Opinion
No. 29807.
February 1, 1932.
1. REWARDS.
Statute respecting reward to person arresting fleeing homicide must be liberally construed in favor of person making arrest (Code 1930, section 1239).
2. REWARD.
Claim of fleeing homicide that flight was for another purpose than to avoid arrest would not defeat claim for reward under statute (Code 1930, section 1239).
3. REWARD.
Where there is killing followed by flight of the homicide, conclusive presumption under statute respecting reward is that flight was for purpose of avoiding arrest (Code 1930, section 1239).
APPEAL from circuit court of Greene county. HON. J.D. FATHEREE, Judge.
E.W. Breland, of Leakesville, for appellants.
In Ex parte Austin et al., 129 Miss. 869, 93 So. 364, a negro boy who had shot and killed another, was found hiding in a barn and the court held in this case that "The manifest purpose of his hiding was to evade arrest or capture" and further held "that this statute should be liberally construed. That a person who hides in a barn is fleeing or attempting to flee."
If the holding of this court in the case of Austin, supra, is the law of the state, then appellants are and were entitled to the reward, and this cause should be reversed.
Ex parte Charles Webb, 96 Miss. 8, 49 So. 567; Harrison County v. Hurst, 110 Miss. 716, 70 So. 889.
W.A. Shipman, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
Before the court would have been warranted in allowing the claimed reward, it was necessary: (1) For the appellants to prove that Ella McLeod killed Ernest May. (2) That she knew she had so killed him. (3) That before and at the time of the alleged apprehension and arrest of Ella McLeod by the appellants, she was fleeing or attempting to flee, in order to escape arrest and trial, for the killing of Ernest May.
The testimony of the claimants — appellants is practically, in its entirety, hearsay testimony. Neither of them, of his own knowledge, was aware of the fact of the killing; neither of them knew that Ella McLeod had killed Ernest May; one of them stumbled upon her in a creek swamp, two miles from her own home, ten or eleven hours after the shooting.
The trial judge held that from the evidence Ella McLeod was not a fleeing homicide before and at the time she accompanied the two claimants to Leakesville. The findings of fact by the trial judge come before this court with all the force and effect and are entitled to all of the credit accorded by it to the verdict of a jury. The court below properly applied the facts and the law in this case.
Ex parte Webb, 96 Miss. 8, 49 So. 567; Ex parte Brasfield, 129 Miss. 769, 109 So. 736; Sunflower County v. Wright, 111 Miss. 790, 72 So. 226; Wilkinson County v. Jones, 52 So. 453; Monroe County v. Bell, 18 So. 121.
This is an appeal prosecuted by appellants from a judgment of the circuit court of Greene county denying their petition for the statutory reward of one hundred dollars for the apprehension, arrest, and delivery up to the sheriff of that county for trial, of Ella McLeod, claimed by them to have been a fleeing homicide at the time. Appellants claim the reward under authority of section 1239 of the Code of 1930, which is in this language: "A person who shall arrest any one who kills another and is fleeing, or attempting to flee, before arrest, and shall deliver him up for trial, shall be entitled to the sum of one hundred dollars out of the treasury of the county in which the homicide occurred, upon the allowance of the circuit court and the board of supervisors of the county in the manner provided by law."
The evidence showed, without dispute, the following facts: In January, 1931, Ella McLeod, a negro woman, shot and killed Ernest May, a negro man. The killing took place about daylight at the home of the deceased in Greene county, and immediately thereafter Ella McLeod fled from the scene and secreted herself in a swamp in a creek bottom about two and a half miles from the place of the homicide and about five miles from her own home. The sheriff was informed of the homicide and with some of his deputies, and other persons, went to the scene of the killing, and thereafter during the day they were engaged in a search for Ella McLeod. Among those engaged in the search were the appellants. That night about seven o'clock appellant Hubbard Fairley, who was engaged in the search with the appellant Charles Huggar, found Ella McLeod hiding in a creek swamp, which, as stated, was about two and a half miles from the scene of the killing and about five miles from her home. After discovering her, appellant Fairley left her for a while and went to appellant Huggar and induced him to join with him in going back to her place of hiding. They thereupon returned and found her, and together conveyed her to the county seat and delivered her to the sheriff of the county, who lodged her in jail.
Ella McLeod testified, and her testimony is undisputed by any witness, that she shot at the deceased twice and ran away; that she did not know whether either of the shots took effect or not — in other words, that she did not know whether she had killed him or not, but was afraid that she had not, and fled to the swamp in the creek bottom because she was afraid the deceased would pursue and kill her — that that was the reason she remained all day in hiding, and not through fear of arrest for the homicide.
The statute provides that any person who shall arrest any one who kills another and is fleeing, or attempting to flee, before arrest, and shall deliver him up for trial, shall be entitled to the reward. As stated above, the evidence showed without conflict that Ella McLeod killed Ernest May early in the morning and immediately fled and spent the day in hiding. The purpose of the statute is to prevent the escape of fleeing homicides and promote their speedy arrest and trial. To that end the statute is to be liberally construed in favor of any person making the arrest and delivering up the homicide for trial. Warren County v. Lanier, 87 Miss. 606, 40 So. 429; Ex parte Webb, 96 Miss. 8, 49 So. 567; Ex parte Austin, 129 Miss. 869, 93 So. 369.
The claim of the fleeing homicide that the flight was not for the purpose of avoiding arrest, but for another and a different purpose, will not defeat the claim for the reward. Where there is a killing followed by the flight of the homicide, the conclusive presumption is that such flight was for the purpose of avoiding arrest. The statute contains no exception; it gives the reward to any person arresting and delivering up a fleeing homicide. Ella McLeod's testimony was as to her state of mind — her purpose in the flight. Naturally it could not be contradicted except possibly by the surrounding facts and circumstances, and in this case they strongly indicate that her flight was for the purpose of avoiding arrest and not to escape harm at the hands of the deceased. But, as stated, the court will not inquire into her state of mind. The homicide, flight, apprehension, arrest, and delivery up by appellants is all that is necessary to entitle them to the reward. In a criminal prosecution, flight of the accused is evidence tending to show guilt. The accused therefore has the incentive to swear falsely as to the purpose of his flight; it is to his interest to show that his flight was not for the purpose of avoiding arrest, but for some other purpose not harmful to him. The probability, therefore, is that if the claim for the reward could be defeated by the homicide's testimony as to the purpose of his flight, oftentimes it would be unjustly defeated.
Reversed, and judgment here for appellants.