See Maclean v. Williams, 116 Ga. 257, 258 ( 42 S.E. 485) (1902). However, it must be remembered that wills are made by laymen as well as professionals. Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 379 ( 24 S.E.2d 381) (1943). Warren acknowledges that Barber possessed no real property when he executed the will and used the term, there is no indication he intended to use the term in its legal sense, and the inclusion of a legal term of art is not necessarily controlling.
" In construing a will, however, it is not "always safe to turn the inquiry into a quest to discover the precise meaning of a word according to scholarly standards. . . ." Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 378 ( 24 S.E.2d 381) (1943). "`A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged. It is the skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.' [Cit.
"Bodily heirs" mean children. Starnes v. Sanders, 151 Ga. 632 ( 108 S.E. 37); Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 382 ( 24 S.E.2d 381). The only logical construction of the sentence is that the words "their bodily heirs" mean children of the testator's children who survive his death. To construe these words in accordance with the contention of the petitioners, it would be necessary to delete the word "their" and to insert words not used in the will, such as, "or the bodily heirs of deceased children."
3. Granting, but not deciding, that the allegations of the petition are sufficient to show a virtual adoption, can the petitioner recover as a child under a will devising property "to my children, share and share alike"? This court in Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 87 ( 23 S.E.2d 420, 144 A.L.R. 664), said: "Generally, the terms `issue,' `children,' `heir,' and words of similar import, in a will, are intended to refer to natural or blood relationships, and would not include an adopted child in the absence of circumstances clearly showing that the testator so intended. The artificial relation created by adoption is an unusual and exceptional one, and hence would not fall within the ordinary signification of such terms." See also Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377 ( 24 S.E.2d 381), and Brookin v. Citizens Southern National Bank, 205 Ga. 128 ( 52 S.E.2d 461). "In the matter of construing the rights of an adopted child to take under a will, it should be borne in mind that it is not a question of the right of an adopted child to inherit, but simply a question of the testator's intent with respect to those who are to share in his estate. The disposition of the courts is to confine and limit the word `children' in its application, when it occurs in a will, to its natural import, excluding adopted children, except where the testator has clearly shown by other words that he intended to use the term in a more extensive sense.
The disposition of the courts is to confine and limit the word `children' in its application, when it occurs in a will, to its natural import, excluding adopted children, except where the testator has clearly shown by other words that he intended to use the term in a more extensive sense." See also Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377 ( 24 S.E.2d 381). We think that the quotations from the Comer case, supra, are directly in point and applicable to the facts in this case.
[9] The question whether an adopted child is included within the meaning of "lawful issue" as used in a will usually turns on the particular circumstances of each case. Thus the meaning of "lawful issue" has been determined from the general scheme or purpose of a will considered as a whole ( Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 69 [ 112 A. 689]; Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 11 [ 149 A. 515, 70 A.L.R. 608]; New York Life Ins. Trust Co. v. Viele, 161 N.Y. 11, 20 [ 55 N.E. 311, 76 Am.St.Rep. 238]; Comer v. Comer, supra, 195 Ga. 79 [ 23 S.E.2d 420, 424, 144 A.L.R. 664]; Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 681 [ 142 S.W.2d 680]), or from the fact that the testator used different terms such as heirs, issue, and children interchangeably to identify the same persons ( Hall v. Crandall, 25 Del. Ch. 339 [20 A.2d 545, 547]; Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 158-159 [ 147 N.E. 788]; Cook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 644 [ 228 N.W. 629]; see Everitt v. La Speyre, 195 Ga. 377 [ 24 S.E.2d 381, 384]). Moreover, the meaning of the term has frequently been determined by the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, such as the testator's knowledge of the adoption and his approval or disapproval thereof ( Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 748 [ 136 A. 588]; Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, supra, 96 Conn. 61, 71; Munie v. Gruenewald, 289 Ill. 468, 472 [124 N.E. 605]; In re McEwan, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 147 [ 15 A.2d 340]; Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 474-475 [ 17 A.2d 517]; see notes, 70 A.L.R. 621, 144 A.L.R. 670), or the testator's knowledge of the inability of persons, whose "issue" are provided for in the will, to bear children.
It need not be shown that the monomania affected all persons and all property of the testator. If the will is the effect and result of monomania as to one person only, it can not be said that the testator was capable of bringing into mental review his family relations and the claims or obligations naturally suggested by such review. The instruction here complained of was affirmed and approved by this court in Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377 ( 24 S.E.2d 381). The charge is not subject to the criticism made. 6. On direct examination, the caveatrix was asked the following question: "How did your grandmother treat you?
Clay v. Central R. Bkg. Co., 84 Ga. 345 ( 10 S.E. 967). See also Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377 ( 24 S.E.2d 381). We are of the opinion that the exclusion clause of the policy above quoted does not relieve the defendant of liability for hospital and medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff as a result of accidental injuries to his person simply because he sustained such injuries while performing duties in the course of his employment, unless he would have a cause of action for such expenses under the Workmen's Compensation Act or similar legislation.
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S.Ct. 158, 62 L.Ed. 372 (1918) (citation omitted), quoted in Everittv. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 379, 24 S.E.2d 381 (1943) and Robbins v. Vanbrackle, 267 Ga. 871, 872, 485 S.E.2d 468 (1997) (Carley, J., dissenting). What both metaphors illustrate is that the words used to express an idea are intertwined with that idea, but distinct from it. So the words used to express an idea sometimes, and perhaps always, do so imperfectly.But Justice Lumpkin was not compelled to surrender his individual opinions.
Messrs. Walker, Walker and Jenkins, C. Walker Limehouse,Esq., P. Kramer, Esq., of Summerville, for Appellants, cite: As to the words "childless (without heirs)" whenused in a Will devising real estate to testatrix's son in fee, not being construed to include a child adopted by testatrix'sson after the execution of the Will and after testatrix'sdeath: 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851; 10 S.C.L. 321; 23 S.E.2d 420; 153 S.E.2d 114; 30 A.L.R. 1412; 70 A.L.R. 621; 144 A.L.R. 670; 86 A.L.R.2d 12; 96 A.L.R.2d 639; S.C. Code Sec. 3562 (1912); 129 S.E.2d 239; 153 S.E.2d 114; 86 A.L.R.2d 12, 60; 95 C.J.S. Sec. 653; 188 S.W.2d 1017; 195 Ga. 79, 32 S.E.2d 420; 23 S.E.2d at 424; 195 Ga. 377, 24 S.E.2d 381; 258 S.W.2d 506; 258 N.C. 590, 129 S.E.2d 239; 129 S.E.2d 242; 2 Am. Jur.2d Adoption Sec. 95, page 935. Messrs. Hammer Bernstein, of Columbia, Parler, Berry Prettyman, of St. George, for Respondents, cite: As tono intention of the testatrix to exclude a child adopted byher son after her death: 252 S.C. 1, 165 S.E.2d 77; 238 S.C. 167, 119 S.E.2d 660; 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851; 127 S.E.2d 439, 241 S.C. 155; 99 S.E.2d 187, 231 S.C. 493; 180 S.C. 138, 185 S.E. 180; 210 S.C. 47, 41 S.E.2d 393; 160 S.C. 374, 158 S.E. 733; Civ. Code 1922, Secs. 5326-5334; 13 S.C. 512, 36 Am. Rep. 716; 37 S.C. 255, 16 S.E. 122, 34 Am. St. Rep. 745; 72 S.C. 179, 51 S.E. 561, 105 S.C. 127, 89 S.E. 637; 40 Cyc. 1459; Sec. 3798, S.C. Code of Laws for 1912; 171 S.C. 408, 172 S.E. 426; 215 S.C. 552, 56 S.E.2d 354; 102 S.C. 7, 86 S.E. 211, 212; 87 S.C. 55, 68 S.E. 966, 968, 30 L.R.A., N.S., 115; 29 S.C. 466, 470, 7 S.E. 817, 819; 2 Story, Eq. Jur., Sec. 1069; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., Sec. 1014; 109 U.S. 725, 3 Ct. 575 (