Ex Parte Benton

7 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Miller

    261 F. Supp. 442 (D. Del. 1966)   Cited 14 times
    In United States v. Miller (D.Del.) 261 F. Supp. 442, military policemen apprehended the accused, an airman, while he was in possession of a stolen automobile and took him to the military headquarters of the air police for questioning. He was there interrogated and signed a statement inculpating himself.

    354 U.S. at 37, 77 S.Ct. at 1241. See also Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (N.D.Cal. 1945), where the Court noted that, "* * * the constitutional guarantees of the 5th and 6th amendments relating to criminal prosecutions may not be invoked in `cases arising in the land or naval forces' of the United States."

  2. Keppleman v. Upston

    84 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1949)   Cited 3 times

    Traditionally, there is a line of demarcation between Civil and Military authority. Indeed, assuming that plaintiff had been convicted by the Military Court, and sought to review the matter before this Court on habeas corpus, our authority would be limited to the isolated issue of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal. Ex parte Benton, D.C., 63 F. Supp. 808, 809: "It is not questioned, as indeed it could not be by virtue of an unbroken line of authority, that civil courts cannot review the judgments of courts martial, on habeas corpus, if the military had jurisdiction to try the offender and if the sentence of the court or commission was within its power to pronounce. United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 11 S.Ct. 54, 34 L.Ed. 636; Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 17 S.Ct. 448, 41 L.Ed. 823; Mullan v. United States, 212 U.S. 516, 29 S.Ct. 330, 53 L.Ed. 632; Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 26 L.Ed. 1213; Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 25 L.Ed. 538; Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 22 S.Ct. 181, 46 L.Ed. 236.

  3. Ex Parte Smith

    72 F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1947)   Cited 17 times

    Military Law is due process of law to those in the military or naval service and for proceedings before Courts-Martial a commissioned officer is competent counsel. Ex parte Benton, D.C.Cal., 1945, 63 F. Supp. 808. Altmayer v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 148 F.2d 161.

  4. United States v. Swenson

    75 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)   Cited 1 times

    In U.S. v. Hiatt, D.C., 141 F.2d 664, 666, the court said: "We conclude that it is open for a civil court in a habeas corpus proceeding to consider whether the circumstances of a court-martial proceeding and the manner in which it was conducted ran afoul of the basic standard of fairness which is involved in the constitutional concept of due process of law and, if it so finds, to declare that the relator has been deprived of his liberty in violation of the fifth amendment and to discharge him from custody." See also Ex parte Benton, D.C., 63 F. Supp. 808. It is noted, in the consideration of the case at bar, that no error is alleged on the part of the trial court itself.

  5. In re Wrublewski

    71 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal. 1947)   Cited 4 times

    To resolve the jurisdictional issue, it is not necessary to decide whether a court martial conviction of the crime of manslaughter, where there has been a previous trial of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder, amounts to double jeopardy. This is for the reason that the specific guaranties of the 5th amendment to the Constitution relating to criminal prosecutions may not be invoked in "cases arising in the land or naval forces" of the United States. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 43, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123, 18 L.Ed. 281; United States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal, 2 Cir., 131 F.2d 576; Ex parte Benton, D.C., 63 F. Supp. 808. The naval court's decision denying the plea of double jeopardy may have been erroneous.

  6. In re Wrublewski

    71 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1947)

    To resolve the jurisdictional issue, it is not necessary to decide whether a court martial conviction of the crime of manslaughter, where there has been a previous trial of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder, amounts to double jeopardy. This is for the reason that the specific guaranties of the 5th amendment to the Constitution relating to criminal prosecutions may not be invoked in 'cases arising in the land or naval forces ' of the United States. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 43, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123, 18 L.Ed. 281; United States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal, 2 Cir., 131 F.2d 576; Ex parte Benton, D.C., 63 F.Supp. 808. The naval court's decision denying the plea of double jeopardy may have been erroneous.

  7. In re Palacio

    238 Cal.App.2d 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 1 times

    As stated in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 [77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148], "As yet it has not been clearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and other protective parts of the Constitution apply to military trials." There is respectable authority for the view that the right to counsel is applicable ( United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (opinions of Judges Quinn and Ferguson); Griffiths v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 691; Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 [107 Ct.Cl. 650]; Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 293) as well as for the contrary view ( United States v. Culp, supra (opinion of Judge Kilday); Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808; People ex rel. Pantano v. Sheriff of City of New York, 38 Misc.2d 879 [238 N.Y.Supp.2d 886]; Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill or Rights: The Original Practice, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 49). There is also an apparent lack of appellate court authority in California as to whether the state constitutional guarantee of right to counsel applies to military trials, although similar state constitutional provisions in New York and Nevada have been held applicable to court-martial proceedings.