Opinion
WR-95,855-01
09-11-2024
EX PARTE CODY NATHANIEL BROWN, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 13-11-07833-CRR IN THE 143RD DISTRICT COURT FROM REEVES COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM
Applicant was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
On July 17, 2024, the trial court entered an order designating issues. The application was forwarded before the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. We remand this application to the trial court to complete its evidentiary investigation and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Slaughter, J., joined.
Applicant pled guilty to, and was convicted of, burglary of a habitation in January of 2014, and he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. He did not pursue a direct appeal from that judgment.
More than ten years later, in June of 2024, Applicant filed an initial application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. In his application, he alleges that his counsel was ineffective, which he claims led to an involuntary plea.
Today, the Court remands this application to the convicting court to further develop the record. I join the Court's remand order. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a convicting court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, 663 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (Yeary, J., concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant pled guilty and was convicted in 2014, but he did not file this writ application until over ten years later. The record is also silent regarding circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the convicting court "may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief." Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the convicting court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay and give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the convicting court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.