Eveready v. Freight v. Pub. Util

7 Citing cases

  1. J. C. Trucking v. Public Utilities Comm'n

    776 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1989)   Cited 1 times

    For example, the broad language of section 40-10-101(4)(a) may be construed to permit the Commission to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity to common carriers granting such carriers authority to perform call and demand service. See Eveready Freight Serv., Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 577, 449 P.2d 642 (1969) (based on predecessor to current statutory scheme). It might also be argued that, pursuant to the "or otherwise" language of section 40-10-101(4)(a), the Commission has authority to grant both common carriers as well as Class B contract carriers authority to provide call and demand services on a contract basis.

  2. East West Resort Transportation, LLC v. Binz

    494 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Colo. 2007)   Cited 1 times
    Noting that for intrastate transportation to qualify as interstate service subject to federal regulation, thereby preempting regulation by the state, it "may not operate independently of the interstate service, but instead must be conducted as part of existing interstate service"

    The Commission provides scant authority for its proposition that "regularly scheduled" must mean a "pure," "reliable, chronological" schedule. Citing Eveready Freight Service, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 449 P.2d 642, 644 (Colo. 1969), the Commission contends that "scheduled operations must entail the concept of a regular time schedule previously announced as to time of departure and arrival between definitely established points regardless of whether there are passengers or freight to be carried." However, Eveready addressed a situation where the carrier conceded it did not run scheduled operations on a particular route, running them only "on request at that time" due to the paucity of need for that route.

  3. Bethke v. Edson Exp., Inc.

    459 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Colo. 1978)   Cited 1 times

    17. Edson is also operating in clear and patent violation of the limitation in its certificate of registration which provides for service on "call and demand," and which by necessary implication precludes operating on schedule. The distinction between scheduled and call-and-demand service, as these terms are used in operating authorities issued by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, was clearly set forth in Eveready Freight Service v. PUC, 167 Colo. 577, 449 P.2d 642 (1969). The definition of scheduled service set forth in that case was found to be applicable to the certificate of registration under which Edson is operating by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Overland Motor Express, Inc. v. Englewood Transit Company, supra. Edson is admittedly transporting interstate freight under this certificate of registration in vehicles which are operated in accordance with time schedules on file with the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. The transportation of interstate shipments under this certificate of registration has become an integral part of Edson's scheduled operation.

  4. Salida Transfer Co. v. P.U.C

    792 P.2d 809 (Colo. 1990)

    J.C. Trucking, Inc., 776 P.2d at 373. We differentiated scheduled service from call and demand service in J.C. Trucking, Inc., 776 P.2d at 373 (quoting Eveready Freight Service, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 167 Colo. 577, 581, 449 P.2d 642, 644 (1969)), as follows: "It seems clear to us that any definition of 'scheduled operations' must entail the concept of service on a regular time schedule previously announced as to time of departure and arrival between definitely established points regardless of whether there are passengers or freight to be carried. It is because a scheduled carrier must operate its equipment — whether fully loaded or not — that distinguishes it from the common carrier offering only call and demand service; and the risks and burdens entailed in such 'scheduled operation' are what entitles the former carrier to protection.

  5. Sangre De Cristo Electric Ass'n v. Public Utilities Commission

    185 Colo. 321 (Colo. 1974)   Cited 8 times

    Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. PUC, 182 Colo. 269, 513 P.2d 721. [2] We have consistently adhered to the principle that where there is competent evidence to support the findings of the Commission, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. North Eastern Motor Freight Inc. v. PUC, 178 Colo. 433, 498 P.2d 923; Aspen Airways, Inc. v. PUC, 169 Colo. 56, 453 P.2d 789; Eveready Freight Service, Inc. v. PUC, 167 Colo. 577, 449 P.2d 642; B.D.C. Corp. of Colo. v. PUC, 167 Colo. 472, 488 P.2d 615; Airport Limousine Service, Inc. v. Cabs, Inc., 167 Colo. 378, 447 P.2d 978. [3] Upon the record here, the continuation by the Commission of Public Service's right to serve industrial loads in the territory in question is amply supported by the evidence.

  6. Answerphone, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission

    185 Colo. 175 (Colo. 1974)   Cited 6 times

    "The protestant] . . . first argues that the evidence adduced during the hearings before the Commission is not sufficient to support the Commission's decision. In examining this contention, we do so in the light of the rule in Colorado that findings and conclusions of the Commission based on questions of fact which are in dispute, when supported by competent evidence in the record, must not be disturbed by a reviewing court, and in such circumstances the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Aspen Airways, Inc. vs. Public Utilities Commission, 169 Colo. 56, 453 P.2d 789; Eveready Freight Service vs. Public Utilities Commission, 167 Colo. 577, 449 P.2d 642; B.D.C. Corp. of Colo. vs. Public Utilities Commission, 167 Colo. 472, 448 P.2d 615; Airport Limousine Service, Inc. vs. Cabs, Inc., 167 Colo. 378, 447 P.2d 978."

  7. No. East'n v. Pub. Util

    498 P.2d 923 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 14 times

    North Eastern first argues that the evidence adduced during the hearings before the Commission is not sufficient to support the Commission's decision. In examining this contention, we do so in the light of the rule in Colorado that findings and conclusions of the Commission based on questions of fact which are in dispute, when supported by competent evidence in the record, must not be disturbed by a reviewing court, and in such circumstances the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Aspen Airways, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm., 169 Colo. 56, 453 P.2d 789; Eveready Freight Service v. Public Utilities Comm., 167 Colo. 577, 449 P.2d 642; B.D.C. Corp. of Colo. v. Public Utilities Comm., 167 Colo. 472, 448 P.2d 615; Airport Limousine Service, Inc., v. Cabs, Inc., 167 Colo. 378, 447 P.2d 978. [2-4] This is a classic case for the application of the above stated rule.