r, 190 Minn. 305 ( 251 N.W. 665, 668) (1933); Prestwood v. Hambrick, 308 So.2d 82, 84 (Miss. 1975); State ex rel. Wendt v. Journey, 492 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Mo.App. 1973); State ex rel. Tague v. Dist. Ct., 100 Mont. 383 ( 47 P.2d 649, 651) (1935); Paasch v. Brown, 199 Neb. 683 ( 260 N.W.2d 612, 615) (1977); Kellar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 86 Nev. 445 ( 470 P.2d 434, 436-7) (1970); State v. Blaisdell, 381 A.2d 1201, 1201-2 (N. H. 1978); Matter of Buehrer. 50 N.J. 601 ( 236 A.2d 592, 600) (1967); Intl. Mineralsc. Corp. v. Local 177, United Stone c. Products Workers, 74 N.M. 195 ( 392 P.2d 343, 346) (1964); State University of N. Y. v. Denton, 35 A.D.2d 176, 316 N.Y.S.2d 297, 302 (1970); State v. Sherow, 101 Ohio App. 169 ( 138 N.E.2d 444, 447) (1956); Matter of Johnson, 467 Pa. 552 ( 359 A.2d 739, 742) (1976); State v. Bowers, 241 S.E.2d 409, 412 (S.C. 1978); Burdick v. Marshall, 8 S.D. 308 ( 66 N.W. 462, 464) (1896); Strunk v. Lewis Coal Co., 547 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1976); Ex parte Cragg, 133 Tex.Crim. 118 ( 109 S.W.2d 479, 481) (1937); State ex rel. Dorrien v. Hazeltine, 82 Wn. 81 ( 143 P. 436, 440) (1914); State v. Bittner, 102 W. Va. 677 ( 136 S.E. 202, 206) (1926); State v. Meese, 200 Wis. 454 ( 229 N.W. 31) (1930). E.g., Crary v. Curtis, 199 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Iowa 1972) ("clear, satisfactory and convincing" evidence); Raszler v. Raszler, 80 N.W.2d 535, 539 (N. D. 1956) ("clear and satisfactory" evidence); Whillock v. Whillock, 550 P.2d 558, 560 (Okla.
Ex parte Elmore [ 161 Tex. 585], 342 S.W.2d 558. "The burden of proof in a contempt proceeding is 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' Ex parte Cragg [ 133 Tex.Crim. 118], 109 S.W.2d 479." In the present case the record reflects that no evidence was produced to show that petitioners had violated the court order.
The burden of proof in a contempt proceeding is 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' Ex Parte Cragg, 133 Tex.Crim. R., 109 S.W.2d 479 (1937). We are of the opinion that the evidence in this present case wholly fails to meet the measure of the law.
Notice or knowledge of the order which one is charged with violating is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the validity of a contempt order. In discharging a relator in Ex parte Stone, 72 S.W. 1000 (Tex.Cr.App., 1903) the court held: '* * * In a matter of this sort, we must be governed by the record as it is presented to us; and unless the jurisdictional fact of notice to the relator is made to appear, the court below had no power to treat his disobedience of the writ of injunction as a matter of contempt. * * *.' See also Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1967); Deramus v. Thornton, 160 Tex. 494, 333 S.W.2d 824 (1960); Ex parte Cragg, 133 Tex.Cr. 118, 109 S.W.2d 479 (1937); 17 C.J.S. Contempt ยง 18. After several hearings the trial judge on February 23 entered a temporary injunction which, among other orders, commanded J. T. and J. B. Conway to make certain road repairs to the disputed strip of land.
She says that the evidence on which the court found she committed constructive criminal contempt fails to meet the Ex parte Cragg, 133 Tex.Crim. R., 109 S.W.2d 479, 481 (1937), standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, since the contempt judgment before us was rendered because of the violation of an order in a civil cause, our original habeas corpus jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court.