No. 05-06-01220-CR
Opinion Filed October 27, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-00620-JX. Reverse and Remand.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and LANG-MIERS.
Opinion By Justice WRIGHT.
Thomas Belt Blair was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from confinement on the bond he posted. The trial court denied appellant the relief he sought. In three points of error, appellant challenges the trial court's order requiring him to submit to psychological testing or present evidence he has no history of psychological problems before being released on the posted bond. We reverse the trial court's order denying habeas corpus relief and remand for further proceedings.
Background
On August 10, 2006, the trial court set a $100,000 surety bond, with a $10,000 cash requirement. Appellant posted the cash bond on August 22, 2006. On August 31, 2006, the trial court held a hearing regarding how to implement the electronic monitor condition of bond. There was no testimony at the hearing regarding the circumstances surrounding the assault. John Michael Brennan, the complainant, testified he is a physician engaged in organ transplant screening at Baylor hospital. Brennan testified he did not recognize the person who shot him. He, his staff, and the Baylor police did extensive research to determine who the man was. After appellant surrendered himself to the police, Brennan and his staff researched their records to determine if there was any contact with appellant. The records did not reveal anything. Brennan does not know if appellant was related to someone who needed a transplant. Brennan testified he has not felt safe since the shooting incident in May 2004. As a result of the incident, security has been upgraded in many ways. Appellant presented an affidavit from his girlfriend Kerri Boyd in which she stated that appellant lives with her and she is willing to facilitate electronic monitoring. She also stated that she would "personally do everything [she] can to insure that he complies with any and all conditions of release. . . ." Appellant also submitted a letter from his employer that stated appellant had worked for the company for eight years and is "in good standing." At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered that before being released from jail, appellant had to submit evidence of his psychological history in the form of professional psychological analysis, appellant's testimony on his mental health history, or testimony from others knowledgeable about his mental health history. Appellant objected to the additional psychological requirement and remains in custody. Thereafter, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking to remove that condition, and the trial court denied relief. Applicable Law
In reviewing the trial court's decision to grant or deny habeas corpus relief, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (per curiam). We will uphold the ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id. We afford almost total deference to the court's determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts if the resolution of the ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. If the resolution of the ultimate questions turns on an application of legal standards, we review the determination de novo. Id. The primary objective of an appearance bond is to secure the defendant's presence at trial on the offense charged. Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980). It is within the trial court's discretion to impose conditions on the bail. See Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). That discretion, however, is not unlimited. See Smith v. State, 829 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). Conditions of pretrial bail must meet three standards: (1) they must be reasonable; (2) they must be to secure the defendant's attendance at trial; and (3) they must be related to the safety of the alleged victim or the community. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.15, 17.40 (Vernon 2005); see also Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 401-02. To be reasonable, conditions of bail must bear a rational relationship to the purpose of bail, that is, to secure the defendant's presence in court. See Smith, 829 S.W.2d at 887; cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951) (bail set in figure higher than amount reasonably calculated to ensure defendant's presence at trial excessive). Analysis
In three issues, appellant challenges the trial court's order conditioning release on his presentation of evidence as to his psychological condition and history. In his first issue, he asserts the trial court is not authorized to impose this requirement. His second and third issues assert constitutional challenges. The State argues the condition is authorized and is reasonable. Bond conditions are put in place to ensure the defendant's compliance with the bond. That is, they are to ensure the defendant will appear for his court proceedings, to protect the complainant, and to ensure the safety of the community. See Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 401-02. In this case, as written, the "condition" does not ensure appellant's compliance with the bond because appellant will not be released on the bond he has already posted until he provides the psychological history information the judge required. Nothing in the record relates to the mental health of appellant, the safety of the victim or the community. Nothing in the record supports the need for psychological evidence. There is nothing in the order regarding how the results of psychological testing effects the purpose of the bond. Thus, it has become a condition precedent to release rather than a condition of release. We conclude, therefore, the trial court's order, as written, does not satisfy the reqirements for a bond condition. We sustain appellant's first issue. Because we resolve the first issue in appellant's favor, we need not address his two remaining issues. Ordinarily, the Court would delete an improper bond condition. However, in this case, the psychological history information has been made a condition precedent to release rather than a condition of release. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying habeas corpus relief and remand for further proceedings.