Opinion
No. 07-20-00227-CR
11-09-2020
EX PARTE ROBIN SEAN DAVIS, APPELLANT
On Appeal from the 249th District Court of Johnson County, Texas
Trial Court No. F-50644-A , Honorable John Weeks, Presiding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
Robin Sean Davis appeals from an interlocutory order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Through that writ he sought dismissal of the indictment against him. He believed himself entitled to that relief because the State allegedly failed to prosecute him within the time parameters designated in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD). We dismiss.
Because this appeal was transferred from the Tenth Court of Appeals, we are obligated to apply its precedent when available in the event of a conflict between the precedents of that court and this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
Per the IAD, the State secured Davis's transfer from Oklahoma to Texas for trial under a pending indictment. Apparently, Davis arrived in Texas in February of 2020. The IAD required him to be tried within 120 days of his arrival, subject to a continuance for good cause. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 51.14, art. IV(c) (West 2018) (stating that "trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court . . . the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance"). He was not so tried. Thus, he petitioned for writ of habeas corpus to dismiss the indictment. The trial court ordered the petition denied, resulting in this interlocutory appeal from that order.
Our Court of Criminal Appeals has held that "pretrial habeas proceedings are not an appropriate avenue for raising an IAD claim." Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (dismissing the appeal). Rather, petitioning for a writ of mandamus may be the appropriate remedy. Id. Davis's petition for habeas relief falls within the Doster bar. Thus, we dismiss the appeal.
We note Davis's assertion that the delay also violated his constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Yet, the sum of his argument consisted of his statement that "[t]he Trial Court's basis to deny Appellant's relief under the IADA and TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 51.14 was erroneous and not a proper legal basis for such denial. The denial also violated Appellant's right to a speedy jury trial. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION SIXTH AMENDMENT and TEXAS CONSTITUTION ART. I, Sec. 10 & Sec. 15." Nothing else was said about the constitutional claims. Without substantive analysis, it was inadequately briefed and, therefore, waived. Linney v. State, 413 S.W.3d 766, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating that the "[f]ailure to provide substantive legal analysis—'to apply the law to the facts' —waives the point of error on appeal.").
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice Do not publish.