Ex Parte Balderas

8 Citing cases

  1. Ex Parte Chunn

    881 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App. 1994)   Cited 7 times

    As an element of due process, when a trial court assesses criminal punishment for contempt that is probated until the compliance hearing, the trial court may not impose punishment at the compliance hearing that is greater than was originally assessed. Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261, 263-64 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding). Accordingly, in the present case, the trial court could not lawfully increase the punishment at the compliance hearing from a fine to imprisonment, for relator's contemptuous conduct committed prior to the March 11 hearing.

  2. In re Newby

    370 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App. 2012)   Cited 12 times

    RPI cites four cases in her response for the proposition that instead of holding that the contempt order is void, we may modify it instead so that the sentence does not exceed 180 days. See In re Villanueva, 56 S.W.3d 905 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Pierre, 50 S.W.3d 554 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Patillo, 32 S.W.3d 907 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding). However, none of these cases controls: Villanueva and Patillo are both civil contempt cases, Pierre involves an improper condition of community supervision, and in Balderas, the trial court's written order did not conform to its oral pronouncement of sentence. Villanueva, 56 S.W.3d at 910;Pierre, 50 S.W.3d at 557–59;Patillo, 32 S.W.3d at 909–11;Balderas, 804 S.W.2d at 263–64.

  3. In re Newby

    NO. 02-12-00145-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 6, 2012)

    RPI cites four cases in her response for the proposition that instead of holding that the contempt order is void, we may modify it instead so that the sentence does not exceed 180 days. See In re Villanueva, 56 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Pierre, 50 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Patillo, 32 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding). However, none of these cases controls: Villanueva and Patillo are both civil contempt cases, Pierre involves an improper condition of community supervision, and in Balderas, the trial court's written order did not conform to its oral pronouncement of sentence.

  4. In re Patillo

    32 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App. 2000)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that when a trial court lists each failure to comply with an order separately and assesses a separate punishment for each failure to comply, only the invalid portion of the contempt order is void and the remainder of the contempt order is enforceable

    Where a trial court lists each failure to comply with an order separately and assesses a separate punishment for each failure to comply, only the invalid portion of the contempt order is void and the remainder of the contempt order is enforceable.See Ex parte Hudson, 917 S.W.2d 24, 26-27 (Tex. 1996); Ex parte Carey, 704 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Tex. 1986); Ex parte Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d 220, 225-26 (Tex. 1968); In re Aarons, 10 S.W.3d 833, 834 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Arnold, 926 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Linder, 783 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Myrick, 474 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, orig. proceeding). We find no infirmity in the provisions of the Order assessing ninety days incarceration for criminal contempt.

  5. Ex parte Phillips

    No. 12-23-00148-CV (Tex. App. Jul. 21, 2023)

    Because contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, Texas law holds that such proceedings should "conform as nearly as practicable to those in criminal cases." Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Sanchez, 703 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. 1986) (when the trial court revokes probation of sentence for contempt, court may impose punishment no greater than was originally assessed)).

  6. Locascio v. State

    No. 01-99-00858-CR (Tex. App. Apr. 20, 2000)

    We agree that the trial court was without the authority to sentence appellant to confinement for five years when he was originally sentenced only to three years confinement. See Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 42.12, § 23(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000); Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261, 263-4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding). The only issue concerns the appropriate remedy for the trial court's imposition of a sentence greater than the sentence originally given. Under Rule 43.2(b), this Court has the authority to reform or modify the judgment of the trial court and affirm the judgment as modified.

  7. Weed v. State

    891 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App. 1995)   Cited 21 times
    Noting that the availability of the full range of punishment arises in the revocation of deferred adjudication but not with revocation of straight probation

    See Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Our interpretation of article 42.12 gives full play to those due process rights, and prevents a trial court from essentially re-adjudicating guilt in the absence of a formal proceeding. See Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261, 263-64 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (trial court violated relator's due process to assess punishment for contempt, probate the punishment in part, and thereafter revoke the probation, then impose a greater sentence than originally assessed). Commonly recognized due process rights for probationers include: (1) written notice of the alleged violations; (2) disclosure to probationer of evidence against him; (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present evidence; (4) the right of confrontation and cross-examination; (5) a neutral and detached judge; (6) a written statement by the judge as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation; and (7) right to counsel.

  8. Ex Parte Skero

    875 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    Each is distinguishable in that in none of them was the original punishment announced by a master. Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Durham, 708 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, orig. proceeding); Ex parte McNulty, 678 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, orig. proceeding). Relator's second ground for discharge from custody is overruled.