Opinion
NO. 03-16-00826-CR
05-03-2017
Ex parte Naree Dilworth
FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 7 OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. C-1-CR-15-151616, HONORABLE ELISABETH ASHLEA EARLE, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Naree Dilworth's driver's license was barred from renewal after she failed to appear regarding several traffic citations. See Tex. Transp. Code § 706.004(a) (setting out circumstances in which driver's license renewal may be denied "for failure to appear" or "failure to pay"). Prior to her license being barred from renewal, Dilworth was convicted of driving without insurance. See id. § 601.191 (governing offense of driving without insurance and stating that offense is misdemeanor offense). Following her license being barred from renewal, Dilworth was convicted of another charge for driving without insurance and was also convicted of the additional offense of driving with an invalid license. See id. § 521.457 (stating that "[a] person commits an offense if the person operates a motor vehicle" after her license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked or after driver's license renewal "has been denied" and providing that offense is misdemeanor offense).
After each of the three convictions listed above, Dilworth was assessed a surcharge under the driver responsibility program. See id. § 708.103. That program authorizes the imposition of an annual surcharge on people who have been convicted of specific driving-related offenses "during the preceding 36-month period." See id. §§ 708.001-.159. For the offenses of driving while an individual's license was invalid and driving without insurance, the amount of the surcharge is, with certain exceptions, "$250 per year." See id. § 708.103(b). If an individual fails to pay the surcharge, her license is automatically suspended until she pays the amount owed. See id. § 708.152. Approximately half of the money collected through the surcharges is placed into the general fund or the Texas mobility fund, and the remaining money is used "to fund designated trauma facilities, county and regional emergency medical services, and trauma care systems." See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 780.002-.004.
In addition to the convictions listed above, Dilworth was charged with another offense of driving a motor vehicle while her license was invalid, and the information also alleged that "at the time of the offense," Dilworth was driving a motor vehicle without insurance. See Tex. Transp. Code §§ 521.457, 601.191. Following the issuance of the information alleging the most recent charges, Dilworth filed an application for writ of habeas corpus. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.09 (covering writs of habeas corpus for individuals charged with misdemeanors). In her application, Dilworth argued that the surcharges that had previously been assessed violated her double-jeopardy guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense because she had already been punished for those offenses by paying the accompanying fines. Moreover, she contended that "she will face yet more penalties if she is found guilty of the current allegations." Accordingly, she sought habeas relief from "the requirement of a payment of a surcharge and the threat of continued suspension of her driver's license . . . upon failure of timely payment."
After convening a hearing on the writ and after considering the arguments by the parties, the trial court denied the writ. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court determined that Dilworth's license "is currently barred from renewal . . . for failing to appear to answer four traffic citations," that Dilworth "was cited and released . . . for the offense of driving while license invalid as charged" in the most recent information, and that binding precedent compels a conclusion that Dilworth's writ challenge must be denied.
Dilworth appeals the trial court's order denying her requested habeas relief. We will affirm the trial court's order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ used to challenge the legality of one's restraint. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.01. Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on an application for writ of habeas corpus under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable." Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref'd). But a trial court does not abuse its discretion if its ruling lies within "the zone of reasonable disagreement." Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Under that standard, appellate courts "review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling." Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664.
DISCUSSION
In her sole issue on appeal, Dilworth challenges the denial of her habeas application and asserts that "the surcharges constitute multiple punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Cf. Washington v. State, 946 S.W.2d 912, 913-14 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref'd) (stating that, in multiple-punishments context, guarantee against double jeopardy in Texas Constitution does not provide any greater protection than federal guarantee).
Before addressing the merits of the parties' arguments, we note as an initial matter that the parties seem to disagree regarding what type of habeas relief is being sought here. In its appellee's brief, the State asserts that Dilworth filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus challenging her restraint resulting from the pending charges for driving while her license was invalid and for driving without insurance. Although the State acknowledges that a "[p]retrial habeas can be used to bring a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute that defines the offense," see Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 71, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), the State notes that to be entitled to relief, an applicant must be unlawfully restrained, see Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also Ex parte King, 134 S.W.3d 500, 502 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref'd) (explaining that "[a]n accused may apply for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus on double jeopardy grounds"). In light of this assertion, the State contends that Dilworth is not being restrained due to any failure to pay the assessed surcharges and is instead being restrained due to her allegedly committing the two most recent traffic violations. Accordingly, the State contends that a determination regarding the constitutionality of the surcharges will not free Dilworth from the restraint that she is under and, therefore, that her pretrial habeas application does not present a cognizable claim. See Ex parte Ali, 368 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref'd) (stating that for "trial court to have jurisdiction to consider a habeas application, among other requirements, the applicant must be subject to 'confinement' or 'restraint'"). On the other hand, Dilworth urged in her habeas application that her "writ petition challenges surcharges imposed against [her] after her punishments for the past offenses listed in the petition. It has nothing to do with any pending charges." Given the language from Dilworth's application indicating that she was not pursuing a pretrial habeas challenge to the most recent charges, we will assume without deciding that Dilworth has presented a cognizable habeas challenge to the imposition of the surcharges. Cf. Ex parte Drake, 212 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref'd) (noting that surcharge was imposed months after trial ended and that "the driver responsibility program provides for the assessment of a surcharge without a prior hearing and without any subsequent review" when determining that applicant's "petition raises a cognizable claim" in pretrial context).
As set out above, Dilworth asserts that the imposition of the surcharges constitutes double jeopardy. The "Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants from three things: 1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and 3) multiple punishments for the same offense." Ex parte Milner, 394 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). "A double jeopardy claim based on multiple punishments arises when the State seeks to punish the same criminal act twice under two distinct statutes under circumstances in which the Legislature intended the conduct to be punished only once." Shelby v. State, 448 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). "Fines, of course, are treated in the same way as prison sentences for purposes of double jeopardy and multiple-punishment analysis." See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977).
When challenging the trial court's ruling, Dilworth repeats her arguments from her application for writ of habeas corpus that she had already been punished for her prior convictions by paying their accompanying fines and that the imposition of the surcharges is punitive and, therefore, constitutes multiple punishments for the same offenses. As support for her argument that the surcharges were meant to be punishments for violations of provisions of the Transportation Code, Dilworth points to portions of a floor debate regarding the enactment of the statutes authorizing the imposition of the surcharges. See Debate on Tex. H.B. 3588 on the Floor of the House, 79th Leg., R.S., (May 9, 2003). During the debate, various representatives discussed whether the statutes would be imposing a tax, and the author of the amendment repeatedly stated that the statutes did not impose a tax and were instead designed to "penaliz[e] habitually bad drivers" and "bad behavior" and was an "increased penalty . . . for the habitual pattern of callous disregard of Texas law."
In light of this and other similar language, Dilworth urges that the legislative history conclusively establishes that the surcharge is a second punishment for the same offense and not a tax or other type of civil assessment, see United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (explaining that "[a] tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government" and that "a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act"), and that this Court need not consider any additional constructive tools when considering the issue of legislative intent, cf. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (considering comments made by author of bill "on the Senate floor" when ascertaining legislative intent regarding meaning of statute).
In addition to relying on comments found in the legislative history, Dilworth also points to cases in which courts have determined that other fees imposed on individuals who have committed a crime violated double-jeopardy protections. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 769, 770, 784 (1994) (concluding that tax imposed "'on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs'" "assessed after the State has imposed a criminal liability for the same conduct" "was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time" (quoting Mont. Code § 15-25-111)); La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572, 575 (determining that tax imposed for illegal sale of alcohol was actually penalty and that prior conviction and payment of fines prohibited civil action seeking taxes that was actually "punitive proceeding"). In light of those cases, Dilworth urges that "the surcharge is conditioned solely on specified crimes related to driving and imposed only after the person has been punished" and constitutes "multiple punishment[s] imposed against a person for the same offense." Finally, Dilworth argues that most of the factors previously identified by the Supreme Court as tools to be employed when ascertaining whether an assessment is criminal in nature weigh in favor of a conclusion that the surcharges are criminal punishments. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 95-96, 97, 99-100 (1997) (holding that imposition of administrative proceedings and civil "assessments" were "not a bar to the later criminal prosecution because the administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal," and listing factors to be considered in determining "[w]hether a particular punishment is criminal or civil").
However, this Court has been presented with similar double-jeopardy arguments before. See Ex parte Drake, 212 S.W.3d 822. In Drake, the applicant also referred to the "colloquy between members of the Texas House of Representatives during floor debate on the bill that enacted the program," but this Court found the statements by the author "unpersuasive" because determinations regarding legislative intent seek to glean "the collective intent of the legislature" by focusing "on the text of the statute" and because a conclusion that a double-jeopardy violation was present would require "a showing that the surcharge is a criminal punishment" and not just that it "can be viewed as a penalty." Id. at 826; see also Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d at 473 (turning to "extratextual factors" for determining legislative intent only after determining that language of statute did not provide "precise meaning of" phrase at issue). Moreover, this Court determined that there was "nothing in the statutory language to indicate that the surcharges imposed under the driver responsibility program were intended as criminal punishments" and concluded instead "that the surcharges imposed by the driver responsibility program were intended by the legislature to be civil penalties." Ex parte Drake, 212 S.W.3d at 826. In addition, this Court considered the factors identified by the Supreme Court and relied on by Dilworth in her brief and concluded that those factors did not compel a determination that "the surcharges" were "so punitive in their purpose or effect as to make them criminal penalties regardless of the legislature's intent." Id. at 827-28.
Furthermore, in addition to relying on the analysis from Drake, we observe that the cases highlighted by Dilworth in her brief in which the courts found double-jeopardy violations were all decided before our opinion in Drake, and Dilworth has not referred this Court to any changes in the law occurring after our decision in Drake that might justify reconsidering that otherwise binding precedent. On the contrary, since we issued our opinion, at least one of our sister courts has issued an opinion agreeing with our result. See Stautzenberger v. State, 232 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
For all of these reasons, we must conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dilworth's application for writ of habeas corpus and, accordingly, overrule her sole issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Dilworth's sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court's order denying Dilworth's application for writ of habeas corpus.
/s/_________
David Puryear, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Goodwin Affirmed Filed: May 3, 2017 Do Not Publish