Law Criminology 314, 324 (1990). In Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444 (Ala. 1992), the 18-year-old defendant was arrested for first degree robbery; the defendant applied for youthful offender status pursuant to § 15-19-1 et seq. From the record before the trial court, it was clear that the trial court denied the petition for youthful offender status simply because of the severity of the charge itself, first degree robbery. We held that the trial court erred in denying the petition solely on the basis of the criminal charge in and of itself.
He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request based solely on the severity of the capital-murder charges. Flowers cites the Alabama Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444 (Ala. 1991), to support his contention. The record shows that Flowers filed an application for YO status.
"[i]n determining whether to treat a defendant as a youthful offender, the trial court has nearly absolute discretion. Morgan v. State, 363 So.2d 1013 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978) ; see also, Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444, 449–50, n. 3 (Ala. 1991). There is no set method for considering a motion requesting such treatment.
“ ‘ “In determining whether to treat a defendant as a youthful offender, the trial court has nearly absolute discretion. Morgan v. State, 363 So.2d 1013 (Ala.Crim.App.1978); see, also, Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444, 449–50, n. 3 (Ala.1991). There is no set method for considering a motion requesting such treatment.
628 So.2d at 1036, quoting A.W.M., 627 So.2d at 1154. Similarly, in Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444 (Ala.1991), the Alabama Supreme Court stated that the criminal charge alone can not support a judicial ruling denying youthful-offender status. The same rationale applies to the present case.
628 So. 2d at 1036, quotingA.W.M., 627 So. 2d at 1154. Similarly, in Ex parte Farrell, 591 So. 2d 444 (Ala. 1991), the Alabama Supreme Court stated that the criminal charge alone can not support a judicial ruling denying youthful-offender status. The same rationale applies to the present case.
The trial court then asked the prosecutor what he would expect the evidence to establish. The trial court indicated that it had reviewed Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444 (Ala. 1991), which held that an individual may not be denied youthful offender status based solely on the nature of the charge. However, the case further established that the nature of the fact situation on which the charge was based may be grounds for denying youthful offender status.
TAYLOR, Judge. As directed by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444 (1991), the appellant's conviction of first degree robbery is reversed and this cause is remanded "to the trial court with instructions to enter an order granting [appellant's] petition for youthful offender status and to conduct further proceedings necessary to the disposition of the case under the youthful offender statutes." Farrell, 591 So.2d at 450.
He alleges that his trial counsel offered no evidence of his "psychological or social background, in particular the available evidence of his relative immaturity." (Doc. 36-1, p. 56 (citing Ex parte Farrell, 591 So. 2d 444, 448 (Ala. 1991))). In addition, Taylor concedes that counsel filed two subsequent motions for the trial court to reconsider its denial, but he argues effort was ineffective as well because counsel provided no grounds for reconsideration, grounds such as "the court could not summarily deny youthful offender status without indicating the basis for its order."
"Complicity is a theory for imposing criminal culpability, for which aiding and abetting may be an element." Ex parte Farrell, 591 So.2d 444, 447 (Ala.1991). In the circuit court, however, the State did not pursue a complicity theory by attempting to prove that each of the petitioners rendered assistance to the others in the commission of hunting offenses.