Ex parte Cragg

5 Citing cases

  1. In re Crane

    253 Ga. 667 (Ga. 1985)   Cited 37 times
    Discussing when a judge must disqualify himself from a proceeding on criminal contempt as a matter of due process

    r, 190 Minn. 305 ( 251 N.W. 665, 668) (1933); Prestwood v. Hambrick, 308 So.2d 82, 84 (Miss. 1975); State ex rel. Wendt v. Journey, 492 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Mo.App. 1973); State ex rel. Tague v. Dist. Ct., 100 Mont. 383 ( 47 P.2d 649, 651) (1935); Paasch v. Brown, 199 Neb. 683 ( 260 N.W.2d 612, 615) (1977); Kellar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 86 Nev. 445 ( 470 P.2d 434, 436-7) (1970); State v. Blaisdell, 381 A.2d 1201, 1201-2 (N. H. 1978); Matter of Buehrer. 50 N.J. 601 ( 236 A.2d 592, 600) (1967); Intl. Mineralsc. Corp. v. Local 177, United Stone c. Products Workers, 74 N.M. 195 ( 392 P.2d 343, 346) (1964); State University of N. Y. v. Denton, 35 A.D.2d 176, 316 N.Y.S.2d 297, 302 (1970); State v. Sherow, 101 Ohio App. 169 ( 138 N.E.2d 444, 447) (1956); Matter of Johnson, 467 Pa. 552 ( 359 A.2d 739, 742) (1976); State v. Bowers, 241 S.E.2d 409, 412 (S.C. 1978); Burdick v. Marshall, 8 S.D. 308 ( 66 N.W. 462, 464) (1896); Strunk v. Lewis Coal Co., 547 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1976); Ex parte Cragg, 133 Tex.Crim. 118 ( 109 S.W.2d 479, 481) (1937); State ex rel. Dorrien v. Hazeltine, 82 Wn. 81 ( 143 P. 436, 440) (1914); State v. Bittner, 102 W. Va. 677 ( 136 S.E. 202, 206) (1926); State v. Meese, 200 Wis. 454 ( 229 N.W. 31) (1930). E.g., Crary v. Curtis, 199 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Iowa 1972) ("clear, satisfactory and convincing" evidence); Raszler v. Raszler, 80 N.W.2d 535, 539 (N. D. 1956) ("clear and satisfactory" evidence); Whillock v. Whillock, 550 P.2d 558, 560 (Okla.

  2. Ex Parte Carson

    641 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)

    Ex parte Elmore [ 161 Tex. 585], 342 S.W.2d 558. "The burden of proof in a contempt proceeding is 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' Ex parte Cragg [ 133 Tex.Crim. 118], 109 S.W.2d 479." In the present case the record reflects that no evidence was produced to show that petitioners had violated the court order.

  3. Ex Parte Arnold

    503 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)   Cited 15 times
    Adopting the foregoing quote from Ex parte Ratliff

    The burden of proof in a contempt proceeding is 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' Ex Parte Cragg, 133 Tex.Crim. R., 109 S.W.2d 479 (1937). We are of the opinion that the evidence in this present case wholly fails to meet the measure of the law.

  4. Ex Parte Conway

    419 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1967)   Cited 14 times

    Notice or knowledge of the order which one is charged with violating is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the validity of a contempt order. In discharging a relator in Ex parte Stone, 72 S.W. 1000 (Tex.Cr.App., 1903) the court held: '* * * In a matter of this sort, we must be governed by the record as it is presented to us; and unless the jurisdictional fact of notice to the relator is made to appear, the court below had no power to treat his disobedience of the writ of injunction as a matter of contempt. * * *.' See also Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1967); Deramus v. Thornton, 160 Tex. 494, 333 S.W.2d 824 (1960); Ex parte Cragg, 133 Tex.Cr. 118, 109 S.W.2d 479 (1937); 17 C.J.S. Contempt ยง 18. After several hearings the trial judge on February 23 entered a temporary injunction which, among other orders, commanded J. T. and J. B. Conway to make certain road repairs to the disputed strip of land.

  5. Ex parte Karr

    663 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App. 1983)   Cited 15 times

    She says that the evidence on which the court found she committed constructive criminal contempt fails to meet the Ex parte Cragg, 133 Tex.Crim. R., 109 S.W.2d 479, 481 (1937), standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, since the contempt judgment before us was rendered because of the violation of an order in a civil cause, our original habeas corpus jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court.