Opinion
NO. 01-16-00838-CR
02-14-2017
EX PARTE TAMI BLEIMEYER
On Appeal from the 178th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1522993
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an interlocutory appeal from a bail proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31. Appellant, Tami Bleimeyer, was charged with injury to a child and endangering a child. As a condition of her release on bail, the trial court ordered that appellant inform the court if she were to become pregnant. Appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, contending that this condition of bail was unreasonable and unconstitutional. The trial court denied habeas corpus relief. This appeal followed. We affirm.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. § 22.04 (West 2011) & art. § 22.041 (West Supp. 2016).
BACKGROUND
Appellant stands charged with injury to a child and endangering a child. Specifically, she is alleged to have starved a five-year-old child. She has had seven children, and her parental rights have been terminated as to six of them. As a condition of her release on bail, the trial court required that (1) she have no contact with children under the age of 14, and (2) notify the court immediately should she become pregnant.
Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the trial court held a hearing on her petition. The court granted habeas corpus relief, in part, by amending the bond conditions to require that appellant have no unsupervised contract with children under the age of 14. However, the trial court denied habeas corpus relief regarding the bail condition that appellant inform the court if she becomes pregnant while released on bail. In so ruling, the trial court stated:
This portion of the trial court's order is not challenged in this appeal.
The Court finds from the evidence that the [bail] conditions are not unreasonable.
The Court finds that based on the state of the record and the interest of the community are always to be considered. And this particular case notifying the Court of pregnancy is not unreasonable, not intrusive.Appellant brings this interlocutory appeal.
And the State having an interest in protecting the welfare of all of the children previously under the care, custody and control of the defendant as well as any potential children.
The Court's position is that said condition of required notification of the Court—to the Court of her pregnancy is not unreasonable and in furtherance of protecting the community. The unborn child can necessarily be part of a community. And necessarily the State has an interest in protecting unborn children as well as children born alive.
That's my ruling.
PROPRIETY OF BOND CONDITION
In her sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that "the bond condition requiring the accused to notify the court if she becomes pregnant, is unreasonable and overbroad in violation of her right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The primary purpose of pretrial bail is to secure the defendant's attendance at trial, and the power to require bail, including the power to set conditions to bail, should not be used as an instrument of oppression. Ex parte Anunobi, 278 S.W.3d 425, 427 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Ivey, 594 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)). To secure a defendant's attendance at trial, a magistrate may impose any reasonable bond condition related to the safety of a victim of the alleged offense or to the safety of the community. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.40(a) (West 2015). Bond conditions, however, must not unreasonably impinge on an individual's constitutional rights. Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Therefore, courts must be mindful that one of the purposes of release on bail pending trial is to prevent the infliction of punishment before conviction. Id. at 405. "The trial court's discretion to set the conditions of bail is not . . . unlimited. A condition of pretrial bail is judged by three criteria: it must be reasonable; it must be to secure the defendant's presence at trial; and it must be related to the safety of the alleged victim or the community." Anunobi, 278 S.W.3d at 427 (citing Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 401-02).
We review a trial court's imposition of bond conditions for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 428 (citing Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). The appellant bears the burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the specific condition. Id. (citing Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849). "In reviewing a trial court's bond decision, the appellate court measures the trial court's ruling against the same factors it used in ruling on bail in the first instance." Id.
The applicable bail provision in this case provides:
To secure a defendant's attendant at trial, a magistrate may impose any reasonable condition of bond related to the safety of a victim of the alleged offense or to the safety of the community.TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.40(a).
Analysis
Appellant argues that "[t]he Court's order unduly interferes with Applicant's liberty interest, privacy and right 'to be left alone' during the first trimester of her pregnancy." Thus, we must decide whether the bail restriction "unreasonably impinge[s] on [appellant's] constitutional rights." Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 402.
Here, the bail condition does not unreasonably impinge on any constitutional right to privacy or to make personal decisions in relation to procreation. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558-59, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2473-74 (2003). The bail condition requires notice to the court of pregnancy, but it does not limit appellant's right to make decisions regarding such pregnancy.
This notification as a condition of release on bail is reasonable given the circumstances for two reasons. First, it directly relates to securing appellant's presence at trial. In the bail hearing, appellant testified that she felt that she was being "harassed" by the Department of Family and Protective Services because of her prior history, which involved the termination of her parental rights to six of her children. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that, if she had another pregnancy, appellant might flee to avoid the removal of that child from her custody, and that by requiring her to report any pregnancies, the court would be made aware if she unexpectedly became an increased flight risk.
Second, the trial court reasonably concluded that, like any of her previous six children, any child born to appellant while she was on bail could be at risk of harm. By requiring appellant to notify the court of any pregnancy, the court would be in a better position to protect that child, a member of the community, from the moment of its birth. Any child born while appellant is on bail is a member of the community.
The trial court's condition is a reasonable restriction on appellant's privacy rights because the condition assists in assuring her presence at trial and would assist the court in protecting any child born to appellant while she is released on bail.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment denying habeas corpus relief.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Bland. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).