See Head v. Phillips Camper Sales Rental, Inc., 234 Mich. App. 94, 111, 593 N.W.2d 595 (1999); Pamar Enterprises, Inc. v. Huntington Banks of Michigan, 228 Mich. App. 727, 733, 580 N.W.2d 11 (1998). A conversion may be partial, as where the owner's property is returned after being wrongfully retained for a period of time under claim of lien where there was no lien. Even-Heat Co. v. Wade Electric Products Co., 336 Mich. 564, 572, 58 N.W.2d 923 (1953). To be held liable under M.C.L. § 600.2919a, the defendant must have known that the property at issue was stolen, embezzled, or converted.

As our Supreme Court has explained, conversion does not require a complete and absolute deprivation of property, and a partial or temporary deprivation is sufficient for purposes of conversion. Even-Heat Co v Wade Electric Prods Co, 336 Mich 564, 572; 58 NW2d 923 (1953). In addition, the evidence adduced at trial supported the conclusion that Temperance's exercise of dominion was wrongful.

There may be a deprivation that is only temporary, as where the plaintiff's personal property is restored to him. Even-Heat Co v Wade Electric Products Co, 336 Mich. 564, 572; 58 N.W.2d 923 (1953). A check is considered the personal property of the designated payee.

As Mitchell notes, “even ‘temporary' conversion gives rise to a valid cause of action.” (ECF No. 38, PageID.908); see also Even-Heat Co. v. Wade Elec. Prods. Co., 58 N.W.2d 923 (Mich. 1953) (“But conversion does not necessarily imply a complete and absolute deprivation of property; there may be a deprivation which is only partial or temporary, and where the property of the plaintiff remains in or is restored to him.”). Mitchell demanded the parts and tooling as early as September 20, 2021 (ECF No. 1-9, PageID.134), but never received them. Because even a temporary conversion is actionable, it is not clear why the workers' seizure of the tooling at some point after Mitchell made its demand for the tooling-especially a seizure that occurred after the complaint was filed, and after the stipulation unequivocally directed the release of the tooling-would moot these claims.

It is not clear what, if any, damages inure to defendant/counter-plaintiff on this claim, and none is specified in its pleading; nonetheless, this matter presents a triable issue of fact. SeeEven–Heat Co. v. Wade Elec. Products Co. , 336 Mich. 564, 572, 58 N.W.2d 923 (1953) (Conversion may be found in cases where “there may be a deprivation which is only partial or temporary, and where the property of the plaintiff remains in or is restored to him,” and in such cases damages are “commonly less” than the whole value of the property.). V. CONCLUSION

Id. (citing Even-Heat Co. v. Wade Elec. Prods. Co., 336 Mich. 564, 572, 58 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Mich. 1953)). Oasis does not appear to dispute that the gas stations in question displayed Marathon's marks and signage, or that Hardy was prevented from entering the respective properties to recover Marathon's signage in early October 2010.

Debtor may alternatively elect to have her Equipment returned, in which case her recovery will be reduced in full or in part by the market value of each piece of Equipment that is returned. See Even–Heat Co. v. Wade Elec. Products Co., 336 Mich. 564, 573, 58 N.W.2d 923 (1953) (permitting the converter to mitigate damages by returning converted property); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts: Return or Tender of Converted Chattel § 922 (1979) (providing that the court in its discretion may mitigate conversion damages by ordering return of property). She is not entitled to both damages and possession, as this would constitute an improper double-recovery.