Ultimately, resolution of the question of proximate cause is generally for the trier of fact. Estate of Joshua T., 150 N.H. at 408.The dispute before us centers upon a somewhat narrow time frame, starting with the doctor's appointments on March 26 and March 28 and concluding at the time of Mr. Beckles' fall on April 6. It is our task to review whether the summary judgment record, including the expert testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs as the non-moving parties, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, see Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 159 N.H. 232, 234, 979 A.2d 760 (2009), would be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's conclusion that the causal link between the defendants' alleged negligence and Mr. Beckles' fall probably existed, see Bronson, 140 N.H. at 801.As an initial matter, we note that defendants Dr. Madden, Dr. Lesser, Foundation Medical Partners and Foundation Neurology contest whether an opinion letter authored by one plaintiff expert, Dr. Fischer, should be considered part of the summary judgment record, arguing that “[r]eliance on the unsworn disclosure is inappropriate.”

This statement in Grady was despite the fact that the Court had previously cited § 324A in support of its analysis in other cases. SeeEveritt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 159 N.H. 232, 237-38 (2009); VanDeMark v. McDonald's Corp., 153 N.H. 753, 757 (2006); Williams v. O'Brien, 140 N.H. 595, 599-600 (1995); Corson v. Liberty Mut. Ins.Co., 110 N.H. 210, 213-14 (1970).

Under New Hampshire law, a negligence claim must be based on a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 159 N.H. 232, 235-36 (2009). "Whether a duty exists in a particular case is a question of law."

Boston Minuteman is also entitled to summary judgment on the alternative ground that it had no duty to warn Reed of the dangers of sledding. Whether a duty exists in a particular set of circumstances is a question of law to be decided by the court.See, e.g., Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., ___ N.H. ___, 979 A.2d 760, 762 (N.H. 2009). As a matter of law, "a defendant generally has no duty to warn and instruct a plaintiff of obvious dangers about which the plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation equal the defendant's."

We have referenced Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in several cases and conclude that it is consistent with our analysis of whether liability exists in these circumstances. See, e.g., Grady v. Jones Lang LaSalle Constr. Co., 171 N.H. 203, 211, 193 A.3d 283 (2018) ; Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 159 N.H. 232, 237-38, 979 A.2d 760 (2009) ; VanDeMark v. McDonald's Corp., 153 N.H. 753, 757, 904 A.2d 627 (2006) ; Williams v. O'Brien, 140 N.H. 595, 599-600, 669 A.2d 810 (1995) ; Corson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 210, 213-14, 265 A.2d 315 (1970). Section 324A provides:

At least thirty-six state supreme courts have cited § 317 favorably, many explicitly adopting it. See e.g., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287–88 (Colo.1988) (en banc); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 361 n. 14 (Fla.2002) ; Wong–Leong v. Hawaiian Indep. Refinery, Inc., 76 Hawai‘i 433, 879 P.2d 538, 549–51 (1994) ; Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 195 Ill.2d 210, 253 Ill.Dec. 632, 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1179–86 (2000) ; Gariup Const. Co. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (Ind.1988) ; Thies v. Cooper, 243 Kan. 149, 753 P.2d 1280, 1285 (1988) ; Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 850 (Ky.2005) ; Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208, 1222 (Me.2005) ; Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 47 A.3d 560, 575–76 (2012) ; Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Minn.1992) ; Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo.1997) (en banc); Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 159 N.H. 232, 979 A.2d 760, 764–65 (2009) ; Nelson v. Gillette, 571 N.W.2d 332, 340–41 (N.D.1997) ; Vance v. Consol. R. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 222, 652 N.E.2d 776, 790 (1995) ; Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Okla. City, 188 P.3d 158, 170–71 (Okla.2008) ; Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 246 A.2d 418, 419–21 (1968) ; James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 377 S.C. 628, 661 S.E.2d 329, 330 (2008) ; Iverson v. NPC Intern., Inc., 801 N.W.2d 275, 281 (S.D.2011) ; Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 313 (Tex.1983) ; Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 157 Vt. 477, 601 A.2d 978, 981 (1991) ; Niece v. Elmview Grp. Home, 131 Wash.2d 39, 929 P.2d 420, 427 (1997) (en banc); Shafer v. TNT Well Serv. Inc., 285 P.3d 958, 966 (Wyo.2012). ¶ 33 Section 317 recognizes a “special relationship” basis for a duty of an employer to exercise reasonable care in preventing an employee from acting outside the scope of employment in “intentionally harming others.”

“When reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, we consider the affidavits and other evidence, and inferences properly drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 159 N.H. 232, 234, 979 A.2d 760 (2009). “If this review does not reveal any genuine issues of material fact, i.e., facts that would affect the outcome of the litigation, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm.”