually innocent.
Without explicitly saying so, the Court today rightly rejects Applicant's claim that he is actually innocent. Instead, relying on the recommendations of both the State and the convicting court, and this Court's opinion in Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), as well as on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court grants Applicant relief on the basis of: (1) his claim that he was denied due process by the use of false evidence against him; and (2) his claim that his plea was involuntary. But I cannot join the Court's conclusion that Applicant's plea was involuntary.
Both the State and the convicting court reject the idea of granting relief to Applicant on the ground that he is actually innocent.
Unlike the Court, I see no need to determine whether Applicant's plea was involuntary. As I have observed before, "[t]his Court has yet to definitively say, in a published opinion, whether or not Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] applies to a guilty plea scenario" so as to render the plea involuntary. See Ex parte Yearling, 663 S.W.3d 695, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (Yeary, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804, 814 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)). It still has not done so, though purporting (needlessly, and in an unpublished opinion) to grant relief on that basis today. However, I concur with the Court's decision to grant relief on the ground that false evidence was used against him. I therefore concur, respectfully, but only in the Court's judgment.