Evicci v. Maloney

7 Citing cases

  1. Evicci v. Dennehy

    544 U.S. 1005 (2005)

    C.A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 387 F. 3d 37.

  2. Olszewski v. Spencer

    466 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2006)   Cited 66 times
    Holding that "proof of irreplaceability is required in both apparent and potential exculpatory evidence cases"

    Where the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we review the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief without deference. Evicci v. Moloney, 387 F.3d 37, 39-40 (1st Cir.2004); Correia v. Hall, 364 F.3d 385, 387-88 (1st Cir. 2004). This court's review of petitioner's claims is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").

  3. Lynch v. Ficco

    438 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2006)   Cited 139 times
    Holding that failure to object to inverting jury instruction was ineffective assistance of counsel

    Prou involved the habeas statute for prisoners in federal custody, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but Strickler itself involved a state prisoner, and the logic of Prou extends to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We so held in Evicci v. Maloney, 387 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). See id. at 40; see also Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F.3d 46, 56 n. 7 (1st Cir. 2002).

  4. Ali v. Gerry

    Civil No. 12-cv-185-JL (D.N.H. Oct. 10, 2012)   Cited 6 times

    "Ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be exhausted as to each ground alleged to constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment." Evicci v. Maloney, No. Civ.A. 99-11561-DPW, 2003 WL 21339277, *7 (D. Mass. June 4, 2003), aff'd, 387 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). To demonstrate that he has exhausted each of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Ali must show that he fairly presented to the NHSC the factual basis of each specific claim raised in the § 2254 petition.

  5. Kidd v. Blaisdell

    Civil No. 11-cv-350-JL (D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2012)

    "Ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be exhausted as to each ground alleged to constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment." Evicci v. Maloney, No. Civ.A. 99-11561-DPW, 2003 WL 21339277, *7 (D. Mass. June 4. 2003), aff'd, 387 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). To demonstrate that he has exhausted each of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Kidd must show that he fairly presented to the NHSC the factual basis of each specific claim raised in the § 2254 petition.

  6. Bader v. Warden

    Civil No. 02-cv-508-JD, Opinion No. 2005 DNH 103 (D.N.H. Jun. 29, 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Analogizing Rhines "good cause" to the "cause" needed to excuse procedural default, but also recognizing confusion among courts regarding proper standard for cause

    The meaning of "good cause" in this context has not otherwise been developed through case law, although cause has been addressed as part of the showing requried to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Evicci v. Maloney, 387 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2004). In that context, the petitioner must show "`that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.'"

  7. People v. Lewis

    2017 Ill. App. 150070 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 24 times

    ¶ 28 Many courts outside this jurisdiction have addressed, and rejected, similar issues as the one defendant raises in this appeal, finding that a defendant can not establish a reasonable probability that he was prejudiced based on counsel's failure to raise the kind of evidence proffered here. See Evicci v. Maloney , 387 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2004) (the petitioner's claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a defense based on the fact that petitioner did not contract chlamydia from the victim after the alleged rape did not establish a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different to warrant habeas relief in light of "the speculative quality of the assumed medical evidence and the substantial evidence of guilt presented by the government"); Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction , 313 Conn. 360, 98 A.3d 23, 25 (2014) (finding that the petitioner had not raised a reasonable probability of prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance based on "trial counsel's failure to investigate his claims that he had a history of various sexually transmitted diseases, to introduce medical records concerning that history, to introduce evidence concerning whether the victim had contracted any sexually transmitted diseases, and to present expert testimony concerning the transmission rates of s