Opinion
CV 20-9896 RGK (AS)
03-09-2021
RICHARD C. EVERETT, Plaintiff, v. PAROLE BOARD, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On October 22, 2020, Richard C. Everett (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a purported civil rights complaint (“Complaint”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against the “Parole Board, ” Atascadero State Hospital (“ASH”), the “Director of Hospital” and “Psychologys Doctors.” (Dkt. No. 1). On October 27, 2020, the Eastern District transferred the Complaint to this Court. (Dkt. No. 3).
For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint must be dismissed with leave to amend.
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff's Complaint is difficult to understand. When asked to identify the constitutional or federal right violated, Plaintiff writes only “8, ” presumably meaning he is attempting to raise an Eighth Amendment violation. (Complaint at 3). He also checks a box identifying the issue involved as “threat to safety” and suggests he does not meet all the requirements to be considered a Mentally Disordered Offender (“MDO”) because the only crimes he has been convicted of are felony battery in 2014, terrorist threats in 2010, illegal possession of stolen things in 1989, and misdemeanor batteries in 1997 and 2004. (Id. at 3-5). Plaintiff also states he wants to file a lawsuit against ASH for abusing its authority and for psychological and emotional torture and abuse. (Id. at 5).
“An offender is eligible for commitment under the [Mentally Disordered Offenders Act, California Penal Code (“P.C.”) §§ 2960 et seq.] if all of the following six factors are met: (1) the prisoner has a severe mental disorder; (2) the prisoner used force or violence in committing the underlying offense; (3) the prisoner had a disorder which caused or was an aggravating factor in committing the offense; (4) the disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; (5) the prisoner was treated for the disorder for at least 90 days in the year before being paroled; and (6) because of the disorder, the prisoner poses a serious threat of physical harm to other people.” May v. Hunter, 451 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2006); P.C. § 2962.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to sua sponte review and must be dismissed if it is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (Section 1915(e)(2) applies to all complaints brought by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if Plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). Although Plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the [complaint] need only give the [Defendants] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014); Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94, construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the pleading party, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). Pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts' treatment of pro se filings; accordingly, we continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.”). Dismissal for failure to state a claim can be warranted based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). A complaint may also be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it discloses some fact or complete defense that will necessarily defeat the claim. Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
The Court has reviewed the Complaint under the aforementioned standards and has concluded the Complaint is deficient and must be dismissed with leave to amend.
Initially, it is unclear whether the pending action is properly filed as a civil rights complaint. If Plaintiff is attempting to challenge his commitment to ASH and is seeking release from such commitment, his exclusive remedy is a habeas corpus petition. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[D]etainees under an involuntary civil commitment scheme . . . may use a § 2254 habeas petition to challenge a term of confinement.”); Hubbs v. Alamao, 360 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[A] civil committee . . . cannot seek to overturn his civil commitment proceedings in a civil rights action for damages and injunctive relief.”); Swinger v. Harris, 2016 WL 4374941, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“If Plaintiff wishes to challenge his commitment to ASH as an MDO, his federal remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after he has exhausted his state remedies.”). However, if Plaintiff is attempting to challenge his conditions of confinement at ASH, such an action may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 499; Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Assuming Plaintiff is attempting to bring a Section 1983 claim, such claim is deficient and must be dismissed with leave to amend. First, Plaintiff's Complaint does not comply with basic pleading requirements. See American Ass'n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000) (A “pro se litigant is not excused from knowing the most basic pleading requirements.”). For instance, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[, ]” and that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). “The ‘short and plain statement' must provide the defendant with ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (citation omitted); see also Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[A] pleading must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly.” (citation and internal punctuation omitted)). Here, however, Plaintiff's allegations are so vague and conclusory that it is impossible to determine exactly what he is complaining about or even if he is trying to raise a Section 1983 claim at all.
Additionally, the Complaint violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3), which requires Plaintiff to include “a demand for the relief sought[.]” The pending Complaint does not identify the relief Plaintiff seeks. “The failure to indicate what in particular [the] plaintiff[] seek[s] by way of [relief] is in itself a failure to state a claim.” Conkey v. Reno, 885 F.Supp. 1389, 1392 (D. Nev. 1995); Henderson v. Moore, 2017 WL 10545138, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
Moreover, Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a) requires that the “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties.” Here, Plaintiff names three defendants in the body of his Complaint - the Parole Board, the “Director of Hospital, ” and “Psychologys Doctors, ” but lists only the Parole Board and Atascadero State Hospital in the Complaint's title. This does not satisfy Rule 10(a). See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-63 (9th Cir. 1992).
Furthermore, ASH is a state hospital under the jurisdiction of the California State Department of Mental Health. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 4100(a), 7200(b). The Eleventh Amendment bars Section 1983 actions in federal court by a citizen against a state or its agencies unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has overridden that immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that ‘§ 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity[.]'” Dittman v. State of Cal., 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Brown v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars any Section 1983 claims against ASH. Brown, 554 F.3d at 752; Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1026.
ORDER
Plaintiff's Complaint (Docket No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Plaintiff intended to file a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the conditions of his confinement and he still wishes to pursue such Complaint, he shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days, which cures the pleading defects discussed herein. The First Amended Complaint shall be complete in itself without reference to any pleading or other document. See Local Rule 15-2 (“Every amended pleading filed as a matter of right or allowed by order of the Court shall be complete including exhibits. The amended pleading shall not refer to the prior, superseded pleading.”). In addition, the First Amended Complaint may not include new defendants or claims not reasonably related to the allegations in the previously filed Complaint.
If Plaintiff is challenging his commitment to ASH and is seeking release from such commitment, he may file a habeas corpus petition, but should only do so after he has exhausted his state court remedies.
Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file a First Amended Complaint, or failure to correct the deficiencies described herein, will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with a court order. Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action in its entirety or with respect to particular defendants, he may file a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). See Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 687-88 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rule 41(a)(1) “does not allow for piecemeal dismissals” but instead “governs dismissals of entire actions” and also allows “the dismissal of all claims against one defendant, so that a defendant may be dismissed from the entire action”; on the other hand, “withdrawals of individual claims against a given defendant are governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, which addresses amendments to pleadings.” (emphasis omitted)). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience.