According to the rule, absent "claims of fraud, mistake, or some other invalidating cause, [a] written agreement may * * * not be varied, contradicted, or supplemented by or on account of evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, or by [subsidiary] written agreements that the terms of the principal contract do not expressly authorize." Evilsizor v. Becraft & Sons Gen. Contrs., Ltd., 156 Ohio App.3d 474, 2004-Ohio-1306, 806 N.E.2d 614, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing Galmish v. Cicchini, 90 Ohio St.3d 22, 27-28, 734 N.E.2d 782 (2000). The rule, regardless, "does not prohibit a party from introducing parol or extrinsic evidence for the purpose of proving fraudulent inducement."

{¶ 28} The parol evidence rule prohibits parties to a contract from later contradicting the express terms of the contract with evidence of other alleged or actual agreements. Katz, Teller, Brant & Hild, LPA v. Farra, 2d Dist. No. 24093, 2011-Ohio-1985, 2011 WL 1591286, ¶ 23, quoting Evilsizor v. Becraft & Sons Gen. Contrs., Ltd., 156 Ohio App.3d 474, 2004-Ohio-1306, 806 N.E.2d 614, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). Absent claims of fraud, mistake, or some other invalidating cause, the parties' written agreement may therefore not be varied, contradicted, or supplemented by or on account of evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements. Natl./RS, Inc. v. Huff, 10th Dist. No. 10AP–306, 2010-Ohio-6530, 2010 WL 5550694, ¶ 24.

Absent claims of fraud, mistake or some other invalidating cause, the parties' written agreement may therefore not be varied, contradicted, or supplemented by or on account of evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, or by written agreements which the terms of the principal contract do not expressly authorize.' " Katz, Teller, Brant & Hild, L.P.A. v. Farra, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24093, 2011-Ohio-1985, ¶ 23, quoting Evilsizor v. Becraft & Sons Gen. Contractors, Ltd., 156 Ohio App.3d 474, 2004-Ohio-1306, 806 N.E.2d 614, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). "An integration clause is essentially a contract's embodiment of the parol evidence rule, i.e., that matters occurring prior to or contemporaneous with the signing of a contract are merged into and superseded by the contract.

"The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law that prohibits parties to a contract from later contradicting the express terms of the contract with evidence of other alleged or actual agreements." Evilsizor v. Becraft Sons Gen. Contractors, Ltd., 156 Ohio App.3d 474, 2004-Ohio-1306, 806 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 12, citing Brantley Venture Partners II, L.P. v. Dauphin Deposit Bank Trust Co. (N.D.Ohio 1998), 7 F.Supp.2d 936. See, also, Galmish v. Cicchini (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 22, 734 N.E.2d 782. The addenda in the instant matter contain subsequent promises and fall outside the parol evidence rule because they are writings made after the principal contract. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Euclid Ave. Assoc. (Mar. 20, 1997), 8th Dist. No. 70779, 1997 WL 127203, at * 3, citing Am. Gen. Fin. v. Beemer (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 684, 687, 598 N.E.2d 144.

The problem with this argument is that-as the Hunters argued below- the Ohio Uniform Commercial Code ("OUCC") governed the parties' agreement to paint David's home with Rhino Shield. See Evilsizor v. Becraft &Sons Gen. Contractors, Ltd., 806 N.E.2d 614, 617 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). Under the OUCC's parol evidence rule, "[t]erms . . . set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement."

"The requirements of R.C. Chapter 1302 apply to contracts, whether oral or written." Evilsizor v. Becraft & Sons Gen. Contractors, Ltd., 156 Ohio App.3d 474, 806 N.E.2d 614, 617 (2d Dist. 2004). The existence of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is contingent on two general facts.

At least one Ohio appellate court has held that the UCC applies to a contract to paint a home. Evilsizor v. Becraft & Sons Gen. Contractors, Ltd. , 156 Ohio App.3d 474, 806 N.E.2d 614, 617 (2004). In that case, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant, a general contractor, for the defendant to furnish and apply Sherwin-Williams paint to the plaintiff's home.

The parol evidence rule "prohibits parties to a contract from later contradicting the express terms of the contract with evidence of other alleged or actual agreements." Evilsizor v. Becraft Sons Gen. Contractors, Ltd., 156 Ohio App.3d 474, 477 (Ohio App. 2004), citing Brantley Venture Parnters II, L.P. v. Dauphin Deposit Bank Trust Co., 7 F.Supp.2d 936 (N.D. Ohio 1998). The purpose of the rule is to preserve the integrity of written contracts.

There are three requirements to the creation of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose: (1) "the seller must have reason to know the buyer's particular purpose"; and (2) the seller must have "reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select appropriate goods"; and (3) "the buyer must in fact rely on the seller's skill or judgment." Evilsizor v. Becraft Sons Gen. Contrs. Ltd., 156 Ohio App. 3d 474, 478 (2004) (citing Delorise Brown, M.D., Inc. v. Allio, 86 Ohio App. 3d 359 (1993)). My analysis of this three-part test is purely a factual one: namely, do the facts support a finding that the transaction created the warranty.

{¶ 51} “The creation of an express warranty, as with any other contract, is determined by examining the intent of the parties to a particular sale and need not be expressed in written form in order to be valid.” Bales v. Isaac, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2003–CA–99, 2004-Ohio-4677, 2004 WL 1949419, fn. 8, quoting Enterprise Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Charles Svec, Inc., 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT–94–052, 1995 WL 326336 ; see also Evilsizor v. Becraft & Sons Gen. Contractors, Ltd., 156 Ohio App.3d 474, 478, 806 N.E.2d 614, 2004-Ohio-1306. An oral express warranty is governed by R.C. 2305.07.