144, 79 Am.Dec. 776 (1861). Various decisions spoke of inherent limits on judicial power to suspend sentences, e. g., State v. Everett, 164 N.C. 399, 79 S.E. 274, 277 (N.C. 1913); Re Jones, 35 Neb. 499, 53 N.W. 468 (1892); cf. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916); of the dissipation of that power at the end of a term of court, Commonwealth v. Foster, supra; cf. Basset v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 38, 19 L.Ed. 548 (1870), or after a prisoner is committed, e. g., People v. Meservey, 76 Mich. 223, 42 N.W. 1133 (1889); Re Jones, supra; see generally Annotation, 44 A.L.R. 1203; and of the right of a convicted defendant to proceed with service of his sentence without undue delay, e. g., Ex parte Ervin, 266 P.2d 984 (Okl.Cr.App. 1954); Marks v. Wentworth, 199 Mass. 44, 85 N.E. 81 (1908); People ex rel. Boenert v. Barnett, 202 Ill. 287, 67 N.E. 23 (1903). A sentencing court has been denied the power to modify the terms of a prisoner's commitment in instances where the court sought to mitigate the effects of its judgment, as by reducing the period of confinement or decreeing a de facto parole.
The Oklahoma courts, in a long line of decisions, have held that it is not within the power of any court of that state to grant credit for time spent in jail prior to sentencing. Williams v. Page, 430 P.2d 345 (Okla.Cr. 1967); Salisbury v. Raines, 365 P.2d 568 (Okla.Cr. 1961); Ex parte Ervin, 266 P.2d 984 (Okla.Cr. 1954); Ex parte Ward, 257 P.2d 1099 (Okla.Cr. 1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 879, 74 S.Ct. 133, 98 L.Ed. 386; State ex rel. Waters v. Lackey, 97 Okla. Cr. 41, 257 P.2d 849 (Okla.Cr. 1953); and Ex parte Colbert, 94 Okla. Cr. 300, 235 P.2d 541 (1951). Credit for jail time or words to that effect included in a sentence are to be regarded as mere surplusage and given no effect. Salisbury v. Raines, supra, Ex parte Ward, supra.
The power to issue pardons is and has always been vested exclusively in the Governor of this State by Article 6, ยง 10 of the Oklahoma Constitution; and no evidence has been presented that any Governor of this State has ever granted this petitioner either a pardon or a commutation of his sentence. See Re Application of Cooley, Okla. Cr. 295 P.2d 816; Ex parte Ervin, Okla. Cr. 266 P.2d 984. In this case it is not necessary to consider whether or not the State of Wyoming might properly have refused to have honored the application for requisition of McKee on the theory that he was not a fugitive.
On the question of an agreement with the county attorney for a ten year term, this Court has repeatedly held that any agreement made by the county attorney with a defendant for sentence would not be binding on the trial court pronouncing the sentence. Maxwell v. State, Okla. Cr. 292 P.2d 181; Ex parte Johnson, 97 Okla. Cr. 374, 264 P.2d 367; Ex parte Ervin, Okla. Cr. 266 P.2d 984. The county attorney can make no agreement with an accused for fixing his punishment on a plea of guilty which is binding on the trial court, without the trial court's participation and agreement. The judgment of the district court of Jefferson County is affirmed.
The Governor shall have power to grant after conviction, reprieves, or leaves of absence not to exceed sixty days, without the action of said Board. . . ." A plain reading of the above section clearly indicates that the Governor has no power to grant a pardon or a parole absent a favorable recommendation of the Pardon and Parole Board. This construction was placed upon Article VI, Section 10 of the Oklahoma Constitution, by the Court of Criminal Appeals in the case of Ex parte Irvin, 266 P.2d 984, wherein the following language appears in syllabus 4 by the Court: "The sole power to issue commutation after conviction for crime is vested in the Governor under the provisions of Oklahoma Constitution, Article VI, Section 10. The application must be processed through the Pardon and Parole Board, and the Governor must have the benefit of a recommendation from that Board." It is, therefore, the opinion of the Attorney General that your question be answered in the negative.