It further provides cooperative proceedings for temporary transfer of prisoners for purposes of trial on outstanding charges among the participating jurisdictions to aid with disposition.'" Ex parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165, 167 n. 2 (Ala. 2000), aff'd, 533 U.S. 146, 121 S.Ct. 2079 (2001), quoting Gillard v. State, 486 So.2d 1323, 1325 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986). The primary purpose of the IAD is to address concerns that untried charges pending in other jurisdictions and difficulties in obtaining a speedy trial create uncertainties that interfere with and disrupt prisoner rehabilitation and treatment programs.
Pp. 156-157. 781 So.2d 165, affirmed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I, II-A, and II-C of which were unanimous, and Part II-B of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.
00-492 ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN. Sup.Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 781 So.2d 165. 00-5961 TYLER v. CAIN, WARDEN. C.A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
The common-law doctrine allowing a surety to assert all defenses available to its principal was in existence when § 6-5-221 was enacted. The legislature could have expressly limited that doctrine if it desired to do so, but it chose not to. See Ex parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165, 169 (Ala. 2000) (holding that "the Alabama Legislature could have stepped beyond the confines of the text of the compact and included limitations in the statute expressly allowing `technical' violations to occur. However, it, like Congress, did not do so.
Because the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue and because there is limited persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, this Court is free to select the interpretation it considers most reasonable. See Ex parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165 (Ala. 2000) (recognizing that when the United States Supreme Court has not addressed how a particular federal statute should be interpreted and the federal circuit courts are split on the interpretation, this Court may select the interpretation it considers most sound). As we begin our analysis we are mindful that
Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, Inc., 22 Cal.4th 316, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 36, 993 P.2d 366, 368 (2000).See also Ex Parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165 (Ala. 2000), affirmed, 533 U.S. 146, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001), and Bishop v. Burgard, 198 Ill.2d 495, 261 Ill.Dec. 733, 764 N.E.2d 24 (2002). But see People v. Bradford, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118, 118 S.Ct. 1796, 140 L.Ed.2d 937 (1998) (viewing the decisions of federal courts of appeal as persuasive, but not binding authority).
When the United States Courts of Appeal are more or less evenly divided on an interpretation of a federal statute, then I adhere to the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction in deciding which line of authority I will follow. See Ex parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165 (Ala. 2000), which the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 533 U.S. 146 (2001).
When the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a federal-law issue and there is a split of authority among the various federal courts of appeals on that issue, "this Court is free to select the interpretation it considers most sound." Ex parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165 (Ala. 2000). We find the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit more persuasive and conclude that the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling qualifies as a final order.
COBB, Judge. On the authority of Ex parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165 (Ala. 2000), we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this cause to the Covington County Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED.