Opinion
No. 1991507.
Decided January 5, 2001.
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, CV-99-801; Court of Civil Appeals, 2990308.
Betty Batchelor and J.D. Brown sued Orwood Yates and Travis Yates, as personal representatives of the estate of David Yates, deceased, alleging that they had intentionally interfered with an expectancy in an inheritance or gift. The circuit court dismissed the case, holding that even if the facts in the complaint were true, Batchelor and Brown had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Civil Appeals, on March 10, 2000, affirmed that dismissal, without an opinion.Batchelor v. Yates (No. 2990308), ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Civ.App. 2000) (table). We granted certiorari review. We reverse and remand.
Facts
Batchelor and Brown are the niece and nephew, respectively, of Christine Belcher. They allege these additional facts in their amended complaint:
"Christine Belcher and Leland Belcher were married for approximately 40 years and had no children. Leland Belcher predeceased Christine Belcher and she married David Yates prior to 1995.
"On or about October 3, 1995, Christine Belcher Yates retained Honorable Thomas A. Nettles, IV, an attorney, to draft a Last Will and Testament. Christine Belcher Yates and Mr. Nettles met several times over the course of many months in order to discuss the contents of her Will.
"On or about July 28, 1997, Christine Belcher Yates was in the hospital for a heart condition. Mr. Nettles and Davis S. Burton, Jr., the accountant for Christine Belcher Yates, took a draft of the Will prepared by Mr. Nettles to the hospital for execution.
"At said time and place, Christine Belcher Yates was alert and competent and told Mr. Nettles to make certain changes to the Will, which included donations to certain charitable organizations and the designation of the recipients of the remaining principal of a `Family Trust" created by said Will. She directed that the remaining principal of said trust should be distributed to her `heirs' as determined by state law of intestate succession.
"After the above-described meeting, Mr. Nettles made the changes to the Will as requested by Christine Belcher Yates, which resulted in the `Last Will and Testament of Christine Belcher Yates' attached hereto as Exhibit `A' [not included with this opinion].
"On or about the following day, July 29, 1997, Mr. Nettles had a telephone conversation with David Yates. Mr. Yates told Mr. Nettles in a loud and angry voice that he did not appreciate Mr. Nettles and Mr. Burton going to the hospital in order to get Christine Belcher Yates to sign her Will and otherwise objected to their efforts in having said Will executed. After Mr. Yates had finished speaking, he ended the telephone conversation without waiting for a reply from Mr. Nettles.
"As a direct and proximate result of said telephone conversation, Mr. Nettles did not attempt to contact Christine Belcher Yates in order for her to execute the revised Will as she had requested.
"Christine Belcher Yates died intestate on September 2, 1997. Her second spouse, David Yates, inherited the entire estate of Christine Belcher Yates."
David Yates died shortly afterward, and his heirs, to the exclusion of Christine's heirs, inherited all his assets.
Batchelor and Brown sued the "Estate of David Yates," alleging intentional interference with an expectancy in an inheritance or gift. They amended their complaint to name as defendants Orwood Yates and Travis Yates, the personal representatives of the estate of David Yates.
Discussion
"A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief under some cognizable theory of law." Morton v. Prescott, 564 So.2d 913, 916 (Ala. 1990). "This Court must review [a motion] to dismiss in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all reasonable doubts in his favor." Thermal Components, Inc. v. Golden, 716 So.2d 1166, 1167 (Ala. 1998). Batchelor and Brown ask this Court to recognize a separate claim in tort for intentional interference with an expectancy in an inheritance or gift. This Court has previously addressed this issue inHolt v. First National Bank of Mobile, 418 So.2d 77 (Ala. 1982). Although in Holt the Court affirmed the judgment dismissing the complaint, it did not rule out the possibility that it would recognize a cause of action for intentional interference with an expectancy in an inheritance or gift. Rather, it concluded that the facts of that case were too weak to warrant the Court's recognizing such a cause of action.
Three specific factors in Holt led this Court not to recognize interference as a cause of action: (1) the original complaint had been filed 15 years after the promise to convey was alleged to have been made; (2) the alleged tortfeasor was dead; and (3) no written evidence indicated either the intent to convey or the interference. In this present case, however, the complaint was filed upon the discovery of the alleged interference and the plaintiffs presented written evidence of the would-be testator's intent, specifically, a copy of the unexecuted will. While David Yates, the person alleged to have interfered, is dead, the lawyer involved in drafting the will can testify as to the events that transpired while Christine Belcher Yates was hospitalized — the events the plaintiffs allege prevented the lawyer from getting the will executed. The facts alleged in the complaint present a proper case for this Court to determine whether Alabama will recognize a cause of action for intentional interference with an expectancy in an inheritance or gift. After considering that question, we recognize as a tort, supporting an independent cause of action, one's intentional interference with another's expectancy in an inheritance or gift.
Many of the jurisdictions already recognizing this cause of action this statement in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1977): "One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift." This Court has stated that "[f]or [an] action to lie, the defendant must have used independently tortious means to interfere with the testator's intent." Holt, 418 So.2d at 79 (citingPeffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1975); and William Prosser,Law of Torts, § 130 at 951 (4th ed. 1971)).
The plaintiffs Batchelor and Brown allege that Yates interfered with, and thereby defeated, Christine Belcher Yates's intent by interfering with her contractual relationship with her lawyer. Thus, they allege that David Yates intentionally prevented her lawyer from making sure her will was executed and thereby caused Batchelor and Brown not to receive from her the inheritance or gift they say they would have received by the terms of the will. Construing the allegations in the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs Batchelor and Brown, we conclude that they have alleged in support of their claim facts that, if proved, would entitle them to relief.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the judgment of dismissal is reversed. This cause is remanded for the Court of Civil Appeals to enter an order directing proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Hooper, C.J., and Houston, Cook, and Johnstone, JJ., concur.
Maddox, See, and Lyons, JJ., dissent.
Ms. Belcher-Yates died without reviewing or signing the document that purports to be her will; the record contains no evidence that the document accurately reflects her intentions for the disposition of her property. Because it appears, therefore, that the plaintiffs cannot show that Mr. Yates's alleged interference denied them an inheritance or gift that they "would otherwise have received," I would affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1977) (defining the cause of action for tortious interference with an expectancy in an inheritance).
Section 43-8-131, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "every will shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the will." This Court has recognized that the statutory requirements are minimal and that, without the testator's signature, there can be no will. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Calhoun, 514 So.2d 895, 897 (Ala. 1987). Such requisite formalities ensure "that [the] testator has a definite and complete intention to pass his property, and to prevent, as far as possible, fraud, perjury, mistake and the chance of one instrument being substituted for another." William J. Bowe Douglas H. Parker,Page on the Law of Wills § 19.4, at 66 (1960) (emphasis added).
The main opinion states that in this case, unlike that presented byHolt v. First National Bank of Mobile, 418 So.2d 77 (Ala. 1982), "the plaintiffs presented written evidence of the would-be testator's intent, specifically, a copy of the unexecuted will." ___ So.2d at ___ (emphasis added). I disagree. Because the requirements of § 43-8-131 were not satisfied, there was no will. Although Ms. Belcher-Yates asked Mr. Nettles to make changes to the draft of her will, there is no evidence that those changes were ever approved, or even that they were ever reviewed, by Ms. Belcher-Yates. See Goldsmith v. Gates, 205 Ala. 632, 634, 88 So. 861, 863 (1921) (citing the rule in Hill v. Barge, 12 Ala. 687, 694 (1848), that "`[o]rdinarily, when a man of sound mind and memory executes a will by signing and publishing it and calling on witnesses to attest, the presumption is that he knew the contents, although it is not written by him.'"). Nor is there any evidence that Ms. Belcher-Yates did not change her mind about the disposition of her property. Because there is no written evidence of Ms. Belcher-Yates's "definite and complete intent" to pass her property in the manner described in the revised document, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim of tortious interference with an expectancy.
Several of our sister states have recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with an expectancy in an inheritance, the cause of action a majority of this Court recognizes today. See, e.g., Wickert v. Burggraf, 214 Wis.2d 426, 570 N.W.2d 889 (Wis.App. 1997); Doughty v. Morris, 117 N.M. 284, 871 P.2d 380 (N.M.App. 1994); Firestone v. Galbreath, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, 616 N.E.2d 202 (1993); In re Estate of Knowlson, 204 Ill. App.3d 454, 149 Ill. Dec. 813, 562 N.E.2d 277 (1990);Hammons v. Eisert, 745 S.W.2d 253 (Mo.App. 1988) (surveying other state courts that recognize the cause of action). Those courts recognizing this cause of action require that a plaintiff prove some degree of force, coercion, or fraud in order to recover for a tortious interference with an expected inheritance. For example, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has required that a plaintiff prove the following elements: "(1) the existence of an expectancy; (2) a reasonable certainty that the expectancy would have been realized, but for the interference; (3) intentional interference with that expectancy; (4) tortious conduct involved with interference, such as fraud, duress, or undue influence; and (5) damages." Doughty, 117 N.M. at 288, 871 P.2d at 384.
Our sister courts also analogize tortious interference with an expectancy in an inheritance to tortious interference with existing or prospective contractual relations. Alabama has for years recognized a cause of action for intentional interference with business or contractual relations. To recover under that cause of action, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: "(1) The existence of a contract or business relation; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract or business relation; (3) intentional interference by the defendant with the plaintiff's contract or business relation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's interference." Barber v. Business Prods. Ctr., Inc., 677 So.2d 223, 227 (Ala. 1996). In addition, this Court requires that a plaintiff seeking to recover under that cause of action "produce substantial evidence of fraud, force, or coercion on the defendant's part" in interfering with the business or contractual relations. Id. See, also, Joe Cooper Assocs., Inc. v. Central Life Assurance Co., 614 So.2d 982 (Ala. 1992).
If this Court is to recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with an expectancy in an inheritance, then I think it should require a plaintiff to produce substantial evidence of force, duress, coercion, undue influence, or fraud on the part of the defendant, just as this Court already requires a plaintiff to do in an action alleging intentional interference with contractual relations and just as our sister states have required in regard to the cause of action for tortious interference with an expectancy in an inheritance. I dissent because, in my opinion, the plaintiffs in the case before us have presented no evidence of force, duress, coercion, undue influence, or fraud on David Yates's part that could be considered a tortious interference with his wife's relationship with her attorney. The plaintiffs' only allegation suggesting such evidence is their allegation that in a telephone conversation, David Yates told his wife's attorney, Mr. Nettles, "in a loud and angry voice that he did not appreciate Mr. Nettles and Mr. Burton going to the hospital in order to get Christine Belcher Yates to sign her Will and otherwise objected to their efforts in having said Will executed." ___ So.2d at ___ (quoting the amended complaint). Even if the evidence proved this allegation, which suggests no threat, I would not consider that evidence to be "substantial evidence" of force, duress, coercion, undue influence, or fraud. Thus, I conclude, as this Court did in regard to the plaintiffs in Holt v. First National Bank of Mobile, 418 So.2d 77 (Ala. 1982), that the plaintiffs in this present case can prove no set of facts that would support their claim, and that the facts alleged do not warrant our recognizing at this time a cause of action for tortious interference with an inheritance.
Maddox, J., concurs.